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People v. Graham

California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, First Division
Apr 20, 2009
D052256, D054791 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 20, 2009)

Opinion


THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. SCOT ELWOOD GRAHAM, Defendant and Appellant. In re SCOT ELWOOD GRAHAM on Habeas Corpus. D052256, D054791 California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, First Division April 20, 2009

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County No. SCE207093, Jeffrey F. Fraser, Judge, considered with a petition for writ of habeas corpus.

O'ROURKE, J.

Scot Elwood Graham appeals from the trial court's judgment recommitting him as a mentally disordered offender (MDO) under Penal Code sections 2970 and 2972. During the proceedings, the trial court accepted Graham's waiver of the right to be represented by counsel. Graham contends the trial court applied the wrong standard in determining his mental competency to waive this right. We affirm.

All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In April 2007, the People filed a petition to extend Graham's commitment as an MDO for one additional year, alleging that in May 2001, Graham was found guilty of two counts of making criminal threats under section 422, three counts of making harassing phone calls under section 653m, subd. (a) and one count of stalking under section 646.9, subd. (a). In October, 2006, the trial court found he was an MDO and committed him to a state hospital for one year.

In August, 2007, Graham requested to represent himself in the recommitment proceedings. The trial court asked Graham whether he had read and understood the waiver form he signed, and if he knew the advantages and disadvantages of self representation. Graham stated, "Yes." The trial court cautioned Graham that (1) he would have limited access to resources such as a telephone or a paralegal, and (2) petitioner's attorney was more experienced and knew the rules of evidence and court procedures. Graham stated he had a Bachelor's degree in Latin American Studies. The court asked, "What familiarity do you have with the legal system that makes you feel you could knowledgably present your case to this court?" Graham responded, "Well, I think I know how to rebut allegations against me, but again, I am not strong on procedure and practice. So I will try to hone that as best I can." The court told Graham, "It is my advice and recommendation that you not waive your right to have an attorney represent you" and added, "Your current lawyer is well-known to the court. He knows the rules and procedures. He presents cases all the time."

The court granted Graham's motion, stating, "[He] has the mental capacity to waive the right to counsel. The defendant has been advised of the probable risks and adverse consequences of proceeding without an attorney, and the defendant's waiver of the right to counsel is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. We had the opportunity to discuss these issues. [¶]... I heard the tenor of his voice and his responsiveness to my questions and find that he's alert and understands what we are doing here and has advised me that he understands the risks of representing himself."

At a subsequent hearing the trial court discussed the evidence Graham sought to introduce: "Mr. Graham, I want you to also understand, I do not read — I don't look at the evidence until we start the trial. So I have not looked at the [psychological] evaluations. This is going to be a jury trial at this point. If this were a court trial, then I would have asked for an agreement by the parties and I would read the evaluations and have some idea of what it is you are going for and be able to fill in a gap or two; but I don't prejudge the evidence. I don't preread it. I will wait for the trial and the jury to get the evidence, and then I will get it as the jury is getting it."

Thereafter, Graham obtained two continuances, but the court denied a third continuance request.

In October, 2007, the witnesses Graham had subpoenaed were not prepared to testify on the matters he had expected them to, and he had no rebuttal evidence to present. Accordingly, Graham elected to waive his rights to trial and cross-examine witnesses, stating that without that evidence a trial would be a waste of his time. The prosecutor informed the court, "I have had a chance to talk with Mr. Graham while off the record, and I informed him that I am ready to proceed. I am sure he's aware of his right to proceed and his right to waive. [¶] I explained that he's got a right to go to a jury trial. He's got a right to a bench trial. He's got a right to waive and not fight the recommitment, the petition. And I didn't go into intricate detail, but I explained those rights to him. And I am here ready to proceed; and so whatever Mr. Graham wishes to do, I am ready for."

The trial court found Graham validly waived his right to trial, and ordered him recommitted for one additional year, which expired on July 11, 2008.

DISCUSSION

Graham contends the trial court denied him due process of law under the United States Constitution by granting his request for self-representation because the trial court, having declined to read Graham's psychological evaluations, did not understand the extent of Graham's illness. Graham further contends his competency to waive the right to counsel should have been determined under the standard outlined in the recent case of Indiana v. Edwards (2008) ___ U.S. ___ [128 S.Ct. 2379] (Edwards).

The People maintain that the issue is moot because Graham's commitment term expired in July 2008. Even if the issue is technically moot, we nonetheless exercise our discretion to address the issue. (People v. Williams (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 436, 441, fn. 2.) We conclude the trial court applied the proper standard to determine Graham's competency to waive the right to counsel.

This court has held that MDO proceedings are civil in nature and the right to counsel in these proceedings is of statutory, not constitutional origin. (People v. Williams (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1577, 1591.) However, once given, the right cannot be taken away without due process of law, which requires notice, an opportunity to be heard, and a decision before an impartial hearing body. (Id., at p. 1592.) The trial court's decision to grant or deny a request for self-representation, because no constitutional right to self-representation is implicated, is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. (Ibid.) We review the trial court's determination for such abuse of discretion. (Accord, id. at p. 1593.)

The trial court fully informed Graham of his right to appointed counsel; in response, he stated he understood but wished to represent himself, despite the trial court's efforts to dissuade him. We conclude that on this record the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Graham knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. Contrary to Graham's contention, the trial court was not required to read the psychological evaluations before allowing Graham to represent himself because there was no substantial evidence of Graham's incapacity to waive representation by counsel. (Accord, People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 740 [" 'When the evidence casting doubt on an accused's present sanity is less than substantial[,]... only where a doubt as to sanity may be said to appear as a matter of law[,] or where there is an abuse of discretion[,] may the trial judge's determination be disturbed on appeal' "].)

Graham's appellate argument relies on Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 (Faretta), which applies in criminal proceedings and holds that a defendant has a right to self-representation under certain circumstances. (Id. at p. 819.) The California Supreme Court stated the following regarding the Faretta holding: "The high court has instructed that courts must draw every inference against supposing that the defendant wishes to waive the right to counsel. [Citation.] It follows, as several courts have concluded, that in order to protect the fundamental constitutional right to counsel, one of the trial court's tasks when confronted with a motion for self-representation is to determine whether the defendant truly desires to represent himself or herself. [Citations.] The court faced with a motion for self-representation should evaluate not only whether the defendant has stated the motion clearly, but also the defendant's conduct and other words." (People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 22-23.) Even if we assumed that Faretta applied, we would reach the same result based on Graham's unequivocal election to waive the right to be represented by counsel.

We reject Graham's claim that Edwards, supra, ___ U.S. ___ [128 S.Ct. 2379] is applicable here. "In Dusky v. United States (1960) 362 U.S. 402, the Supreme Court held that the standard for competence to stand trial is whether a defendant has 'sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding' and has 'a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.' [¶] In Godinez v. Moran (1993) 509 U.S. 389, the Supreme Court articulated for the first time the standard for determining competence to plead guilty or to waive the right to assistance of counsel. The court specifically rejected 'the notion that competence to plead guilty or to waive the right to counsel must be measured by a standard that is higher than (or even different from) the Dusky standard.' " (People v. Hightower (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1112-1113.) "[T]he competence that is required of a defendant seeking to waive his right to counsel is the competence to waive the right, not the competence to represent himself." (Godinez, supra, at p. 399.) The Supreme Court concluded that "[r]equiring that a criminal defendant be competent has a modest aim: It seeks to ensure that he has the capacity to understand the proceedings and to assist counsel. While psychiatrists and scholars may find it useful to classify the various kinds and degrees of competence, and while States are free to adopt competency standards that are more elaborate than the Dusky formulation, the Due Process Clause does not impose these additional requirements." (Godinez, supra, 509 U.S. at p. 402, italics added.)

Under Godinez, "California is free to adopt 'more elaborate' standards than the Dusky standard for determining competence to waive the right to counsel but is not required to do so." (People v. Hightower, supra, at pp. 1112-1113.) The Hightower court summarized: "California courts appear not to have adopted a 'more elaborate' standard than the federal standard for determining competence to waive the right to counsel. Under Godinez, that standard is the same as the standard for competence to stand trial." (Id. at p. 1116 [because the trial court properly found defendant competent to stand trial, it necessarily follows that the court erred in denying his motion for self-representation; the two rulings are simply antithetical].)

The Edwards court noted that "Mental illness itself is not a unitary concept. It varies in degree. It can vary over time. It interferes with an individual's functioning at different times in different ways. " (Edwards, supra, ___ U.S. ___ [128 S.Ct. at p. 2386].) The court added that the trial judge "will often prove best able to make more fine-tuned mental capacity decisions, tailored to the individual circumstances of a particular defendant." (Id., ___ U.S. ___ [128 S.Ct. at p. 2387].)

Edwards held that "the Constitution permits judges to take realistic account of the particular defendant's mental capacities by asking whether a defendant who seeks to conduct his own defense at trial is mentally competent to do so. That is to say, the Constitution permits States to insist upon representation by counsel for those competent enough to stand trial under Dusky but who still suffer from severe mental illness to the point where they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves." (Edwards, supra, ___ U.S. ___ [128 S.Ct. at pp. 2387-2388].)

As Graham concedes, the trial court did not deny but granted him the right of self-representation. The different contexts raise different issues and concerns. (Edwards, supra, ___ U.S. ___ [128 S.Ct. at pp. 2385-2388].) The Godinez case "involved a State that sought to permit a gray-area defendant to represent himself. Godinez's constitutional holding is that a State may do so. But that holding simply does not tell a State whether it may deny a gray-area defendant the right to represent himself — the matter at issue here." (Edwards, supra, ___U.S. ___ [128 S.Ct. at p. 2385].) Here, the facts are analogous to those in Godinez; accordingly, the applicable standard is that enunciated by Godinez and left unchallenged by Edwards. We conclude that Graham's competency to waive the right to counsel was determined under the correct standard.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Graham's petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied because we addressed its subject matter on the merits in this opinion.

WE CONCUR: BENKE, Acting P. J., HUFFMAN, J.


Summaries of

People v. Graham

California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, First Division
Apr 20, 2009
D052256, D054791 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 20, 2009)
Case details for

People v. Graham

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. SCOT ELWOOD GRAHAM, Defendant and…

Court:California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, First Division

Date published: Apr 20, 2009

Citations

D052256, D054791 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 20, 2009)