Opinion
2011-09-23
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Rivka GOLI, Defendant–Appellant.
Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York City, for respondent. Lewin & Lewin, LLP, Washington, D.C. (Nathan Lewin of counsel), for appellant.
Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York City, for respondent. Lewin & Lewin, LLP, Washington, D.C. (Nathan Lewin of counsel), for appellant.
Present: SCHOENFELD, J.P., HUNTER, JR., J.
PER CURIAM.
Judgment of conviction (James M. Burke, J.), rendered January 29, 2009, modified, on the law and the facts, to vacate defendant's conviction of obstructing governmental administration in the second degree and to dismiss the count of the accusatory instrument relating thereto and, as modified, affirmed.
The verdict convicting defendant of unlawful eviction ( see Administrative Code of City of N.Y. § 26–521[a][3] ) was supported by legally sufficient evidence and was not against the weight of the evidence, which established that defendant ousted her roommate from possession of the apartment that they had shared for several months by unilaterally changing the entrance lock and removing the complainant's possessions. While it may be that defendant and the complainant tentatively discussed terminating their written roommate agreement, the court, as factfinder, was warranted in determining that the complainant had not surrendered possession and remained in “lawful occupancy” of the apartment (Code § 26–521[a] ) at the time the incident occurred. Defendant's contention that the antieviction ordinance is properly invoked only against a finite class of landlords—those, it is urged, who “engage in bad faith conduct” aimed at reaping unfair profits—is belied by the text of the ordinance, whose terms, with a single, limited exception not here relevant ( see Code § 26–522[a][2][b] ), are expressly made applicable to “any person” who engages in the conduct proscribed therein.
Far less persuasive was the evidence presented in connection with the governmental obstruction charge. In this regard, the trial proof showed only that defendant, during a hiatus in police questioning inside the apartment, peaceably entered her bedroom, locked the door and, in what was described without refutation in the trial testimony as a “fear[ful] and apprehens[ive]” state, telephoned an attorney-acquaintance seeking counsel. On this record, and without more, defendant's failure to comply with the police directive to open the door did not evince the requisite intent to obstruct the police investigation through “physical force or interference” ( see Penal Law § 195.05; Matter of Kendell R., 71 A.D.3d 553, 897 N.Y.S.2d 83 [2010]; People v. McDaniel, 154 Misc.2d 89, 593 N.Y.S.2d 154 [1992], lv. denied 81 N.Y.2d 889, 597 N.Y.S.2d 950, 613 N.E.2d 982 [1993] ).
Defendant's evidentiary arguments, to the extent preserved, are either academic or without merit.