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People v. Green

California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, First Division
Feb 1, 2011
No. D056644 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 1, 2011)

Opinion


THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. WALTER OYA GREEN, Defendant and Appellant. D056644 California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, First Division February 1, 2011

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County No. RIF100431, Michele D. Levine, Judge.

HUFFMAN, J.

A jury convicted Walter Green of nine counts of committing lewd acts on four of his stepdaughters or daughters under the age of 14 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)), plus one count of forcibly committing a lewd act on another daughter under the age of 14 (§ 288, subd. (b)). Additionally, the jury found true that Green had committed an offense described in section 667.61, subdivision (e)(5) against more than one victim. Green admitted two prison priors. (§ 667.5, subd. (b).)

All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.

The trial court sentenced Green to a total prison term of 104 years to life, composed of indeterminate terms of 15 years to life, consecutively, on each of counts 1 through 5 and 12. As a determinate sentence, the court imposed six years on count 13, plus consecutive two-year terms for each of counts 14, 16, and 17. (§ 288, subds. (a), (b).) Additionally, one consecutive year term was ordered for each of the two prison priors. (§ 667.5, subd. (b).)

Green appeals, contending that as to count 14 only (lewd act upon his stepdaughter N. while she was under 14 years of age), the trial court prejudicially abused its discretion in admitting evidence of other uncharged sexual offenses committed by Green on N. while she was older than 14 (until she was 17). (Evid. Code, §§ 1101, 1108.) According to Green, at the in limine stages of the proceedings, he raised general and specific Evidence Code 352 objections to the admission of uncharged sexual offenses, and these were sufficient to require the trial court, at a later time, to exclude N.'s testimony about those other events.

On this record, we determine the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted such evidence of uncharged sexual offenses against N., because the general objections raised by Green under Evidence Code section 352 at the in limine stage of the proceedings were adequately dealt with by the trial court, but when the evidence came in later, it was without any objection that would have allowed the trial court to make a more informed or timely exercise of discretion. The evidence of sexual offenses committed against N. after she reached the age of 14 essentially came in without objection, and Green has forfeited arguments on appeal challenging that evidence as unduly prejudicial.

In any case, the evidence was not erroneously admitted, because it was relevant under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b) to show Green's intent and also his identity as the perpetrator, since during one or more of the sexual offenses, he had claimed he mistook his stepdaughter for his wife. This evidence also met the criteria required under Evidence Code section 1108, to show propensity to commit such acts, and the record does not show any resulting jury confusion or undue prejudice. (Evid. Code, § 352.) We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Green challenges only his conviction on count 14, regarding his stepdaughter N., solely on evidentiary grounds. He does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions, and we refer only generally to the underlying facts, and only for the purpose of evaluating his evidentiary error claims about similar uncharged conduct.

A. Background

At the time these offenses were committed, approximately between 1992 and 2001, Green was living off and on at various locations with E. (Mother), the mother of N. and her two sisters, L. and Sh. (Green's three stepdaughters). From 1992 through 1997, Green and Mother also had five children together, four of them girls: S., A., K., and M. These charges of sexual offenses involved all seven of the girls, but convictions were obtained about only five of them.

The jury did not reach verdicts on counts involving A. or M., and a mistrial was declared. The prosecution ultimately dismissed those counts (counts 6-11, 15, lewd acts upon a young child, as to A. and M.).

In broad outline, the evidence showed that Green and Mother met in 1989, when N. was eight or nine years old, and her two sisters were ages seven and four. Green was in the Marine Corps, living in the vicinity of Twentynine Palms. He started living with Mother about that time, and left the military. Over the next few years, he moved in and out of her home five or six times, sometimes to or from prison.

Until 1995, N. and her two sisters lived with a guardian, since Mother had drug problems, but the sisters visited Mother and Green occasionally. In 1995, N. and her two sisters came to live with Green and Mother in Hemet. By then, Green and Mother had four more girls, S., A., K., and M., and in 1997, their boy D. was born.

After 1995, the family moved from dwelling to dwelling about once a year, going to Perris, Mead Valley, and again to Perris in 1999. By 1999, N. (no longer a minor) had moved out, but she still stayed with the family occasionally. In 2000, they all moved to another apartment in Perris, and then to Moreno Valley. During his time with Mother, Green was inappropriately touching the female children in various ways, as will be described.

B. In Limine Proceedings on Admissibility of Prior Uncharged Sexual Misconduct Incidents

Before the jury was selected, the court heard the prosecutor's motions in limine regarding her intent to introduce testimony about prior uncharged sexual offenses against one of the stepdaughters, L., approximately three years before L. and her sisters moved in with Mother and Green in 1995. (Evid. Code, § 1108.) The written motion described at least three incidents: (1) Green digitally penetrated L.'s vagina and rubbed his penis between her buttocks (when she was seven), (2) two years later, he put his hands and face in her vaginal area, and (3) he sat her on his lap in the car while he had an erection.

At argument on the motion, defense counsel responded that the proposed testimony should be analyzed on a case-by-case basis under Evidence Code section 352, and he argued that there were so many acts and offenses already charged that it would be too prejudicial also to present uncharged offense testimony. The prosecutor responded that the digital penetration offense was similar to what Green had done to the other stepdaughters, and that all three of the stepdaughters responded in the same manner, by not saying anything, because each one thought that she was the only one being molested.

In response, the trial court acknowledged that there were many overlapping issues with respect to the request to have a named victim testify about other events that were not part of the charges. The court determined that the probative value of such uncharged offenses outweighed the prejudicial impact, because this was not an entirely unrelated factual situation (such as where the uncharged offenses related to a victim not named in the current case). Instead, this testimony about uncharged offenses was similar to what the jurors would otherwise hear from other victims in the family, and it would give the jury an opportunity to evaluate the credibility of the victims. (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b) [intent or common plan].) The court stated that the uncharged offense evidence would be allowed on that basis and also as propensity evidence, although the objections to it would be noted. (Evid. Code, §§ 1108, 352.)

The trial court then dealt with a related issue in limine, whether the statements and disclosures of the younger victims given to N. should be admitted under hearsay principles, as prior consistent or inconsistent statements, or under the fresh complaint doctrine. The court heard argument and ruled that since all of the sisters and stepsisters were going to testify, there was no problem with confrontation issues, but the court noted that other defense objections could be presented at the time and would be ruled upon individually.

C. Trial Proceedings: Prosecution

During N.'s testimony at trial, she described how she and her two sisters visited Mother and Green in the Twentynine Palms area and in Hemet, from approximately 1992 until they were formally placed with Mother in 1995 (when N. was entering her teenage years). Between 1992 and 1994, N. visited the family and babysat for her new stepsister. From the moment that she was placed back in the home with her mother, and earlier, while she was visiting her mother, things started to happen, such as when she woke up at night to find a man's hands fondling all over her. She started to scream, and although she did not see the face of the man in her room, she later understood that it was Green, because she knows him and his style.

At another time during a visit from foster care, N. was sleeping at night in the bed with her mom, and she woke up to find that Green was putting his hands inside her shirt on her breast and his other hand on her crotch, rubbing and rubbing. She screamed, and so did her mother and so did Green. Green started to apologize, saying that he was drunk and he thought that N. was her mother. N. thought that was possible, because she and her mother looked like twins, and she was fully developed in seventh grade, which is about when that happened. Nobody reported anything at that time, because it seemed like a drunken mistake.

Later on, while the family continued to move around, the same thing would happen "a lot, " in which N. would wake up to Green's hands fondling all over her body. She would pretend to sleep or would shift and move, and then Green would run out of the room. Sometimes he would crawl to her bedside like a predator and fondle her all over and then leave, and sometimes the next morning he would tell her he was sorry about last night. That conduct went on from the time she was placed with her mother until she was in 10th grade, in 1997, when she confronted him about it and told her mother. She did so because she learned that Green was also sexually fondling Sh. and L., and she could not "take one for the team" any more (meaning that she had endured molestations to avoid others being molested). After that 1997 confrontation, Green no longer fondled or touched N.

In 2001, N. learned from L. that Green had been molesting the younger sister, M., and there was a new confrontation between Green, Mother, and the girls. N. then took all the girls into the bedroom and after she observed some weird behavior on their part, they told her about how Green had been sexually touching them without their consent for years. N. went to the doctor with them. She also took all the girls to the police station, where they were interviewed by Detective Michael Lind of the Riverside Sheriff's Department, and those interviews were transcribed and presented as evidence at trial.

No issues are raised on appeal about the detective's interviews or about the interviews' contents, and we need not discuss them further, nor outline the other incidents of molestation testified to by the other four girls, except as stated above.

In L.'s testimony, she explained that she moved in or visited with her mother and Green, from foster care, when she was about seven years old (around 1992). Within a few days, she woke up where she was sleeping on the couch and felt him put his fingers inside of her vagina, while he was also playing with his penis alongside of her buttocks. She felt scared and felt that it hurt. L. said that she began to avoid going to sleep anywhere near Green, because she had experienced other incidents in which he touched her. She described those incidents as one in which Green touched her on her vagina and put his face there, and once when he held her on his lap in the car, grinding his penis into her buttocks.

Another incident of the same type of touching happened when L. was 11 or 12 years old. She was in bed sleeping with her mother when Green got between them and started touching L.'s breasts. She woke up and turned around and Green pulled his hand back and pretended to go to sleep. The next day, L. told her sister Sh. and her mother, and her mother made excuses that Green must have thought he was touching the mother. Later, when L. was about 17, her stepsister M. told her Green had been hurting her sexually, and the 2001 confrontation occurred. Green denied everything.

At the request of investigators, Mother made phone calls to Green, asking him about the incidents, and he gave conflicting responses. Dr. Susan Horowitz, a forensic medical doctor, examined the medical reports from the November 2001 examinations of the girls. No anal trauma or injury was found at that time, but unless any abuse had occurred within 72 hours of the exam, there would not be any such findings of trauma.

Dr. Horowitz also testified about child abuse accommodation syndrome, explaining why children might delay their reporting of incidents of sexual molestation.

D. The Defense Case; Verdict; Judgment

Green testified in his defense at trial. He denied that he ever wrongfully touched the girls, or that he had ever said he had mistaken one or more of them for their mother in bed. However, he did inadvertently once hug N. from behind when he, his wife, and N. were sleeping in one bed, but he did not do so in a sexual way.

Green said he had never admitted to molesting the girls, even though he admitted he had a problem during the 2001 "pretext" phone calls with Mother that were arranged by the detective (and testified to by the detective). Although he did not believe the children were liars, he claimed that one of them (M.) must have mistakenly believed that the incidents happened, or she had been told to tell these stories.

The matter was argued and sent to the jury. During deliberations, the jury sent out several questions to the judge, requesting readback of testimony from several of the girls (not including N.).

As summarized above, the jury returned verdicts finding Green guilty, specifically as to N., count 14, of committing a lewd act between June 1992 through August 1995. As to L. in particular, the jury verdicts found Green guilty of two counts of lewd acts on a child (count 12, act from November 1996 through December 1997, and count 13, from November 1992 through July 1997). As to three of the other girls, the jury verdict found Green guilty of lewd acts (one forcible), as previously summarized. Additionally, the jury found true the further allegations of multiple victims. (§ 667.61, subd. (e)(5).)

After admitting to the prison priors and being sentenced to a total term of 104 years, Green timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

Green challenges his conviction on count 14 on the theory that the trial court's rulings that allowed into evidence testimony from N., not only about various acts of molestation of her that occurred before she turned 14, but also acts that occurred afterwards, were erroneous, such that there was a reasonable probability the jury convicted him of that count based upon improperly admitted evidence. (Evid. Code, §§ 1101, subd. (b); 1108.) In response, the Attorney General contends this argument was forfeited by a failure to raise it below, or that in any case, there was no error, or it was harmless. We discuss these theories, after setting forth applicable standards.

I

PERTINENT LAW

Before Evidence Code section 1108 was enacted, prior or uncharged bad acts were inadmissible when their sole relevance was to prove a defendant's propensity to engage in criminal conduct (see Evid. Code, § 1101 ; People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 911, 913-922 (Falsetta)). However, the enactment of Evidence Code section 1108 created a statutory exception to the rule against the use of propensity evidence, allowing admission of evidence of other sexual offenses in cases charging such conduct, for proof of the defendant's disposition to commit the charged offense. (Falsetta, supra, at p. 911.) Section 1108 has been upheld against constitutional challenges. (Falsetta, supra, at pp. 910-922.)

Evidence Code section 1101 provides in relevant part: "(a) Except as provided in this section and in Section[]... 1108..., evidence of a person's character or a trait of his... character (whether in the form of... evidence of specific instances of his... conduct) is inadmissible when offered to prove his... conduct on a specified occasion. [¶] (b) Nothing in this section prohibits the admission of evidence that a person committed a crime, civil wrong, or other act when relevant to prove some fact (such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident...) other than his... disposition to commit such an act."

Evidence Code section 1108, however, conditions the introduction of uncharged sexual misconduct or offense evidence upon whether it is admissible under Evidence Code section 352. "A careful weighing of prejudice against probative value under [Evidence Code] section 352 is essential to protect a defendant's due process right to a fundamentally fair trial. [Citations.]" (People v. Jennings (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1314 (Jennings).)

Evidence Code section 352 provides: "The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, or confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury."

In evaluating such Evidence Code section 1108 testimony, pursuant to Evidence Code section 352, "trial judges must consider such factors as its nature, relevance, and possible remoteness, the degree of certainty of its commission and the likelihood of confusing, misleading, or distracting the jurors from their main inquiry, its similarity to the charged offense, its likely prejudicial impact on the jurors, the burden on the defendant in defending against the uncharged offense, and the availability of less prejudicial alternatives to its outright admission, such as admitting some but not all of the defendant's other... offenses, or excluding irrelevant though inflammatory details surrounding the offense." (Falsetta, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 917.) In evaluating such evidence, the court must determine "whether '[t]he testimony describing defendant's uncharged acts... was no stronger and no more inflammatory than the testimony concerning the charged offenses.' " (People v. Harris (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 727, 737-738.)

On appeal, we review the admission of other acts or crimes evidence under Evidence Code section 1108 for an abuse of the trial court's discretion. (Kipp, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 371.) The determination as to whether the probative value of such evidence is substantially outweighed by the possibility of undue consumption of time, unfair prejudice or misleading the jury is "entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial judge who is in the best position to evaluate the evidence." (People v. Fitch (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 172, 183.)

As to both Evidence Code sections 1101, subdivision (b) and 1108, the weighing process under Evidence Code section 352 "depends upon the trial court's consideration of the unique facts and issues of each case, rather than upon the mechanical application of automatic rules." (See Jennings, supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at p. 1314.) " 'The "prejudice" referred to in Evidence Code section 352 applies to evidence which uniquely tends to evoke an emotional bias against defendant as an individual and which has very little effect on the issues. In applying section 352, "prejudicial" is not synonymous with "damaging." ' " (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 320.) We will not find that a court abuses its discretion in admitting such other sexual acts evidence unless its ruling " 'falls outside the bounds of reason.' [Citation.]" (Kipp, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 371.)

II

ISSUES PRESENTED

A. Preserving Objections for Appeal

Green contends that he is entitled to reversal of the count 14 conviction because the prosecution's written in limine motion only expressly referred to uncharged conduct toward L., not her stepsister N., and therefore the court improperly admitted evidence of some uncharged conduct as to N. that occurred after she turned 14. Green argues that when N. later testified to so many nonqualifying acts, when only one or two could reliably be traced to the period when she was younger than 14, this could have confused the jury and encouraged it to convict him of the offense on the strength of the nonqualifying acts.

Green impliedly argues that his trial counsel's failure to object further, after the in limine stage of the proceedings, was reasonable, in light of the scope of the motion as it was orally argued. He contends his trial counsel adequately preserved the issue for appeal, by objecting to the evidence at the in limine stage of the proceedings, and the trial court accordingly abused its discretion in admitting this evidence.

As acknowledged by Green in his reply brief, the transcript of the in limine motion indicates that Green's trial counsel expressly invoked Evidence Code section 352, and its standards of probativeness versus prejudice, to object to admission of any evidence that would pertain to uncharged acts, which could apparently include others than those against L. The court and all counsel were aware from the information and the investigative transcripts that Green was being charged with sexual abuse incidents beginning as early as 1992 and continuing up until 2001, during which time the children and he both moved in and out of the home, and the family moved from place to place on an almost yearly basis. This factual context of an ongoing sequence of events, involving multiple allegations of multiple molestations of multiple children, all in the same family and during the same period, was specifically addressed by defense counsel in his objection, when he discussed the large number of charges brought as to various family members and suggested undue prejudice would occur from any evidence of uncharged acts. Defense counsel raised this issue in the context of whether Green would be defending by claiming that he mistakenly touched N. or L., in the belief that he was touching his wife. From this record, Green's appellate counsel argues that trial counsel could not have intended to forego any objection to uncharged acts testimony by other witnesses, in light of the facts known at the time, under all the circumstances.

For purposes of appeal, no particular form of objection was required, as long as it was made in such a way as to alert the trial court to the nature of the problematic evidence, and the rationale for requesting its exclusion. (People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 883, 906; People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 189-190; overruled on other grounds in People v. Stansbury (1995) 9 Cal.4th 824, 830.) The validity of any such objection necessarily depends on whether the trial court had the opportunity to sufficiently and properly evaluate the proffered evidence, in light of the grounds asserted.

Here, it is reasonable to assess the in limine arguments as dealing with the admissibility of various acts of uncharged conduct, even though only three incidents about L. in particular were briefed by the prosecution. Defense counsel recognized that his client was being charged with a long series of such acts, involving multiple family members, and all parties must have recognized that there might be other such uncharged acts that could come into evidence at some point. The court expressly took note of the defense objection when overruling it. In the context of the next issue being discussed (fresh complaint doctrine), the court expressly told counsel he could continue to raise objections as they arose. It is not a reasonable reading of the record to find that those discussions about prior uncharged acts were confined to only one of the six girls, or to only a short period within the entire time frame of the charges, while other such acts were alleged to be ongoing.

After the hearing in limine, no further defense objections were made to N.'s testimony about uncharged sexual molestation conduct by Green that occurred "a lot" after she turned 14 (in 1995), and "over the years, " when the "same thing would happen." None is cited in the briefs nor have we been able to find any. Although the record is susceptible to a finding that by failing to renew his objections during N.'s testimony, Green has forfeited his challenge to admissibility of the uncharged acts evidence (People v. Williams (2008) 43 Cal.4th 584, 620), we will consider the merits of these claims next, in an abundance of caution. (Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a).)

B. Merits of Evidentiary Objection; No Error Occurred

On appeal, Green mainly contends this evidence does not satisfy the criteria for admissibility under either Evidence Code sections 1101 or 1108, because its probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect. He asserts the entire sequence of events was already confusing and there was a real danger of conviction based on the wrong evidence. (Evid. Code, § 352.) Green argues his counsel's objections under section 352 should have been interpreted by the trial court as not permitting any large volume of evidence from N. about uncharged acts that occurred after she turned 14.

Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b), authorizes admission of evidence of uncharged crimes "when relevant to prove some fact (such as motive, ...) other than his or her disposition to commit such an act." The admissibility of uncharged crimes depends on: " '(1) the materiality of the facts sought to be proved, (2) the tendency of the uncharged crimes to prove those facts, and (3) the existence of any rule or policy requiring exclusion of the evidence.' [Citation.]" (People v. Kelly (2007) 42 Cal.4th 763, 783.)

We look to whether the court prejudicially abused its discretion under Evidence Code section 352 by admitting such evidence, if it were more prejudicial than probative, due to any high likelihood of juror confusion from remoteness in time, weak probative value, or cumulative nature. (People v. Fitch, supra, 55 Cal.App.4th 172, 183.) In other words, we will only disturb a trial court's ruling under Evidence Code section 352 where the court has exercised its discretion in a manner that resulted in a miscarriage of justice. (People v. Frazier (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 30, 42.)

Green's defense was mainly challenging the credibility of the victims. The relevant issues under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b) included whether the evidence of uncharged crimes was probative of some fact, other than propensity, "such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident...." (Ibid.)

Regarding the factors of identity and opportunity, the trial court had a substantial basis to find the evidence about later acts to be admissible under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b), because N. reported that she did not see the face of the man who suddenly fondled her at night, the first time it happened, but she later learned that it must have been Green, because she knows him and his style.

Also on the issues of Green's intent and common scheme or plan, the prosecution had legitimate need of such evidence, because the uncharged later offenses had a tendency to prove the facts of an ongoing sequence of events that similarly affected girls in the family. The jury could consider this evidence when it interpreted his explanations of what had happened.

Regarding the factors of absence of mistake or accident, the evidence as to the offenses on both N. and L. involved either Green or their mother telling them that when it happened, Green must have thought he was touching the mother, not the girl. The trial court had a substantial basis to find the later act evidence (that N. was molested "a lot") to be admissible to show there were no such mistakes or accidents, but rather a common scheme or plan. (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b).) The probative value of the uncharged offenses outweighed the prejudicial impact, because this was not an entirely unrelated factual situation, such as where outside evidence of uncharged acts was brought in about a nonparty victim. N.'s testimony about uncharged offenses, even if somewhat weak, was similar to what the jurors heard from other victims in the family. As specifically discussed at the in limine hearing, the type of behavior Green showed toward L. was similar to what Green had done to the other stepdaughters. All of this evidence served to explain Green's mental state and his conduct within the family.

On the issue of credibility of N., the legislative intent "in sex offense cases [was] to relax the evidentiary restraints [Evidence Code] section 1101, subdivision (a), imposed, to assure that the trier of fact would be made aware of the defendant's other sex offenses in evaluating the victim's and the defendant's credibility." (Falsetta, supra, 21 Cal.4th 903, 911.) It was therefore important to bolster the credibility of N., regarding the earlier offenses, by showing that later offenses occurred, under this common design or plan theory of admissibility under Evidence Code section 1101.

When we apply the above criteria, we find no error or abuse of discretion in allowing into evidence those prior uncharged acts against N., committed when she was over 14. (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b).) Also, under Evidence Code section 1108, Green cannot show an abuse of discretion in admitting the evidence about later sexual activity with N., with regard to Green's propensity to commit such acts. The evidence was not unduly remote or dissimilar, and there were many overlapping issues with respect to the prosecution's request to have a named victim testify about other events that were not part of the charges. The presentation of this evidence, by one witness, was not unduly burdensome in terms of trial time. (Falsetta, supra, 21 Cal.4th 903, 917.) Although the defense objected generally, and the parties were well aware of the nature of the problem, the defense objections were not well taken, for the above reasons. (Evid. Code, §§ 1108, 352.)

Finding no error in admission of this evidence, we need not conduct any harmless error analysis. (See People v. Walker (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 782, 808 [" 'the erroneous admission of prior misconduct evidence does not compel reversal unless a result more favorable to the defendant would have been reasonably probable if such evidence were excluded.' "].)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

WE CONCUR: BENKE, Acting P. J., McINTYRE, J.

To be relevant on the issue of intent, uncharged crimes need only be sufficiently similar to a charged offense to support the inference that the defendant probably harbored the same intent in each instance. (People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 371 (Kipp).)


Summaries of

People v. Green

California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, First Division
Feb 1, 2011
No. D056644 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 1, 2011)
Case details for

People v. Green

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. WALTER OYA GREEN, Defendant and…

Court:California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, First Division

Date published: Feb 1, 2011

Citations

No. D056644 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 1, 2011)