Opinion
1016 KA 20-01571
12-23-2021
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Terick R. GOODWIN, Defendant-Appellant.
CAITLIN M. CONNELLY, BUFFALO, FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. LEANNE K. MOSER, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, LOWVILLE, D.J. & J.A. CIRANDO, PLLC, SYRACUSE (JOHN A. CIRANDO OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
CAITLIN M. CONNELLY, BUFFALO, FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
LEANNE K. MOSER, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, LOWVILLE, D.J. & J.A. CIRANDO, PLLC, SYRACUSE (JOHN A. CIRANDO OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., CARNI, NEMOYER, CURRAN, AND BANNISTER, JJ.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously reversed as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice, the plea is vacated, and the matter is remitted to Lewis County Court for further proceedings in accordance with the following memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him, upon his plea of guilty, of two counts of predatory sexual assault against a child ( Penal Law § 130.96 ). During a court appearance at which County Court extended a plea offer that called for an aggregate sentence of 15 years to life imprisonment, the court informed defendant that "my policy is if a defendant gets convicted at trial, that means that individual has not accepted responsibility for the conduct that they've been convicted of, and ... [i]n all likelihood the sentence [after trial] would not even be close to the 20 years [to life sought by the People], it would be much more -- many more years and you are looking at a potential [of] 100 years to life." The court issued a virtually identical admonition at the next appearance, and defendant subsequently accepted the court's offer of 15 years to life imprisonment. Under the circumstances, we agree with defendant that the court's statements during plea negotiations did "not amount to a description of the range of the potential sentences but, rather, they constitute[d] impermissible coercion, ‘rendering the plea involuntary and requiring its vacatur’ " ( People v. Flinn , 60 A.D.3d 1304, 1305, 875 N.Y.S.2d 364 [4th Dept. 2009] ; see People v. Rogers , 114 A.D.3d 707, 707, 979 N.Y.S.2d 673 [2d Dept. 2014], lv denied 23 N.Y.3d 1067, 994 N.Y.S.2d 326, 18 N.E.3d 1147 [2014] ; People v. Wilson , 245 A.D.2d 161, 163, 666 N.Y.S.2d 164 [1st Dept. 1997], lv denied 91 N.Y.2d 946, 671 N.Y.S.2d 726, 694 N.E.2d 895 [1998] ). The court's coercive statements were "all the more serious" in light of its misleading insinuation at the January 25, 2019 appearance that consecutive sentencing would be mandatory after trial ( People v. Sung Min , 249 A.D.2d 130, 132, 671 N.Y.S.2d 480 [1st Dept. 1998] ; see People v. Christian [appeal No. 2], 139 A.D.2d 896, 897, 527 N.Y.S.2d 1020 [4th Dept. 1988], lv denied 71 N.Y.2d 1024, 530 N.Y.S.2d 559, 526 N.E.2d 51 [1988] ). Contrary to the People's contention, the constitutional bar on coercing a guilty plea does not invariably turn on whether the court "utilized language that deduced to an absolute guarantee" of a maximum sentence after trial (see e.g. Rogers , 114 A.D.3d at 707, 979 N.Y.S.2d 673 ; Flinn , 60 A.D.3d at 1305, 875 N.Y.S.2d 364 ; Wilson , 245 A.D.2d at 163, 666 N.Y.S.2d 164 ).
Thus, although defendant failed to preserve his challenge to the voluntariness of his plea, we exercise our power to review it as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice (see CPL 470.15 [3] [c] ), and we reverse the judgment, vacate the plea, and remit the matter to County Court for further proceedings on the indictment. We direct that all further proceedings in this case be conducted before a different judge (see e.g. People v. Zuniga , 42 A.D.3d 474, 475, 838 N.Y.S.2d 445 [2d Dept. 2007], lv denied 9 N.Y.3d 966, 848 N.Y.S.2d 34, 878 N.E.2d 618 [2007] ).