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People v. Godine

California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, First Division
Sep 15, 2008
No. D051754 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 15, 2008)

Opinion


THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. WILLIE CHARLES GODINE, Defendant and Appellant. D051754 California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, First Division September 15, 2008

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County No. SCD206181, Cynthia A. Bashant, Judge.

IRION, J.

A jury convicted Willie Charles Godine of felony assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)) (count 1); felony assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury (ibid.) (count 2); and misdemeanor vandalism causing less than $400 in damage (§ 594, subds. (a), (b)(2)(A)) (count 3). Godine admitted that he had served a prior prison term within the meaning of sections 667.5, subdivision (b) and 668. The trial court sentenced Godine to four years in prison, ordering that the sentence for counts 1 and 2 be served concurrently.

Unless otherwise indicated all further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

Godine argues that (1) the trial court prejudicially erred in admitting evidence that he contends lacked relevance to the issues at trial and (2) the trial court erred in ordering that the sentence for counts 1 and 2 be served concurrently rather than staying the sentence for count 2 pursuant to section 654. We conclude that Godine's arguments lack merit, and accordingly we affirm.

I

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On April 27, 2007, Godine had been married to Janet Story for approximately two months. On that day, Godine told Story that he was going to move out of their home and into his mother's house. Story drove Godine and his possessions to Godine's mother's house. Later that day, Godine spoke to Story on the telephone and stated that he wanted to come over and pick up a movie that he had forgotten to take with him, but Story stated that she had to leave for work. While Story was on the way to work in her pickup truck, a car in which Godine was a passenger pulled in front of Story's pickup truck and blocked the street. Story backed up her truck and drove down a different street. The car in which Godine was riding pursued Story's truck.

While Story was stopped at a traffic signal, Godine exited the car in which he was riding and walked toward Story's truck. As the light turned green and Story started to accelerate, Godine ran to Story's truck and jumped inside the truck bed. As Story picked up speed and started swerving the truck, Godine hit the driver's side window with his hand while standing up in the truck bed. Godine then started hitting the back window of the truck cab with a wooden shelving board that he found in the truck bed. As Story pulled the truck over, Godine broke the back window of the truck cab and hit Story in the back of the neck with the board. According to Story's statement to police and the testimony of a bystander who saw the incident, Godine then kicked through the broken window several times, hitting Story in the back of the neck. After Story exited the truck, Godine got in and drove away with the truck. After a bystander called 911, paramedics arrived and took Story to the hospital for treatment of a sore neck.

As a result of the incident, Godine was charged in an information containing three counts. In count 1, Godine was charged with assault with a deadly weapon and by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury based on his use of the board to hit Story's neck. (§ 245, subd. (a)(1).) In connection with count 1, the information also alleged that Godine personally used a deadly weapon (i.e., the board) within the meaning of section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(23). In count 2, Godine was charged with assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury based on his kicks to Story's neck. (§ 245, subd. (a)(1).) In count 3, Godine was charged with misdemeanor vandalism based on the damage to the truck's window. (§ 594, subds. (a), (b)(2)(A).)

At trial, Godine's defense was that he broke the truck's window in self-defense because of Story's erratic driving rather than to assault Story.

The jury convicted Godine on all counts. However, with respect to count 1, the jury made a not true finding as to the charge that during the offense, Godine personally used a deadly weapon. Godine admitted a prison prior, and the trial court sentenced Godine to four years in prison, specifying that the prison term for count 2 would run concurrently with the prison term for count 1.

Godine appeals from the judgment.

II

DISCUSSION

A. Godine's Challenge to the Admission of Evidence That Story Believed Godine "Needed Anger Management" Is Without Merit

Godine's first contention is that the trial court prejudicially erred by admitting evidence that three days after the incident Story told a police detective she believed Godine should obtain anger management counseling. Godine contends that the trial court abused its discretion and violated his federal due process rights by allowing the admission of irrelevant evidence.

1. Relevant Trial Court Proceedings

We first examine the trial proceedings giving rise to Godine's argument. During trial, defense counsel objected to the prosecutor's anticipated questioning of Story about her statement that she believed Godine "needed anger management." Defense counsel's sole basis for objection was that the statement lacked relevance. The trial court overruled the objection, explaining that Godine's statement was relevant to whether Godine was angry during the incident.

Accordingly, the jury heard the following testimony:

"Q: Ms. Story do you remember conveying to the detective that you thought the defendant needed anger management?

"A: Yes."

Story then testified that she believed Godine needed anger management because later, concerning the incident, "he told me he blacked out. He don't remember."

2. Godine's Challenge to the Admission of the Evidence Lacks Merit

On appeal, Godine argues that Story's testimony was not relevant because she based her opinion on what Godine told her after the incident. Godine argues that "Story's statement that, in her opinion, [Godine] needs 'anger management' is not relevant to the material matter for which it was offered, because it was not grounded on her observations of his behavior on that day [of the incident], but rather an observation grounded on his behavior after the event which led the charges in this case." Godine argues that "[r]elevant testimony in this matter would have focused on whether he was angry on the day these events occurred," and that "[s]ince it was not based on Story's observations of [Godine's] behavior on the day of the incident, [Story's testimony] did not have any tendency in reason to prove or disprove a fact of consequence to the determination of the action."

In assessing Godine's argument, we apply the principle that under Evidence Code section 350, only relevant evidence is admissible. (People v. Scheid (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1, 13.) " 'The test of relevance is whether the evidence tends "logically, naturally, and by reasonable inference" to establish material facts such as identity, intent, or motive.' " (People v. Harris (2005) 37 Cal.4th 310, 337 (Harris).) Under Evidence Code section 210, relevant evidence is defined as evidence "having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action." "The trial court has broad discretion in determining the relevance of evidence." (Harris, at p. 337.)

We apply an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing a trial court's ruling on an objection based on the relevance of evidence. (Harris, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 337; see also People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 717-718 ["an appellate court . . . examines for abuse of discretion a decision on admissibility that turns on the relevance of the evidence in question. . . . That is because it so examines the underlying determination as to relevance itself" (citations omitted)].) An abuse of discretion is defined as " 'an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd [exercise] that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.' " (People v. Sanders (1995) 11 Cal.4th 475, 512.)

As we will explain, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that Story's statement to the police detective was relevant. A central issue at trial was why Godine broke the window and struck Story in the neck: Was he angry with her and intending to assault her, or was he acting in self-defense due to her erratic driving? Story's statement to the police detective that Godine needed anger management because of what happened during the incident logically tends to prove that Godine acted out of anger rather than self-defense and thus is relevant to the issues presented at trial. As we have noted, Godine argues that "[r]elevant testimony in this matter would have focused on whether he was angry on the day these events occurred . . . ." Applying that standard, Story's testimony was relevant because it did focus on whether Godine was angry during the incident.

Godine also challenges the admission of the evidence, arguing that Story's "lay opinion on [Godine's] need for treatment is baseless because of her lack of training and experience in assessing people for psychological treatment." He argues, "Testimony of anger may be relevant to a material issue in this case, but opinion that someone has an 'anger problem' requiring treatment is improper lay testimony because it is an opinion requiring specialized psychiatric or medical training."

Evidence Code section 800 governs opinion testimony of a lay witness. "If a witness is not testifying as an expert, his testimony in the form of an opinion is limited to such an opinion as is permitted by law, including but not limited to an opinion that is: [¶] (a) Rationally based on the perception of the witness; and [¶] (b) Helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony." (Ibid.) Under this rule, the trial court thus has discretion to permit lay opinion testimony when a proper foundation exists. (See People v. Medina (1990) 51 Cal.3d 870, 887.)

Here, defense counsel did not object to the testimony on the basis that Story's statement to the police detective would constitute improper lay opinion testimony or that Story lacked the proper foundation to express such an opinion. The objection was solely on the ground of relevancy. We may not reverse a judgment based on the erroneous admission of evidence unless we determine that the evidence should have been excluded "on the ground stated" in an objection made in the trial court. (Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (b).) Accordingly, we do not consider whether Story's testimony should have been excluded as improper and unsupported lay opinion testimony.

3. If Any Error Was Committed by the Trial Court, It Was Harmless

Even if the trial court did err in admitting Story's statement, we would nevertheless conclude that the error was harmless under both People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson) and Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman). As we will explain, we base this conclusion on the fact that the jury heard ample other testimony concerning Godine's anger and Story's opinion that Godine needed professional help to address his temper.

We address both the Watson and Chapman standards because Godine contends that the trial court's purported evidentiary error rises to the level of a violation of his federal due process rights. We note however that the "application of ordinary rules of evidence generally does not impermissibly infringe on an accused's right to present a defense" (People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 10, fn. 2), and "the mere erroneous exercise of discretion under such 'normal' rules does not implicate the federal Constitution." (People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 611.)

First, in testimony to which Godine objected at trial but which he does not challenge on appeal, Story conveyed an opinion to the jury that was very similar to her statement that she believed Godine needed anger management. Specifically, the jury heard the following testimony from Story about her statements to a defense investigator:

"Q: And do you remember expressing to the investigator that you weren't really angry with the defendant; correct?

"A: That's correct.

"Q: But you thought that the defendant apparently on the day of April 27, 2007, had a temper and this is the first time you noticed his problem with his temper?

"A: That's correct.

"Q: And you told the investigator that everyone makes mistakes and maybe he needs to get some counseling to deal with his anger?

[Trial court overrules defense counsel's objection premised on relevancy]

"A: That's correct."

Second, the record contains numerous statements about Godine's angry state during the incident. Story stated that three days after the incident she told the police detective that Godine was "really mad" during the incident. The police detective confirmed Story's statement in his testimony, stating that Story described Godine's demeanor during the incident as "angry." Story testified at trial that Godine gave her an "an angry look" before he drove away in her truck. The bystander who witnessed Godine striking Story stated that Godine "was in a rage."

Based on all of the testimony concerning Godine's anger during the incident and the other testimony from Story that she believed Godine needed counseling to address his anger, Story's statement that she believed Godine needed anger management could not reasonably have contributed to the outcome of the trial. Thus, any error in the admission of the evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24), and it is not "reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached" in the absence of the challenged testimony. (Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.)

B. Godine's Challenge Under Section 654 to the Imposition of a Concurrent Sentence for Counts 1 and 2

Godine's second contention is that the trial court erroneously imposed concurrent sentences for the two assault convictions (counts 1 & 2) and instead should have stayed the sentence on count 2 pursuant to section 654.

Section 654, subdivision (a) provides in relevant part: "An act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law shall be punished under the provision that provides for the longest potential term of imprisonment, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one provision." "[S]ection 654 applies not only where there was but one act in the ordinary sense, but also where there was a course of conduct which violated more than one statute but nevertheless constituted an indivisible transaction. . . . If all the offenses were incident to one objective, the defendant may be punished for any one of such offenses but not for more than one." (People v. Perez (1979) 23 Cal.3d 545, 551, italics added, citations omitted.) Whether offenses are "indivisible" for these purposes is determined by the "defendant's intent and objective, not the temporal proximity of his offenses." (People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 335.) "If [a] defendant harbored 'multiple criminal objectives,' which were independent of and not merely incidental to each other, he may be punished for each statutory violation committed in pursuit of each objective, 'even though the violations shared common acts or were parts of an otherwise indivisible course of conduct.' " (Ibid.)

"The determination of whether there was more than one objective is a factual determination, which will not be reversed on appeal unless unsupported by the evidence presented at trial." (People v. Saffle (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 434, 438; see also People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 730 [approving substantial evidence standard of review as stated in Saffle].) "[T]he law gives the trial court broad latitude in making this determination." (People v. Hutchins (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1312.)

Here, the trial court imposed concurrent sentences. "Section 654 does not allow any multiple punishment, including either concurrent or consecutive sentences." (People v. Deloza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 585, 592.) "If . . . a defendant suffers two convictions, punishment for one of which is precluded by section 654, that section requires the sentence for one conviction to be imposed, and the other imposed and then stayed." (Id. at pp. 591-592.)

Here, the trial court did not make an explicit finding that Godine harbored independent criminal objectives in counts 1 and 2. However, in reviewing the trial court's application of section 654, we will imply a finding in support of the trial court's sentencing decision. (See, e.g., People v. Nelson (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 634, 638.)

The basis for the trial court's decision was not clearly expressed in the record. The trial court stated, "I don't think that consecutive sentences are appropriate. Although they were separate acts, clearly the crime was independent of one another. They were one continuous act. They were committed the same time and place. So I think they should be served concurrently . . . ."

Based on our review of the record, we conclude that substantial evidence supports an implied finding that Godine harbored a separate criminal objective in committing the two assaults. Count 1 concerned the assault with the wooden board. Substantial evidence supports a finding that during that assault Godine's objective was to break the window, and the resulting contact with Story was incidental to that objective. Count 2 concerned the assault in which Godine used his feet to kick Story in the neck multiple times. Substantial evidence supports a finding that during the assault with his feet, Godine's objective was to injure Story. Thus, the evidence supports a finding that Godine harbored two independent objectives in committing the two assaults: to break the window in count 1 and to injure Story in count 2. Further, even if Godine's objective during count 1 was to do physical harm to Story rather than to break the window, because the two assaults were distinct in time and carried out with different instruments (the board and Godine's feet), the evidence would still support a finding that they were committed with two independent objectives, namely, to commit two separate acts of violence to Story. (See People v. Trotter (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 363, 368 [determining that two separate shots fired during the same incident giving rise to two counts of assault were properly punished as offenses with two separate objectives because "each shot evinced a separate intent to do violence"].)

Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly imposed consecutive sentences for counts 1 and 2 rather than staying the sentence for count 2.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

WE CONCUR: HUFFMAN, Acting P. J., McDONALD, J.


Summaries of

People v. Godine

California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, First Division
Sep 15, 2008
No. D051754 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 15, 2008)
Case details for

People v. Godine

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. WILLIE CHARLES GODINE, Defendant…

Court:California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, First Division

Date published: Sep 15, 2008

Citations

No. D051754 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 15, 2008)