Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
San Mateo County Super. Ct. No. SC062725
Jones, P.J.
After the lower court denied his motion to suppress, appellant Alfonso Gomez pleaded no contest to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. (Pen. Code, § 12021, subd. (a).) On appeal, Gomez contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant. He does not challenge the validity of the warrant, but rather the manner of its execution. He argues the police officers should have known they were searching multiple rental units rather than a single family dwelling, and improperly accessed his bedroom and a locked drawer. We disagree, and we affirm.
Unless otherwise noted, all further references are to the Penal Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The facts are taken from the evidence presented at the hearing on appellant’s motion to suppress.
Prosecution Evidence
San Jose Police Officer Bret Moiseff testified that he went to a house in East Palo Alto on October 24, 2006 to execute a search warrant. The warrant alleged that Ricardo Alvarez (Alvarez) had violated the Health and Safety Code and authorized the search of the house for cocaine and paraphernalia related to the sale of cocaine. The warrant did not mention appellant.
Moiseff was one of the first officers to enter the house. He described the residence as “a single story house in a residential neighborhood with several bedrooms and a garage which had been converted into a make-shift bedroom. There was a living room and dining room area as you enter [the house] with a hallway in the middle . . . as the common hallway for the different bedrooms.” The residence also contained a kitchen area.
When Moiseff arrived at the house, three adults and two small children were sitting in the living room area. Eventually, Moiseff was asked to search “one bedroom off the hallway” and he complied. Moiseff went into the bedroom and found a locked dresser. Moiseff returned to the living room area and “said something to the effect of there’s a locked drawer, and I was trying to figure out how to get into it. . . .” In response, appellant told him that the key was on the dining room table. Moiseff did not ask appellant for permission to go into the dresser, but he did not tell appellant that he was going to break the door unless he obtained a key. When Moiseff entered appellant’s bedroom, the door was unlocked. In the dresser, Moiseff found two handguns, magazines, ammunition, digital scales, and various items of indicia for appellant and for Alvarez.
When Moiseff entered the residence, nothing about it indicated to him that the bedrooms were separate dwelling units. Appellant’s bedroom did not have a separate entrance, nor did it have its own address or mailbox. It did not have a private bathroom, a kitchen area, or appliances. The doors to the bedrooms “just appeared to be standard doors[.]” There did not appear to be a dead bolt on appellant’s door, nor “any additional locking type mechanisms other than just a standard door lock.” Moiseff noted that he was not “even sure if there was a key” for appellant’s bedroom. Moiseff testified that he was generally familiar with residences where people rent rooms, but he explained that he “[didn’t] think that was ever brought to [his] attention in this situation[.]” When asked whether there was anything about the door to appellant’s bedroom that would have led him to believe that the bedroom was a separate dwelling unit, Moiseff replied, “It didn’t appear that way at all.”
Defense Evidence
Appellant and Ana Maria Alvarez, Alvarez’s sister, testified for the defense. Appellant testified that when the search warrant was executed, there were four adults and four children living at the house. Each adult had a separate bedroom. Appellant stated that the doors to the bedrooms could be locked. He explained, however, that the occupants left their bedroom doors open when they were present. Appellant testified that when the police officers executed the warrant, they did not ask him whether the house contained separate residences, nor did they ask him which room Ricardo Alvarez occupied.
Appellant explained that Alvarez used to live at the house “when he was much younger.” Appellant knew Alvarez and had previously lived with Alvarez’s mother. One of appellant’s roommates, Jacqueline, was the mother of Alvarez’s brother’s children. According to appellant, none of the residents of the house were strangers to him.
Appellant stated that when the police executed the warrant, his bedroom door was open and that the police officers did not need a key to enter his room. The bedroom to the right of his room, however, was locked, and the police broke down that door. He also stated that his bedroom did not have a separate entrance to the outside and that it shared one address with the rest of the bedrooms. Finally, appellant testified that there was only one mailbox for the house.
Ana Maria Alvarez also testified for the defense. She stated that she and six other people lived at the house when the police executed the warrant. She explained that there were three bedrooms in the house; each bedroom door had a “regular lock” that required a different key to open. On the morning of October 24, 2006, she locked her door before she went to work. When she returned from work, the door was broken.
In December 2006, the People filed an information charging appellant with two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm (§ 12021, subd. (a)) and one count of unlawful possession of ammunition (§ 12316, subd. (b)(1)). Appellant moved to suppress. He raised two alternative arguments. First, he argued that if the police officers knew that the residence was a “multiple occupancy structure,” the warrant was invalid. Second, he contended that once the officers learned that there were “multiple residences” within the house, they should have confined their search to Alvarez’s bedroom and the common areas.
At the hearing, the court rejected appellant’s argument that the house was akin to a fraternity house. The court stated, “I don’t agree that’s like a fraternity house. There are . . . many situations where extended members of a family . . . live in the same house and they may have separate bedrooms or some of them share a bedroom, but it’s not equivalent to a boarding house or a fraternity house or sorority house[.]” The court denied the motion to suppress and appellant pleaded no contest to being a felon in possession of a firearm (§ 12021, subd. (a)). A the sentencing hearing, the court suspended imposition of judgment and sentence and placed appellant on three years’ probation.
DISCUSSION
Appellant concedes that the search warrant was properly issued. His quarrel is with the way the officers executed the warrant. He contends that the officers knew or should have known that the house contained separate living units and, as a result, the officers should have obtained a warrant before searching his bedroom or limited their search to common areas of the house.
The standard of appellate review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is well established. “We defer to the trial court’s factual findings, express or implied, where supported by substantial evidence. In determining whether, on the facts so found, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, we exercise our independent judgment. [Citations.]” (People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 362.)
As a general rule, “‘a warrant to search “premises” located at a particular address is sufficient to support the search of outbuildings and appurtenances in addition to a main building when the various places searched are part of a single integral unit. [Citations.]’” (People v. Weagley (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 569, 573, quoting People v. Dumas (1973) 9 Cal.3d 871, 881, fn. 5.) But where “a warrant directs a search of a multiple occupancy apartment house or building,” the warrant must limit the search to the unit occupied by the suspect unless there is “probable cause for searching each unit or for believing that the entire building is a single living unit[.]” (People v. Estrada (1965) 234 Cal.App.2d 136, 146, 148; see also Maryland v. Garrison (1987) 480 U.S. 79, 87-88 (Garrison); U.S. v. Kyles (2nd Cir.1994) 40 F.3d 519, 523-524 (Kyles).) The constitutionality of Moiseff’s execution of the search warrant is assessed “in light of the information available to [him] at the time [he] acted.” (Garrison, supra, 480 U.S. at p. 85.)
Kyles is instructive. In that case, two brothers, Basil and Geoffrey, robbed a bank. (Kyles, supra, 40 F.3d at pp. 521-522.) Law enforcement officers arrested Basil outside an apartment and obtained a warrant to search the apartment for evidence of the robbery. (Id. at p. 522.) Geoffrey was not named in the warrant. (Id. at pp. 522-523.) When the officers executed the warrant, Basil and Geoffrey’s mother answered the door and said that only she and Geoffrey lived there. (Ibid.) The officers began to look through the apartment and discovered a locked door. The mother told the officers that the door led to Geoffrey’s bedroom and that only he had the key. (Ibid.) The officers forced the door open and found evidence from the robbery. (Ibid.)
Geoffrey moved to suppress, claiming “that his bedroom was a separate residence not covered by the warrant because the door was locked [and] only he possessed the key[.]” (Kyles, supra, 40 F.3d at p. 522.) The trial court denied the motion and the Second Circuit affirmed. (Id. at p. 523.) The court explained: “If, during the search, the officers become aware that the warrant describes multiple residences, the officers must confine their search to the residence of the suspect. [Citation.] Factors that indicate a separate residence include separate access from the outside, separate doorbells, and separate mailboxes. [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 524.) The court held that the law enforcement officers “had no reason to believe that Geoffrey’s room was a separate residence: it had neither its own access from the outside, its own doorbell, nor its own mailbox. [The mother’s] statement that Geoffrey was the only person with a key to the room did not, by itself, elevate the bedroom to the status of a separate residential unit. Because the bedroom was not a separate residence, the [officers] had probable cause to believe that the room contained evidence of the bank robbery.” (Ibid.)
The same is true here. The record supports an implied finding that appellant’s bedroom was not a separate residence. From all exterior manifestations, the house appeared to be a single family dwelling. It had only one mailbox and one address. Nothing about appellant’s bedroom suggested that it was a separate unit: it did not have a separate entrance to the outside, a doorbell, or a private bathroom or kitchen area. Moiseff testified that it did not appear that appellant’s bedroom was a separate dwelling unit. In fact, he noted that it did not occur to him until the hearing on appellant’s motion to suppress that the house may have contained “different rental type units . . . It didn’t appear that way at all.” And here, no one told Moiseff that appellant was the only person who possessed a key to appellant’s bedroom. Accordingly, we conclude that the lower court properly determined that, based on the information available to Moiseff when he executed the warrant, he reasonably believed appellant’s bedroom was not a separate residence and that the house was a single family dwelling.
Appellant argues that Moiseff’s failure to realize that the house consisted of separate living units was unreasonable because he was confronted with a situation where there were multiple unrelated persons residing in the house who shared certain common areas. Each bedroom door had a lock and could be entered only by using a key or by force. We disagree. The problem with appellant’s argument is that the information upon which he relies was not known to Moiseff when he executed the search warrant. As noted above, Moiseff testified that nothing about the house indicated that it contained separate residences. Appellant did not tell Moiseff that the bedrooms were occupied by different people, nor did he tell Moiseff that the occupants of the house locked their doors. Accordingly, the search of appellant’s bedroom was “objectively understandable and reasonable” based on the information available to the Moiseff when he executed the warrant. (Garrison, supra, 480 U.S. at p. 88, fn. omitted [officer’s failure to realize the overbreadth of the warrant was “objectively understandable and reasonable. . . . The objective facts available to the officers at the time [the search warrant was executed] suggested no distinction between [the suspect’s] apartment and the third-floor premises”].)
Appellant argues that “[i]n similar cases, courts have found that each room constitutes a separate living space for purposes of the warrant requirement and that continuing a search of all rooms . . . exceeds the scope of the warrant.” One case upon which appellant relies is U.S. v. Greathouse (D. Ore. 2003) 297 F.Supp.2d 1264, 1274-1275 (Greathouse). In Greathouse, the district court concluded that a search of the defendant’s bedroom was unlawful because the law enforcement officers “were immediately advised” by the owner when they entered the house “that the defendant was a renter and that he lived in the back bedroom on the first floor. It was also apparent to the officers that there was no familial relation between any of the residents; they were simply a group of people sharing a house.” (Id. at p. 1274.) In addition, the defendant had a “Do Not Enter” sign posted on his door. (Ibid.) The court concluded that “upon learning this information from [the owner], when coupled with the sign on the defendant’s door and the apparent absence of any familial or other connection between the residents, the agents at that point should have known there were separate residences within the house and should have stopped and obtained a second warrant for the defendant’s bedroom.” (Id. at pp. 1274-1275.)
Greathouse is of no assistance to appellant for several reasons. First, the circumstances of Greathouse are distinguishable. Here, Moiseff was not advised that appellant was a “renter” and it was not apparent to Moiseff that “there was no familial relation between any of the residents.” (Greathouse, supra, 297 F.Supp.2d at p. 1274.) Moreover, appellant did not display a “Do Not Enter” sign on his bedroom door. Second, we are not bound by decisions of the federal district courts. (Raven v. Deukmejian (1990) 52 Cal.3d 336, 352 [lower federal court decisions interpreting the federal Constitution “though persuasive, are not binding on state courts”]; People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 190.) Third, the Greathouse court’s conclusion is dicta, which we are not bound to follow. (See Greathouse, supra, 297 F.Supp.2d at p. 1275 [noting that the “separate residences” argument was moot, but nevertheless determining that the law enforcement officers’ failure to secure a warrant was “an alternative basis for suppression of the evidence”].)
Appellant’s reliance on Mena v. City of Simi Valley (9th Cir. 2000) 226 F.3d 1031, 1036-1039 — a civil rights case arising out of the execution of a search warrant — is misplaced. In that case, police officers obtained a warrant to search a house in Simi Valley. Before they executed the search, the officers knew that a “large number” of people lived in the house and that “all of the doors adjacent to the living room were shut and that some of them had padlocks on them.” (Id. at p. 1035.) When the officers entered the house to execute the warrant, “they observed that many of the rooms were padlocked from the outside. Furthermore, upon forcing entry into the locked rooms, the officers saw that the rooms were set up as studio apartment type units, with their own refrigerators, cooking supplies, food, televisions, and stereos.” (Id. at p. 1038.) The Ninth Circuit concluded that the officers should have realized immediately that the house was a multi-unit residential dwelling and limited their search to their suspect’s apartment because they knew that a large number of persons lived in the house and that the rooms were padlocked and set up as studio apartment units. (Ibid.) The court also concluded that there was virtually no evidence that the suspect had access to or control of the rooms inhabited by other residents. (Id. at p. 1039.) Factual differences prevent Mena from applying here. In contrast to Mena, Moiseff had no knowledge prior to searching the house that a “large number” of people lived in the house or that the some of the bedroom doors had locks. (Id. at p. 1035.) And unlike the officers in Mena, the bedrooms here were not set up as separate studio apartments. Appellant’s bedroom did not have its own bathroom, kitchen, or appliances.
Finally, we are not persuaded by appellant’s attempt to analogize this case to People v. MacAvoy (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 746, 753-754. That case concerned a warrant to search a fraternity house at Stanford University. (Id. at p. 753.) The warrant listed the fraternity’s address and the name of the suspect, but did not restrict the search to the suspect’s bedroom. (Id. at p. 754.) On appeal, the defendant contended that “the search warrant was void because it did not meet the Fourth Amendment’s requirement that the place to be searched be described with particularity because it authorized a search of the entire fraternity, even though probable cause existed only to search [his] room.” (Id. at p. 753.) A division of this court agreed. It began its analysis by noting that “the parties entered into a stipulation that the approximately 50 residents of the fraternity house are assigned rooms by the university and are issued keys to their individual rooms. Thus, for the purposes of our analysis, the fraternity house is essentially a multiunit structure with certain common areas shared by all residents.” (Ibid.)
There is no such stipulation here and there is no evidence in the record that the house here was a fraternity or boarding house. Moreover, Moiseff testified that he was familiar with residences where people rent rooms and that the house did not appear to be one of those residences. As a result, substantial evidence supports the lower court’s finding that the house at issue here was not “like a fraternity house.” Based on the information available to the officers at the time of execution of the warrant, the officers’ belief that the residence was a single shared living space was objectively reasonable, and the search lawful.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: Needham, J., Dondero, J.
Judge of the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.