Opinion
2014-02-5
The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Kenneth ROGERS, appellant.
Lynn W.L. Fahey, New York, N.Y. (Winston McIntosh and Erica Horwitz of counsel), for appellant, and appellant pro se. Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, N.Y. (John M. Castellano and Jill A. Gross–Marks of counsel), for respondent.
Lynn W.L. Fahey, New York, N.Y. (Winston McIntosh and Erica Horwitz of counsel), for appellant, and appellant pro se. Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, N.Y. (John M. Castellano and Jill A. Gross–Marks of counsel), for respondent.
WILLIAM F. MASTRO, J.P., REINALDO E. RIVERA, SANDRA L. SGROI, and JEFFREY A. COHEN, JJ.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Lasak, J.), rendered October 26, 2009, convicting him of burglary in the second degree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence.
ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, on the law, the plea of guilty is vacated, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Queens County, for further proceedings on the indictment.
In order to be valid, a plea of guilty must be entered voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently ( see People v. Mox, 20 N.Y.3d 936, 938, 958 N.Y.S.2d 670, 982 N.E.2d 590; People v. Hill, 9 N.Y.3d 189, 191, 849 N.Y.S.2d 13, 879 N.E.2d 152; People v. Fiumefreddo, 82 N.Y.2d 536, 543, 605 N.Y.S.2d 671, 626 N.E.2d 646). Where a court merely makes remarks regarding a defendant's sentence exposure in the event he were to be convicted after trial, the remarks are properly deemed informative, not coercive ( see People v. Solis, 111 A.D.3d 654, 974 N.Y.S.2d 132; People v. Bravo, 72 A.D.3d 697, 698, 899 N.Y.S.2d 280; People v. Robinson, 64 A.D.3d 1248, 881 N.Y.S.2d 356; People v. Pagan, 297 A.D.2d 582, 747 N.Y.S.2d 174; People v. Cornelio, 227 A.D.2d 248, 642 N.Y.S.2d 648). However, “[a] defendant may not be induced to plead guilty by the explicit threat of a heavier sentence should he choose to proceed to trial” (People v. Hollis, 74 A.D.2d 585, 585, 424 N.Y.S.2d 483).
Here, the Supreme Court's remarks that it would have “no problem” imposing the maximum sentence if the defendant were convicted after trial, which “[would] be basically the end of [the defendant's] life,” were impermissibly coercive, rendering the defendant's plea involuntary ( see People v. Santiago, 71 A.D.3d 703, 894 N.Y.S.2d 904; People v. Fisher, 70 A.D.3d 114, 890 N.Y.S.2d 477; People v. Flinn, 60 A.D.3d 1304, 875 N.Y.S.2d 364; People v. Richards, 17 A.D.3d 136, 792 N.Y.S.2d 79; People v. Stevens, 298 A.D.2d 267, 748 N.Y.S.2d 589; People v. Fanini, 222 A.D.2d 1111, 635 N.Y.S.2d 896; People v. Beverly, 139 A.D.2d 971, 528 N.Y.S.2d 450; People v. Griffith, 80 A.D.2d 590, 435 N.Y.S.2d 767; People v. Hollis, 74 A.D.2d at 585, 424 N.Y.S.2d 483). Accordingly, we vacate the defendant's plea of guilty and remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Queens County, for further proceedings on the indictment.
In light of our determination, we need not reach the defendant's remaining contentions, including those raised in his pro se supplemental brief.