Opinion
B319969
06-18-2024
Jean Matulis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Ryan M. Smith, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Superior Court County of Ventura, No. 2014021172, Ryan J. Wright, Judge.
Jean Matulis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Ryan M. Smith, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
YEGAN, ACTING P.J.
Ruben Matthew Gonzales was convicted by jury of first degree murder with personal use of a deadly weapon. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189, 12022, subd. (b)(1).) Before jury selection, appellant entered a guilty plea to four unrelated counts for assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1), count 2), assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4), count 3), possession of a "shank" in jail (§ 4502, subd. (a), count 4), and possession of alcohol in jail (§ 4573.8, count 5). He was sentenced to state prison for an aggregate term of 33 years and eight months to life.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Gonzales appealed the judgment of conviction and contended his due process rights were violated because the trial court failed to conduct a competency hearing after defense counsel declared a doubt about appellant's mental competency and the proceedings were suspended pursuant to section 1368.
In a published opinion, we conditionally reversed the judgment of conviction and remanded the matter with directions to the trial court to determine whether a retrospective competency hearing was feasible, and if so, to conduct a competency hearing. (People v. Gonzales (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 1081 (Gonzales).)
On remand, the trial court found a retrospective competency hearing was feasible, determined appellant was competent at the time of trial, and resentenced him. Appellant now appeals only from the trial court's feasibility determination. We affirm. We also conclude that the evidence is sufficient to show competency at the time of trial.
Appellant also challenged the imposition of a one-year prior prison term enhancement (§ 667.5, subd. (b)) and sought remand based on amendments to the determinate sentencing laws. (Sen. Bill No. 567 (20212022 Reg. Sess.).) During the pendency of this appeal, appellant's counsel filed a "Notice of Updated Developments in the Superior Court Affecting Issues on Appeal." According to counsel, the trial court has since addressed the sentencing matters, and "there is no need for further remand" on those issues. Consequently, we do not discuss them.
Facts Related to Feasibility Determination
After we remanded the matter to the trial court, the prosecution filed a motion for a retroactive competency hearing. Attached to the motion was a series of exhibits, including a six-page report by psychiatrist, Robert C. Thurston, M.D., prepared in April 2015.
As part of his evaluation, Dr. Thurston met with appellant and conducted a clinical interview. Appellant told Dr. Thurston he was not opposed to going to trial and believed he was competent to stand trial. Although appellant was distrustful of his attorney, he did not believe his "'trust issues'" were "insurmountable." Appellant also described "'a lot of anxiety,'" admitted to hearing voices in the past, and was previously committed to a psychiatric unit, but said he never had any mental illness. After reviewing the records and evaluating appellant, Dr. Thurston concluded appellant was competent to stand trial.
Defense counsel filed a motion in opposition to a retroactive competency hearing, which included a report by neuropsychologist, Jose L. Fuentes, Ph.D. Dr. Fuentes challenged the adequacy of Dr. Thurston's report, which was prepared two years and nine months before trial and did not address appellant's neuropsychological functioning even though certain "neurodevelopmental risk factors" were present in appellant's background.
At the feasibility hearing, Dr. Fuentes testified that a retrospective hearing on competence was not feasible. According to Dr. Fuentes, Dr. Thurston's report was not helpful because it did not provide "measurable, quantifiable, or standardized" data that would permit another professional psychiatrist or psychologist to "independently come to the same conclusions."
After considering the evidence presented and listening to the testimony of Dr. Fuentes, the trial court ruled that a retroactive competency hearing was feasible.
Discussion
Appellant contends reinstatement of the conviction violates his federal and state rights to due process and a fair trial because the trial court erred in deciding that a retrospective competency hearing was feasible. And, he also contends the evidence presented by the prosecution was insufficient to show he was competent at the time of trial.
The People, on the other hand, correctly contend there was relevant evidence at the time of trial to show appellant was competent and was participating in his defense.
"The constitutional guarantee of due process forbids a court from trying or convicting a criminal defendant who is mentally incompetent to stand trial. [Citations.]" (People v. Rodas (2018) 6 Cal.5th 219, 230 (Rodas).) "A defendant is deemed incompetent to stand trial if he lacks '"'sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding . . . [or] a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.'"'" (People v. Lightsey (2012) 54 Cal.4th 668, 690 (Lightsey).)
California law similarly provides that a defendant is mentally incompetent to stand trial when, "as a result of a mental health disorder or developmental disability, the defendant is unable to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational manner." (§ 1367, subd. (a).)
As we explained in our prior opinion, "'[O]nce a doubt has arisen as to the competence of the defendant to stand trial, the trial court has no jurisdiction to proceed with the case against the defendant without first determining his competence in a section 1368 hearing, and the matter cannot be waived by defendant or his counsel. [Citations.]' [Citation.]" (Gonzales, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 1087, italics omitted.) Failure to hold a competency hearing "is known as Pate error." (Pate v. Robinson (1966) 383 U.S. 375.)
A retrospective competency hearing is appropriate "in cases involving unusual circumstances where reliable evidence of the defendant's mental condition at the time of trial would be available at the hearing." (Rodas, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 241, citing People v. Ary (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1016, 1028 (Ary).)
In determining whether a retrospective competency hearing is feasible, the trial court should consider the following four factors: "'"(1) the passage of time, (2) the availability of contemporaneous medical evidence, including medical records and prior competency determinations, (3) any statements by the defendant in the trial record, and (4) the availability of individuals and trial witnesses, both experts and non-experts, who were in a position to interact with defendant before and during trial,"'" as well as any other facts the trial court deems relevant. (People v. Robinson (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 606, 617; Lightsey, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 710.)
We addressed these factors in our prior opinion and concluded they "weigh[ed] in favor of a retrospective competency hearing." (Gonzales, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 1088.)
We now conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding, on remand, that a retrospective competency hearing was feasible. (See Ary, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at p. 1029 [setting forth standard of review].)
The "critical question in determining whether a retrospective competency hearing is feasible is whether there is 'sufficient evidence to reliably determine the defendant's mental competence when tried earlier.'" (Rodas, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 239-240.) The prosecution bears the burden of persuasion to "convince the trial court by a preponderance of the evidence that a retrospective competency hearing is feasible ...." (Lightsey, supra, 54 Cal.4th at pp. 710-711.)
Here, the prosecution introduced Dr. Thurston's report prepared in April 2015, concluding that appellant was competent to stand trial. Defense counsel later withdrew the section 1368 request and did not raise the issue of competency again. This is relevant because "defense counsel will often have the best-informed view of the defendant's ability to participate in his defense." (Medina v. California (1992) 505 U.S. 437, 450.)
In addition to Dr. Thurston's report, the prosecution introduced as evidence our prior appellate opinion, summarizing events that were relevant to the feasibility determination. For example, after counsel withdrew the section 1368 request, appellant "addressed the trial court at an in-camera Marsden hearing (People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 . . .) and, on the first day of trial, entered a change of plea to the assault, weapon and alcohol charges (counts 2-5). Before sentencing, the probation department reported that appellant had accumulated 101 pages of disciplinary reports in jail for 'causing disturbances, contraband, hoarding medicine, possession of "ratlines," unauthorized communications, failure to obey directives, possession of "pruno," tampering with and destruction of County property, battery of an inmate, security tampering, disrespecting staff, refusal to "lock-down," and deception.'" (Gonzales, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1088-1089.)
Additionally, the prosecution introduced the transcript from a proceeding in October 2015, in which appellant requested different counsel, the transcript from appellant's change of plea hearing in January 2018, which showed appellant answered in the affirmative that he understood his pleas and consequences, and appellant's statements to his probation officer in February 2018 declining to speak to him on the advice of counsel.
The prosecution also introduced a copy of an investigation report prepared by the Public Defender's office after appellant relayed to his attorney a conversation that he had with a fellow inmate who advised him to look into the credibility of a witness in the case. The prosecution argued this was a "prime example" of appellant "helping his attorney with his defense."
The evidence was, and is, sufficient to support the trial court's exercise of discretion in determining that a retrospective competency hearing was feasible. And, as indicated, the evidence shows he was competent to stand trial. Accordingly, reversal is not warranted in this case.
We concur: BALTODANO, J., CODY, J.