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People v. Goode

Court of Appeal of California
Jul 30, 2008
No. F053904 (Cal. Ct. App. Jul. 30, 2008)

Opinion

F053904

7-30-2008

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. HUGH CLIFTON GOODE, Defendant and Appellant.

Richard Power, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Louis M. Vasquez and Lewis A. Martinez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Not to be Published


OPINION

THE COURT

Before Vartabedian, Acting P.J., Gomes, J. and Hill, J.

Later statutory citations are to the Penal Code.

On appeal from a final judgment of conviction of battery by a prisoner on a nonprisoner, Hugh Clifton Goode, a state prison inmate, argues that the trial court committed an abuse of discretion by declining to strike either of his strike priors before imposing a 25-to-life three strikes law sentence. The Attorney General argues the contrary. We will affirm the judgment.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

After an information charged Goode with battery on a correctional officer (Pen. Code, § 4501.5)1 and alleged the serious felony priors of first degree burglary and assault with a firearm on a peace officer or firefighter (§§ 245, subd. (d)(1), 459, 460, subd. (a), 667, subd. (a)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c), 1192.7, subd. (c)(18), (c)(31)) within the scope of the three strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(j), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)), a jury in bifurcated proceedings found him guilty as charged and found both priors true as alleged. At the probation and sentencing hearing, the trial court declined to strike either of his strike priors before imposing a 25-to-life three strikes law sentence. (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(j), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d), 1385.)

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On November 25, 2006, a correctional officer who heard unusually loud banging, kicking, and talking in the administrative segregation unit of Corcoran State Prison asked other correctional officers to investigate. One of the investigating officers saw Goode yelling and making noise inside his cell, smelled a strong odor of alcohol from inside his cell, and saw milk cartons inside his cell with a red substance that looked like "pruno," an illicit alcoholic beverage that inmates sometimes manufacture. He thought Goode had been drinking, so he instructed him to back up to the food port of his cell for handcuffing and transportation for medical evaluation. Goode lunged at the officer, grabbed his left wrist, and pulled his hand downward into his cell. Goode and the officer struggled until the officer discharged pepper spray at him and Goode released his hand.

DISCUSSION

The deferential abuse of discretion standard of review governs the trial courts ruling declining to strike either of Goodes strike priors before imposing a 25-to-life three strikes law sentence. (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 371 (Carmony); People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497; § 1385.) Two fundamental precepts guide our review. First, the party challenging the sentence has the burden of clearly showing the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary. (Carmony, at p. 376.) In the absence of the requisite showing, we will presume the court acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives and will allow the sentencing decision to stand. (Id. at pp. 376-377.) Second, as we have no authority to substitute our judgment for that of the trial court, we cannot reverse a sentencing decision merely because reasonable people might disagree. (Id. at p. 377.) "Taken together, these precepts establish that a trial court does not abuse its discretion unless its decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it." (Ibid.)

Since all discretionary authority is contextual, we look to the legal principles and policies germane to the trial courts ruling. (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 377.) The intent of the three strikes law was to restrict the discretion of the trial courts in sentencing repeat offenders. (Ibid.) The three strikes law does not offer a discretionary sentencing choice, as do other sentencing laws, but instead establishes a sentencing norm, carefully circumscribes the power of the trial courts to depart from the norm, requires an explicit justification of any ruling that departs from the norm, and creates a strong presumption that any sentence conforming to the norm is rational and proper. (Id. at pp. 377-378.)

By the governing standard of review, nothing in the record here even intimates a possibility of relief. Goodes strike priors were first degree burglary and assault with a firearm on a peace officer or firefighter. His new felony, battery on a correctional officer, confirms that he still represents a serious danger to society. Citing People v. Burgos (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1209 (Burgos), however, he argues that since both strike priors arose from the same incident the trial court committed an abuse of discretion by declining to strike one or the other. (Id. at pp. 1214-1217.) We disagree.

First, by enacting the three strikes law "the electorate and the Legislature rationally could — and did — conclude that a person who committed additional violence in the course of a prior serious felony (e.g., shooting or pistol-whipping a victim during a robbery, or assaulting a victim during a burglary) should be treated more harshly than an individual who committed the same initial felony, but whose criminal conduct did not include such additional violence." (People v. Benson (1998) 18 Cal.4th 24, 35 (Benson).) Both strike priors in Benson arose from the same incident, but the defendant showed, by stabbing his victim 20 times, that "he posed a far greater threat to public safety than a defendant who has committed a residential burglary without committing such gratuitous violence." (Id. at pp. 26, 35.) Even though both of Goodes strike priors arose from the same incident, he likewise poses a far greater threat to public safety than a defendant who has committed a first degree burglary without committing a gratuitous assault with a firearm on a peace officer or firefighter.

Second, the priors in Burgos were carjacking and robbery, for which, "unlike perhaps any other two crimes, there exists an express statutory preclusion on sentencing for both offenses," even though not explicitly on later sentencing for a new felony with reference to the priors. (Burgos, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at p. 1216, citing § 215, subd. (c).) No preclusion like that exists on sentencing for first degree burglary and assault with a firearm on a peace officer or firefighter. Third, even if Burgos were arguably consistent with Goodes interpretation, Carmony impliedly disapproved the case just months later by an expansive affirmation of the historical intent of the three strikes law, the broad scope of the trial courts discretion whether to strike a strike prior, and the narrow breadth of appellate review. (See Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 376-378.) On the law and the record here, the limits Goode urges on the trial courts discretion whether to strike one of two strike priors arising from the same incident are illusory.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.


Summaries of

People v. Goode

Court of Appeal of California
Jul 30, 2008
No. F053904 (Cal. Ct. App. Jul. 30, 2008)
Case details for

People v. Goode

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. HUGH CLIFTON GOODE, Defendant and…

Court:Court of Appeal of California

Date published: Jul 30, 2008

Citations

No. F053904 (Cal. Ct. App. Jul. 30, 2008)