Opinion
H041929
01-22-2018
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DAVID M. GOMEZ, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Monterey County Super. Ct. No. SS0529787A)
Defendant David M. Gomez, while serving a life term in state prison, killed his cellmate Franklin Feliz in 2005. In 2009, defendant assaulted inmates Lynford Perry and Lewis Bruister on separate occasions. The prosecution charged defendant with murder (count 1; Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) and three counts of assault by a person undergoing a life sentence (counts 2, 3, and 4 as to Feliz, Perry, and Bruister respectively; § 4500).
Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Defendant pleaded not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity, but during trial he withdrew his insanity plea as to counts 3 and 4. In the guilt phase, a jury found defendant guilty on all counts. At the end of the sanity phase, the trial court granted a directed verdict of sanity as to counts 1 and 2. The court imposed a total term of 75 years to life consecutive to two life terms without the possibility of parole for 27 years.
Defendant raises three claims on appeal. First, he contends the trial court erred by denying his repeated motions to represent himself under Faretta. Second, he contends the court erred by granting a directed verdict of sanity. We find these claims without merit. Third, defendant contends the abstract of judgment must be corrected to accurately reflect the date of the assaults. The Attorney General concedes this claim and we accept the concession.
Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806
We will affirm the judgment and order the trial court to correct the abstract of judgment.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Facts of the Offenses
In 2005, defendant was serving a term of 91 years eight months to life in state prison. In May 2005, he killed his cellmate, Franklin Feliz. In February 2009, defendant attacked inmate Lynford Perry with a razor while they were sitting in a courtroom. In April 2009, defendant assaulted inmate Lewis Bruister while the two were awaiting dental treatment.
1. The Murder of Franklin Feliz
On May 16, 2005, defendant and his cellmate Feliz were housed in an administrative segregation unit at the Salinas Valley State Prison. Around 4:10 p.m., correctional officer David Hicks escorted a nurse to their cell to conduct a diabetes check on Feliz. Hicks unlocked a food port on the cell door and told Feliz to approach the port to allow the nurse to conduct the check. Feliz did not do so. Hicks could see Feliz sitting on a toilet in the cell. Feliz tried to speak, but his speech was slurred and Hicks could not understand him. Feliz was sweating and he looked pale. Defendant stated that Feliz needed an insulin shot. Hicks told defendant to move to the back of the cell, and defendant refused to comply. Defendant also claimed that Feliz had been drinking "pruno," a type of inmate-made alcohol.
Correctional officer Christopher Searby arrived and told Hicks to deal with the situation later. Hicks then left to assist other officers with feeding inmates. Searby closed the food port and informed his supervisor that defendant was refusing to step away from his cell door. Defendant continued to refuse orders to submit to handcuffs. The cell remained closed and locked throughout this entire period.
Around 4:40 p.m., after feeding the inmates, Hicks returned to defendant's cell and collected two empty food trays from him. Hicks did not see or hear anything unusual at that time.
Around 4:50 p.m., Hicks returned to defendant's cell to check on Feliz's condition. Defendant was standing at the cell door looking out. He said he would submit to being handcuffed. Hicks could not see Feliz in the cell, so Hicks asked defendant where Feliz was. Hicks told defendant to step away from the door, and defendant complied. Looking through windows in the cell door, Hicks could see some bedding from the bunks rolled up on the floor toward the back of the cell. He saw blood smeared on the bedding and the floor. Hicks asked defendant about the blood, and defendant claimed he had suffered a bloody nose. Hicks instructed defendant to put his hands out through the food port to be handcuffed, and defendant complied. Hicks notified the control booth officer of a possible medical emergency and activated his personal alarm. In less than a minute, staff members from other areas of the prison arrived.
After defendant was placed in handcuffs, Searby and another officer removed him from the cell. Correctional officer Daniel Rocha saw Feliz's body in the cell covered with sheets and blankets. Part of Feliz's arm was sticking out. Rocha and another officer entered the cell and covered Feliz with a shield. The officers then uncovered Feliz and placed handcuffs on him. Feliz was motionless, and he had suffered wounds to his neck and facial area. His face was swollen and collapsed, and his neck had suffered a slash wound. Medical personnel arrived and attempted to perform CPR, but Feliz did not respond. At around 5:05 p.m., a physician arrived and pronounced Feliz deceased.
An autopsy of Feliz's body showed he had suffered four deep lacerations to the right side of the face with underlying fractures. There were also severe blunt force injuries, including bruising and depressed fractures in the center of his face on the right side, and a depressed fracture of the nasal bone. There were a series of sharp cuts four to five inches long on the front and sides of his neck. The lacerations on the neck were consistent with the use of a razor. Hemorrhaging around the eyes and forehead together with injuries to the neck and mouth indicated strangulation. The cause of death was multiple blunt force and incised or sharp force injuries to the head and neck.
Defendant was photographed on the day of the attack. He appeared calm and followed the photographer's instructions with no signs of confusion. The photos showed him with blood on his shirt, his boxer shorts, his shoes, and his legs. He had a razor blade wrapped in toilet paper and hidden inside the waistband of his boxer shorts. The toilet paper around the razor had blood on it. DNA tests of the blood matched it to Feliz. A correctional officer who bagged defendant's hands on the afternoon of the attack saw blood on his arms. As the officer was bagging his hands, defendant told her, "Don't you think it's a little late for this?"
Investigators also found an inmate-manufactured weapon in a corner of the cell. The weapon consisted of a razor blade taken from a disposable razor and melted onto the plastic portion of a toothbrush.
The day after the attack, a clinical psychologist was passing by defendant's holding cell when he flagged her down to get her attention. Defendant told the psychologist he had gotten in trouble and stated he was only supposed to have a cellmate for three days. Defendant was "somewhat smiling" at the time. The psychologist asked him what he planned to do next, and he responded, "[W]ell, I already have a life sentence. So this one was a freebie, you know."
A sample of defendant's blood was taken on the day of the killing. The sample tested negative for several antipsychotic or antidepressant prescription drugs.
2. Evidence of Defendant's Mental State
a. Dr. Kok Mun Soo-Tho
Clinical psychologist Kok Mun Soo-Tho briefly spoke with defendant one or two days after the attack. Defendant was alert, calm, oriented, and responded to Dr. Soo-Tho's questions. Dr. Soo-Tho interviewed defendant in greater depth on May 19, 2005. Defendant was calm, friendly, likable, and pleasant. When Dr. Soo-Tho asked defendant what had happened, he said he had heard the voice of God telling him that Feliz was God's messenger and instructing defendant to send Feliz "back to God." Defendant said he cut Feliz's throat in response.
As Dr. Soo-Tho questioned defendant in detail about the auditory hallucinations, Dr. Soo-Tho observed that defendant was not exhibiting any signs of the cognitive disorganization one would typically expect from a person who is grossly mentally ill. Defendant was coherent; he was neither rambling nor irrational. His appearance was inconsistent with someone in a psychotic state. Dr. Soo-Tho asked defendant questions to determine whether he was malingering. When Dr. Soo-Tho told defendant he did not believe defendant was mentally ill, defendant responded, "Okay. You got me."
Dr. Soo-Tho again asked defendant to explain what had happened. Defendant admitted he had killed Feliz and said he believed Feliz had been sent there to kill him. Defendant explained that he had "crossed the Mexican Mafia in one form or another" and believed they had put "a prison hit out on him." Defendant said he decided to kill Feliz as soon as Feliz was placed in the cell because he was Hispanic. At that point, defendant started saving razors and melted one of them onto the end of a toothbrush. Defendant knew Feliz was diabetic and liked to drink pruno, so defendant waited for an opportunity to kill him.
Defendant described in detail how he planned and conducted the attack. When defendant saw Feliz in a weakened state, defendant started punching and choking him. The attack was interrupted when defendant heard someone walking down the hallway. Defendant explained that a guard or a nurse had come by to give Feliz his medication. Defendant did not want them to see Feliz, so defendant placed himself in front of the cell door and aggressively told them to go away. Defendant realized he only had a short amount of time once they left. His plan was to sever Feliz's head and place it on the sink to send the Mexican Mafia "a very, very clear message." He resumed choking Feliz once the nurse had left, and he attempted to saw Feliz's head off with the razor blade attached to the toothbrush. This attempt failed, so defendant tried stomping and kicking at Feliz's head while Feliz was wrapped in a blanket. At that point defendant was again interrupted by a guard, and the attack ended.
Dr. Soo-Tho testified that defendant's description of the attack was clear and coherent. He was neither rambling nor irrational, and he set forth a consistent, unequivocal narrative of the killing. He demonstrated in detail how he conducted the attack by motioning with his hands.
Dr. Soo-Tho believed that defendant had been faking mental illness because he did not want to be placed in the general population section of the prison. When Dr. Soo-Tho asked defendant about this, he admitted that he was "playing the mental health card" and agreed he was not mentally incapacitated. He explained that the general population section was controlled by Mexican gangs, and he believed he was at greater risk of being killed there. By feigning mental illness, defendant was able to get a secured cell by himself separate from the general population.
Dr. Soo-Tho opined that defendant had made up his mind to kill Feliz in advance, such that it was not a spontaneous act. The attack was mindful and planned, as demonstrated by the fact that defendant prepared a weapon beforehand. The stated purpose of the attack—to send a message to the Mexican Mafia—also showed that it was intentional. Defendant was not responding to hallucinations on the "spur of the moment."
Dr. Soo-Tho testified that defendant met the diagnostic criteria for antisocial personality disorder. Antisocial personality disorder is not considered a psychiatric illness; it is a disorder of character. The disorder does not impede a person's ability to understand right and wrong. Defendant's planning of the attack and his attempt to hide evidence of the crime indicated his awareness of the wrongful nature of the attack. Generally, with antisocial personality disorder, a person's behavior is intentional, calculated, and manipulative.
b. Dr. Cheryl Lynn Paizis
Prison psychiatrist Cheryl Lynn Paizis testified for defendant. Dr. Paizis treated defendant in 2004 and 2005. Around January 2005, she submitted a report in support of a petition for a court order to medicate defendant involuntarily. She had diagnosed defendant as suffering from schizoaffective disorder, antisocial personality disorder, and borderline personality disorder. Schizoaffective disorder is a mental illness under Axis I of the DSM-IV. It is not the same as schizophrenia. It has traits of a mood disorder—either depression or bipolar disorder—but the traits of schizophrenia may not always be apparent.
Dr. Paizis stated in her report that defendant lacked the capacity to consent to medication because he was unable to understand the severity of his symptoms and he denied the need for treatment. Defendant had expressed suicidal ideations, stated he had auditory hallucinations, and described a plan to hang himself. He was constantly paranoid of staff, and he had delusions that people were gassing him through the grate of his cell; putting a microchip in his head; kidnapping his wife; and planning to behead him while monitoring him on television. Dr. Paizis concluded defendant presented a danger to himself and others.
On cross-examination, Dr. Paizis testified that defendant was high functioning, able to interact with people, and responded appropriately to her. She recalled that defendant appeared charming. She testified that schizoaffective would not mean he could not understand the difference between right and wrong, nor that he would not understand the nature and quality of his actions. Similarly, antisocial and personality disorders do not interfere with the ability to know right from wrong or the nature and quality of one's acts. Dr. Paizis did not think defendant was malingering or feigning his schizoaffective disorder.
c. Dr. William Taylor Fithian
Psychiatrist William Taylor Fithian testified for the defense. Dr. Fithian first examined defendant in November 2005 and found him incompetent to stand trial. Defendant was rambling and nonresponsive, and much of his conduct was bizarre and inappropriate. Dr. Fithian diagnosed him with attention deficit disorder, bipolar disorder with mixed features, antisocial personality disorder, and polysubstance abuse. Dr. Fithian did not determine whether defendant was malingering. Defendant had been prescribed psychiatric medications, but Dr. Fithian did not know whether defendant was taking them. Dr. Fithian agreed that a toxicology screen of defendant's blood taken the day he killed Feliz showed the medications were not detected.
In February 2006 and November 2006, Dr. Fithian again opined that defendant was incompetent to stand trial. After interviewing defendant in October 2008, Dr. Fithian changed his diagnosis. Although defendant had been diagnosed in the past with schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, bipolar disorder, and schizoaffective disorder with bipolar and mixed traits, Dr. Fithian opined that those no longer applied; the only consistent diagnosis was personality disorder. He determined that defendant's behavior had become so inconsistent, dramatic, and bizarre that it appeared to be volitional. He testified that "malingering would be one way to look at that." Dr. Fithian found defendant competent to stand trial in October 2008 and in subsequent reports. Dr. Fithian also opined that defendant would use his behavior to manipulate the court system.
When asked about defendant's mental state at the time of the killing, Dr. Fithian opined that defendant "had control over his behavior to a large extent." Dr. Fithian opined that defendant could form the intent to kill, plan it in advance, and carry it out. Dr. Fithian also opined that defendant could "weigh the pros and cons in regard to the act of killing."
3. Assaults on Lynford Perry and Lewis Bruister
On February 18, 2009, several guards had transported defendant and other inmates to court appearances. Defendant was sitting at the end of a pew in the courtroom when one of the guards saw sudden movement and heard chains rattling from where defendant was seated. Once the guard focused her attention on him, she saw him leaning or standing over Perry. Defendant was moving his torso back and forth and swinging his arms. The guards pulled defendant off Perry and escorted them out of court. Perry had suffered a "big slash" on his neck, requiring stitches. A razor was found on the bench where defendant had been seated.
On April 14, 2009, defendant was sitting in a chair in a prison dental laboratory awaiting treatment. Bruister was lying supine in another chair on the other side of the room. Defendant rolled out of his chair, ran to the side of the room where Bruister was lying, and jumped on top of him. Guards intervened and stopped the attack. On the floor, they found an inmate-manufactured weapon made from sharpened eyeglass handles wrapped in cloth. They later discovered Bruister had suffered two puncture wounds to the chest and flesh wounds on his right hand. When a guard attempted to question defendant about the attack, he responded, " 'Why bother? . . . They didn't bother when I sliced that other guy.' "
4. Defendant's Testimony
Defendant testified during the guilt phase, but the court struck his testimony in its entirety based on his disruptive behavior. He testified again in the sanity phase. His was the only testimony presented in the sanity phase.
Defendant testified that he had been in trouble with the law since he was young. He was first taken into custody when he was 11 years old. When he was in the juvenile court system, he was diagnosed with schizophrenia and treated with Ritalin. In the 1990s, he shot himself in the head and abdomen because he believed a SWAT team had surrounded the house he was in. According to the neighbors, it was only a landscaping crew. At the time of the murder, defendant was serving a term of 91 years eight months for raping and orally copulating his wife.
In January 2005, Dr. Paizis wanted defendant to be medicated, but he testified that he did not want to take the medications. When asked about her diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder, defendant denied he needed medication and responded, "You know, as far as my diagnosis, I look at it like this: I'm in a war and I'm in a cell for long periods. I'm in periods of segregation. So we have very long months and years, long[] periods of boredom. And then there are intense bursts of action. This is my life. This is my war." He did not believe he suffered from schizoaffective disorder.
Defense counsel questioned defendant about a letter he wrote the day before killing Feliz. Feliz was in defendant's cell at the time. Defendant testified that he could not refuse having a cellmate because he (defendant) was a gang member at the time and he had no choice. When defendant wrote the letter, he believed he was a soldier for God. He believed someone had put "voice boxes" in the air vent to talk to him, and he believed he was selling body parts for the Mexican Mafia, Italian Mafia, and Irish Mafia. Defendant also believed Feliz was trying to put ricin in his oatmeal or kill him with a bow and arrow.
Defendant admitted he had attacked Feliz. Defendant testified, "I did cause his death. I murdered him. It was him or me." Defendant pointed to the letter he had written and stated, "You know why he died. This is why he died." Defendant further testified that he killed Feliz because he believed Feliz intended to harm him.
B. Procedural Background
The prosecution charged defendant with four counts: Count 1—The murder of Franklin Feliz (§ 187, subd. (a)); and counts 2, 3, and 4—Assault by a person undergoing a life sentence on Franklin Feliz, Lynford Perry, and Lewis Bruister, respectively (§ 4500). The prosecution further alleged four prior strike convictions. (§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(2).) Defendant pleaded not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity.
The case went to trial in July 2014 following competency hearings and other proceedings. With the exception of defendant's own testimony, all evidence was presented during the guilt phase. Before the defense's case in the guilt phase, defendant withdrew his insanity pleas as to counts 3 and 4 (assaults on Perry and Bruister).
At the end of the guilt phase, the jury found defendant guilty on all counts. In a bifurcated portion of the guilt phase, the jury found true all four strike priors. The sanity phase of the trial began the same day. Defendant then testified on his own behalf. At the close of the defense case in the sanity phase, the trial court found the evidence insufficient to support a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity. Accordingly, the court directed a verdict of sanity and dismissed the jury.
On each of counts 3 and 4, the court imposed consecutive terms of life in prison without the possibility of parole for 27 years. On count 1, the court imposed a consecutive term of 75 years to life. As to count 2, the court stayed the term under section 654.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Denial of Defendant's Faretta Motions
Defendant contends the trial court erred by denying his repeated motions to represent himself at trial under Faretta, supra. The Attorney General contends the court acted within its discretion by denying the Faretta motions based on defendant's history of disrupting court proceedings. We conclude the trial court acted within its discretion.
1. Background
Defendant disrupted court proceedings on numerous occasions before the trial court denied his Faretta motions. As described above, defendant attacked Lynford Perry during a calendar call while the two were sitting in a courtroom in 2009. At a hearing in 2011, defendant was sitting in a witness chair next to the judge when he yelled, "He's on fire," and attempted to throw a pitcher of water on the judge. Correctional officers physically restrained defendant and removed him from court. In 2012, while wearing full restraints, defendant assaulted his counsel with a razor blade in court, cutting his face. Defendant was again removed from court. In 2013, defendant repeatedly interrupted the judge, treated his counsel obnoxiously, and voluntarily absented himself from court. Witnesses testified to numerous other instances in which defendant was removed from court for verbally threatening attorneys and court staff.
Defendant also moved multiple times to dismiss his counsel under Marsden. Defendant first moved to represent himself in conjunction with a Marsden motion in 2011. The trial court deferred ruling on the motion pending the outcome of competency proceedings. In 2012, the trial court found defendant had "actively participated in discouraging and making it impossible" for his attorney to continue representing him. When the court appointed new counsel, defendant again moved under Marsden to dismiss the attorney. After the court denied the motion, defendant met with his attorney in prison and threw a milk carton full of urine, feces, and blood into the attorney's face. The court subsequently granted counsel's motion to withdraw.
People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden).
The trial court first denied defendant's Faretta motion in November 2013, after he had been found competent to stand trial. The court made several findings supporting the denial. First, it found defendant was disrupting proceedings by interrupting the court. After the court noted it had denied defendant's most recent Marsden motion, the court found defendant was frustrated by his inability to dismiss his counsel. The court noted that the proceedings had been pending since 2005, finding that the motion was "timely in some respects" but "in other respects the motion is not timely."
The court then found that defendant's disruptive behavior was the most important factor in denying the motion. Defendant had been repeatedly removed from multiple courtrooms for interrupting the court, "outbursts of swearing," belligerence, and various acts of violence. After defendant continued to interrupt the court and behave belligerently, he was again removed from the courtroom. The court found defendant was unable to conduct himself appropriately in the courtroom and his behavior was likely to make trial impossible if he were allowed to represent himself: "The record will reflect that Mr. Gomez has just been escorted from the courtroom due to his swearing and belligerent, interruptive conduct in the courtroom. There have been numerous occasions. This is just the most recent where Mr. Gomez has shown that he cannot conduct himself in an appropriate manner in the courtroom. Doesn't matter whether the proceedings are ones that are controversial or whether he's not allowed what he wants to do. He clearly, on many occasions, tries to control the proceedings. And if things are not going his way, is interruptive, not only verbally, but also physically interruptive of the Court to the extent that he has to be taken out of the courtroom. [¶] That type of conduct is not conduct that would allow any type of court proceedings, particularly a jury trial or any kind of a trial proceeding, to go in a fashion, a productive fashion. I'm not sure we could even begin a trial with Mr. Gomez if it appears that any time something occurs that displeases him he finds it necessary to burst out and interrupt. This recent outburst was relatively mild compared to some of the others."
The court further stated it had reviewed past transcripts documenting multiple instances in which defendant had disrupted the proceedings with violent behavior: "[T]his Court has reviewed a number of transcripts from hearings that were done in front of Judge Hood over the two or three years that he handled Mr. Gomez's case. I've also reviewed Marsden hearings that were conducted by Judge Scott where the defendant has been disruptive and belligerent. He on prior occasions has used offensive language to this Court, as well as the other judges. [¶] And the other things that I'm referring to as far as his physical violence in the courtroom are incidents where the defendant attacked his own attorney in the courtroom with a prison-made weapon slashing his attorney in the face. Another incident in a courtroom several years ago where the defendant . . . attacked another inmate in the courtroom. These types of outbursts are things that would make it impossible to conduct proceedings with Mr. Gomez representing himself."
Defendant renewed his Faretta motion in April 2014. The court denied the motion. Defendant renewed his Faretta motion again in July 2014. The court denied the motion, again citing defendant's outbursts and violent behavior in court.
2. Legal Principles
"A criminal defendant has a right to represent himself [or herself] at trial under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. [Citations.] A trial court must grant a defendant's request for self-representation if three conditions are met. First, the defendant must be mentally competent, and must make his [or her] request knowingly and intelligently, having been apprised of the dangers of self-representation. [Citations.] Second, he [or she] must make his [or her] request unequivocally. [Citations.] Third, he [or she] must make his [or her] request within a reasonable time before trial. [Citations.] Faretta error is reversible per se. [Citations.]" (People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 729 (Welch).)
"However, the right of self-representation is not absolute." (People v. Williams (2013) 58 Cal.4th 197, 253.) A trial court may deny a request for self-representation that is intended to delay or disrupt the proceedings. (People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 27.) The court should consider "the 'quality of counsel's representation of the defendant, the defendant's prior proclivity to substitute counsel, the reasons for the request, the length and stage of the proceedings, and the disruption or delay which might reasonably be expected to follow the granting of such a motion.' [Citations.]" (People v. Burton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 843, 852 (Burton).)
We apply the abuse of discretion standard of review to the denial of a Faretta motion based on a finding that the motion was made for purposes of delay or disruption. (Burton, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 854; Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 735.)
3. The Trial Court Acted Within its Discretion in Denying the Faretta Motions
Defendant contends the trial court erred by denying his Faretta motions because he satisfied the three factors set forth in Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th at page 729. But even assuming those factors are met, a court may still deny a Faretta motion based on the defendant's disruptive behavior. (Id. at p. 734.) "This rule is obviously critical to the viable functioning of the courtroom. A constantly disruptive defendant who represents himself, and who therefore cannot be removed from the trial proceedings as a sanction against disruption, would have the capacity to bring his trial to a standstill." (Ibid.)
As set forth above, the record is replete with examples of defendant's violent and disruptive behavior in various courtroom settings. The trial court's findings regarding his inability to conduct himself appropriately are well supported. The record shows defendant was "so disruptive, obstreperous, disobedient, disrespectful or obstructionist in his [] actions or words as to preclude the exercise of the right to self-representation." (Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 735.) The court acted well within its discretion by denying his repeated Faretta motions.
Defendant does not deny the disruptive and violent nature of his conduct in court. Rather, he asserts he was only disruptive while he was represented by counsel. He contends the trial court abused its discretion because it denied his Faretta motions without first giving him the opportunity to represent himself. For this proposition, he relies on Moon v. Superior Court (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1521 (Moon). We are not persuaded. The defendant in Moon disrupted the proceedings only once—after the trial court denied his Marsden motion. In finding a violation of Faretta, the court of appeal noted, "[T]here is nothing in the record to indicate Moon was prone toward obstreperousness before the court denied his Faretta motion." The court's observation was simply a description of the events that occurred. The court did not hold that a Faretta motion may only be denied after a defendant has been given the opportunity to represent himself. (See People v. Watts (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 621, 630 [defendant was incorrect in asserting that only his conduct at trial could have warranted the denial of his Faretta request].) Moreover, the disruptive nature of defendant's conduct here was vastly more egregious than that of Moon's.
We conclude the record supports the trial court's findings regarding defendant's disruptive behavior and his inability to represent himself without impeding the proceedings. The denial of his motions to represent himself under Faretta was not an abuse of discretion.
B. Directed Verdict of Sanity
Defendant contends the trial court erred by granting a directed verdict of sanity and removing the issue from the jury's consideration. The Attorney General contends the court properly granted a directed verdict because defendant failed to present sufficient evidence he was insane at the time of the murder and assault of Feliz. Our examination of the record reveals no substantial evidence that defendant was legally insane when he killed Feliz. We conclude the trial court properly granted a directed verdict of sanity.
1. Legal Principles
"In any criminal proceeding . . . in which a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity is entered, this defense shall be found by the trier of fact only when the accused person proves by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she was incapable of knowing or understanding the nature and quality of his or her act and of distinguishing right from wrong at the time of the commission of the offense." (§ 25, subd. (b).) "Because a plea of insanity is an affirmative defense in which the defendant has the burden of proof, the court may, through the grant of a directed verdict, 'remove the issue of sanity from the jury when the defendant has failed to present evidence sufficient to support the special plea.' " (People v. Blakely (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 771, 775, quoting People v. Ceja (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1071, 1089 (Ceja).)
In reviewing the grant of a directed verdict of sanity, we apply the substantial evidence standard of review. (People v. Severance (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 305, 320.) "[I]n doing so we do not look for substantial evidence in support of the trial court's ruling that defendant was sane; rather, we look for substantial evidence from which the jury reasonably could have found defendant was not sane. If we find such evidence, then a directed verdict of sanity was improper." (Ibid.) Evidence presented during the guilt phase may be considered in the sanity phase. (People v. Hernandez (2000) 22 Cal.4th 512, 520.)
2. Defendant Presented No Substantial Evidence to Support a Finding of Insanity
Defendant contends substantial evidence showed he was mentally ill at the time of the killing. Two of the expert witnesses—Dr. Soo-Tho and Dr. Fithian—did not support this assertion. To the contrary, Dr. Fithian effectively opined that defendant was malingering. Dr. Fithian further testified that defendant could form the intent to kill, plan it in advance, carry it out, and "weigh the pros and cons" of doing so. The Attorney General concedes, however, that one of the three expert witnesses—Dr. Paizis—opined that defendant suffered from schizoaffective disorder at the time of the killing. But under the M'Naghten standard, mental illness does not mean legal insanity. "[A] defendant may suffer from a diagnosable mental illness without being legally insane." (People v. Elmore (2014) 59 Cal.4th 121, 145-146, internal quotations omitted.) Under section 25, the defendant must show his mental condition rendered him incapable of knowing or understanding the nature and quality of his act, or incapable of distinguishing right from wrong in relation to that act. (Ceja, supra, 106 Cal.App.4th at p. 1089.) "In other words, there is a causation element connecting appellant's criminal acts and a mental condition." (Ibid.)
M'Naghten's Case (1843) 10 Clark & Fin. 200. --------
Defendant does not contend his mental condition rendered him incapable of knowing or understanding the nature and quality of his act. He focuses solely on the second prong of the M'Naghten standard: He contends he presented substantial evidence that his mental illness made him incapable of distinguishing right from wrong at the time of the killing. He argues the evidence showed he was suffering from delusions or hallucinations at the time of the killing. He points out that no psychiatric medications were found in his blood even though they had been prescribed. He notes that the jury inquired about the lack of such drugs in his blood in guilt phase deliberations.
The record holds no testimony or other evidence to show defendant could not distinguish right from wrong at the time of the killing. None of the experts testified that defendant lacked such a capacity. Dr. Paizis testified that a diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder did not mean defendant lacked the capacity to distinguish right from wrong. Even assuming defendant was suffering from delusions or some other mental illness at the time of the killing, this does not imply that his mental defects rendered him unable to distinguish right from wrong. Indeed, the evidence shows defendant understood the wrongful nature of his conduct. He attempted to mislead or distract the guards in the course of the killing, and he attempted to hide the evidence of it. In admitting to the killing after the fact, he described it as a "freebie," showing that he was willing to commit the act in part because he believed he could not be punished for it. In his interview with Dr. Soo-Tho, defendant lied about hearing auditory hallucinations at the time of the killing, showing a desire to disguise his true mental state. He then stated his true motive for the killing was to protect himself from attacks by the Mexican Mafia. His words and conduct thereby showed his actions were calculated and carefully planned with consideration of any potential consequences.
Defendant's own testimony in the sanity phase did not constitute substantial evidence either. At no point did he claim he could not or did not distinguish right from wrong at the time of the killing. To the contrary, he testified that he killed Feliz because he believed he needed to protect himself from harm. He denied that he suffered from schizoaffective disorder. And while he made certain statements implying he was suffering from various delusions at the time, nothing about the delusions showed he lacked the capacity to distinguish right from wrong.
On this record, no reasonable jury could have found defendant was rendered incapable of distinguishing right from wrong at the time of the killing. Nor is there substantial evidence to show his mental condition rendered him incapable of understanding the nature and quality of his act. Accordingly, we find no substantial evidence from which the jury reasonably could have found defendant was not sane. We conclude the trial court properly granted a directed verdict of sanity.
C. Correction of the Abstract of Judgment
Defendant contends the abstract of judgment must be corrected because it states he committed the assaults charged in counts 3 and 4 in 2005, whereas the true date is 2009. The Attorney General concedes this claim. We accept the concession. Defendant is correct that the abstract of judgment incorrectly states he committed the assaults in 2005. We will order the trial court to correct the abstract.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The trial court is ordered to correct the abstract of judgment to reflect that defendant committed the assaults charged in counts 3 and 4 in 2009.
/s/_________
BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, J. WE CONCUR: /s/_________
ELIA, ACTING P.J. /s/_________
PREMO, J.