Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. SF05075
Sims, Acting P.J.
Defendant Rodney Allen Graham appeals following his conviction on three counts of receiving stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a) ) and three misdemeanor counts -- possession of burglary tools (§ 466), possession of drug paraphernalia (Health & Saf. Code, § 11364, subd. (a)), and unlawful appropriation of lost property (§§ 484-485). Defendant was charged with an additional count of possessing stolen property but was found not guilty. On appeal, defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to support the three counts of receiving stolen property. We disagree and shall affirm the judgment.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
BACKGROUND
A first amended information filed in April 2006 charged defendant with the following offenses committed in January 2005:
1. Receiving and withholding stolen property owned by victim Jason Paone (§ 496, subd. (a));
2. Receiving and withholding stolen property owned by victim Hope Goudie (§ 496, subd. (a));
3. Receiving and withholding stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a)) owned by multiple victims (later narrowed down to Mike Haemmig);
And misdemeanor counts of;
4. Possession of burglary tools -- a picklock, key bit, crowbar, screwdriver, vice grip pliers, water-pump pliers, slide hammer, slim jim, tension bar, lock pick gun, tubular lock pick, floor safe door puller, master key, ceramic and porcelain spark plug chips and other tools -- with the intent to break and enter (§ 466);
5. Possession of a device used for smoking a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11364, subd. (a));
6. Possession of stolen property owned by victim James V. (§ 496, subd. (a)); and
7. Unlawful appropriation of lost property (§§ 484-485).
Evidence adduced at the jury trial, as relevant to this appeal, included the following:
On January 19, 2006, peace officers from the county narcotics task force executed search warrants for defendant’s home and storage units he used at his workplace, a mini-storage facility owned by his father. The manager of the storage facility, Donald Slayton, told the officers that defendant had access to the front gate and all unoccupied storage units, which were locked with green padlocks. The officers searched all of the 15 to 20 unoccupied storage units.
In storage unit number 1932, which measured about 36 feet by 12 feet, the officers found a fairly new methamphetamine pipe and Coleman torch near a makeshift bed. They also saw tools suitable for burglaries, a battery-operated police scanner tuned to the Nevada County Sheriff’s channel, and items such as power tools that appeared to belong to other people because they were labeled with other people’s names. A black canvas bag, with the name “Paone” (Count One victim) spray-painted on it, contained items (power tools, a phone, rechargeable batteries, a drill, and flashlights) that had “Paone” written or spray-painted on them. A Coleman grill was found, as was a box of grill accessories bearing a shipping label addressed to Goudie (Count Two victim). Tools bearing the name Haemmig (Count Three victim) were found. Thirteen power tools or chain saws, which normally bear serial numbers, had none. Another two had only partial serial numbers, and a third had an unreadable serial number.
On appeal, defendant argues only one tool bore Paone’s name. However, defendant’s citations to the record do not support this assertion but merely show that one of the officers was shown a photograph of four items at trial, only one of which had the name Paone visible from the angle in which the photograph was taken. In other testimony, both officers testified Paone’s name was on multiple items.
Law enforcement officer Stephen Tripp testified he interviewed defendant, who said he purchased some of the items from garage sales and some from a person selling things out of the back of a pickup truck. Defendant said he found the Coleman grill in a storage unit that had been cleared out and could produce documentation. However, defendant never produced any documentation.
With respect to Count One, victim Paone did not testify at trial. Law enforcement officer Bill Smethers, Jr., testified he contacted Paone, who said the items were taken out of his vehicle but he had not reported the theft because it was not worth the “hassle.” Detective Tripp testified it is not unusual for law enforcement to recover stolen property where no theft report had been made. The detective admitted he returned items to Paone without going through proper channels.
With respect to Count Two, Tom Goudie testified he rented storage units at the facility where defendant worked and stored an RV on the premises, locked but out in the open. The Goudies kept a Coleman propane grill in a locked storage area under the RV’s sleeping quarters. One day “in the 2004 time frame,” Goudie went to retrieve something and discovered the grill and some other items (which cost about $1,000 to replace) were gone. There was no sign of tampering with the lock. After ascertaining that his wife had not removed the items, Goudie reported the theft to the storage facility manager. In 2005, a law enforcement officer informed Goudie his grill and accessories had been recovered. Goudie identified the grill by its scratches and his wife’s name on the shipping label of a box of accessories. On cross-examination, Goudie expressed his view that it was not possible that the items were misplaced rather than stolen but, under prodding that there might be a “remote possibility,” he said it was “possible, not probable.”
With respect to Count Three, victim Mike Haemmig testified he was a licensed contractor. In November or December of 2003, some of his tools -- including a framing saw, drills, radio charger, electrical tester, sprayer, sander, and flashlight -- were stolen out of an unoccupied, locked house on which he had completed construction. The burgled house was near a house where defendant was staying.
Defendant did not testify at trial.
Defendant’s father (who owns the storage facility) testified he trusted his son and allowed him to keep in his storage units any valuable items found abandoned in vacated units. The father testified he himself has purchased tools at garage sales without getting a receipt and, in his experience, many people sell used tools with their names still on them.
The manager of the storage facility, Donald Slayton, testified defendant picked up things that were abandoned or thrown out and put them in the trash or in his storage space. Slayton had access to defendant’s storage units at the facility. Defendant is a “pack rat” who collects all kinds of things, is not secretive, and often leaves the doors open on his storage units. When Goudie reported the theft from his RV, Slayton assumed Goudie had misplaced the items and did not bother to ask defendant about them.
The jury found defendant not guilty on Count Six (possession of property stolen from James V.) but guilty on the other six counts. Although the pleading on Count Three alleged defendant received stolen property belonging to “multiple victims,” the verdict form named M. Haemmig as the victim.
The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and ordered three years of supervised probation, conditioned upon serving 120 days in county jail.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
In reviewing a contention that the evidence is insufficient to support the judgment, we must determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 34, citing Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 319 [61 L.Ed.2d 560].) To support the judgment, there must be substantial evidence, i.e., evidence which, when viewed in light of the entire record, is credible and of solid probative value that inspires confidence that the ultimate facts have been justly determined. (People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 848; People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576.) “‘When a jury’s verdict is attacked on the ground that there is no substantial evidence to sustain it, the power of an appellate court begins and ends with the determination as to whether, on the entire record, there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support it, and when two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, a reviewing court is without power to substitute its deductions for those of the jury. It is of no consequence that the jury believing other evidence, or drawing different inferences, might have reached a contrary conclusion.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Castro (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 137, 140, italics omitted.)
II. Receipt of Stolen Property
To obtain a conviction for receiving stolen property, the prosecution must prove (1) the property was stolen; (2) the defendant knew the property was stolen; and (3) the defendant had possession of the stolen property. (§ 496, subd. (a); People v. Land (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 220, 223.) Possession of the stolen property may be actual or constructive and need not be exclusive. (People v. Land, supra, 30 Cal.App.4th at p. 223.) It is sufficient if the defendant acquires a measure of control or dominion over the stolen property. (Id. at p. 224.) The element of the defendant’s knowledge (that the property was stolen) is normally established not by direct evidence, but by inferences from circumstantial evidence. (People v. Alvarado (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 1003, 1019.)
Section 496, subdivision (a), provides: “Every person who buys or receives any property that has been stolen or that has been obtained in any manner constituting theft or extortion, knowing the property to be so stolen or obtained, or who conceals, sells, withholds, or aids in concealing, selling, or withholding any property from the owner, knowing the property to be so stolen or obtained, shall be punished by imprisonment in a state prison, or in a county jail for not more than one year. However, if the district attorney or the grand jury determines that this action would be in the interests of justice, the district attorney or the grand jury, as the case may be, may, if the value of the property does not exceed four hundred dollars ($400), specify in the accusatory pleading that the offense shall be a misdemeanor, punishable only by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year.”
Defendant argues his constitutional due process rights were violated when he was convicted of the first three counts of receiving stolen property based on speculation and conjecture rather than substantial evidence. We disagree.
As to the first element, there was substantial evidence that the property was stolen, in that Goudie and Haemmig testified their property was stolen, and although Paone did not testify, a peace officer testified (without defense objection) that he spoke with Paone, who said his property had been stolen but he had not bothered with the “hassle” of filing a police report. After being advised the property was recovered, Paone filed a police report.
On appeal, defendant says it was the detective who, upon contacting Paone, “specified” that the items were stolen. However, defendant’s citation to the record does not support this assertion. The rest of defendant’s argument regarding Paone discusses immaterial matters (that the detective failed to obtain court authorization before returning the property to Paone and returned one item that did not bear Paone’s name and for which Paone did not prove ownership).
As for the Goudie property, defendant argues there was no evidence it was stolen, because there was no sign of forced entry; Slayton believed Goudie had misplaced the property; and Goudie admitted it was possible he had misplaced the items. However, Goudie’s testimony that the property was stolen constitutes substantial evidence and is not undermined by the conflicting evidence. Moreover, defendant overstates his evidence. Goudie acknowledged a “remote possibility” the property was misplaced but was adamant in his view that it was stolen. Slayton testified he merely assumed Goudie misplaced the property, which is mere speculation, not substantial evidence. The absence of forced entry is not dispositive, particularly in light of defendant’s possession of burglary tools and two filed-down keys consistent with someone trying to make a master key.
As for Haemmig’s property, defendant argues there was no evidence he ever reported the theft. However, there was peace officer testimony that it is not unusual for theft victims to forego reporting theft. Defendant also notes Haemmig could not positively identify as his a router in a photograph shown to him during trial. This point is inconsequential.
As to the element that defendant possessed the stolen property, there was substantial evidence that defendant had possession of the stolen property, which was in his storage unit. Though others had access to the unit, exclusive possession is not a required element, and defendant clearly had dominion and control over the unit.
As to the element that defendant knew the property was stolen, there was substantial circumstantial evidence supporting a finding that defendant knew the property was stolen, because (1) he had in one place items stolen at different times from different victims; (2) he also had burglary tools and a police scanner; (3) he had 16 items with missing or obliterated serial numbers; and (4) he said he found the Goudie property, yet he made no effort to find the owner listed on the shipping label, who was a regular customer of the storage facility.
Defendant says the circumstantial evidence that has “historically” been found sufficient to support a finding of knowledge that property was stolen includes specific circumstances not present in this case, i.e., that the defendant gave false information and was observed in the company of burglars near the burglary scene; that the defendant acquired the property from known ex-convicts or persons of questionable character; or that the defendant gave evasive answers regarding his acquisition of the property. However, defendant cites no authority that these examples are the exclusive means of proving knowledge. Thus, the absence of these circumstances in this case is meaningless. Moreover, on this record, the jury could find, as it did, that defendant gave false information when he said he bought the tools at garage sales.
Defendant argues the prosecution failed to prove how the tools came into his possession. He cites no authority requiring such proof, and it is not one of the essential elements of the crime. (§ 496, subd. (a), fn. 2, ante; People v. Land, supra, 30 Cal.App.4th at p. 223.)
Defendant cites evidence from which the jury might have reached a contrary conclusion, e.g., that sometimes people sell tools with their names still on them. However, “‘[w]hen a jury’s verdict is attacked on the ground that there is no substantial evidence to sustain it, the power of an appellate court begins and ends with the determination as to whether, on the entire record, there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support it, and when two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, a reviewing court is without power to substitute its deductions for those of the jury. It is of no consequence that the jury believing other evidence, or drawing different inferences, might have reached a contrary conclusion.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Castro, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 140, italics omitted.)
Defendant argues this case is distinguishable from “the majority” of section 496 cases, because here the property was not “recently stolen.” However, defendant cites no authority that section 496 requires recently-stolen property, or that a majority of such cases involve recently-stolen property. Instead, defendant cites cases addressing the principle that “[p]ossession of recently stolen property is so incriminating that to warrant conviction there need only be, in addition to possession, slight corroboration in the form of statements or conduct of the defendant tending to show his guilt. [Citations.]” (People v. McFarland (1962) 58 Cal.2d 748, 754.) “Catching a defendant with the goods in possession shortly after a theft rationally suggests a connection to and knowledge of the crime; while the passage of a long period between the theft and the defendant’s possession of the stolen property weakens any inference of guilty knowledge. [Citation.]” (People v. Anderson (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 414, 421.)
Here, although some of the items were stolen two or three years before their discovery by law enforcement, there is more than slight corroboration of defendant’s guilt. In addition to possessing stolen property, defendant possessed property stolen at different times from different victims, as well as burglary tools and a police scanner. The fact that defendant kept the property rather than “fencing” it is without consequence. Most of the stolen items were tools. Tools were useful to defendant because defendant’s father, in addition to owning the storage facility, also ran a construction business where defendant often worked doing construction jobs. Though defendant put on evidence that customers of the storage facility sometimes abandoned property or relinquished it when they fell into arrears on their rent, defendant told the police that he obtained most of the items at garage sales or bought them on the street.
Additionally, as the prosecutor argued to the jury, they could consider the circumstance that the police found in the storage locker 13 items that should have had, but did not have, serial numbers, and three items with unreadable or partially-removed serial numbers. Moreover, defendant told investigating officers he found the Goudie property on the premises of the storage facility, but he failed to produce the promised documentation, and he failed to try to reunite the property with the owners named on the shipping label of the accessory box, who were regular customers of the storage facility.
We conclude substantial evidence supports the judgment.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: MORRISON, J., BUTZ, J.