Opinion
A167735
08-02-2024
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. NADHIR MUFTAH GHUZI, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
(Solano County Super. Ct. No. FCR360687)
CHOU, J.
Defendant Nadhir Muftah Ghuzi appeals a final judgment after a jury found him guilty of second-degree murder and hit and run driving resulting in injury to another person. Ghuzi argues that his conviction for second-degree murder should be reversed because the victim's conduct immediately before the collision constituted an independent intervening act. Ghuzi further argues that the restitution order requiring him to pay for the victim's funeral expenses violated the Establishment Clause under the First Amendment and should be stricken. We reject both arguments. First, we find that the victim's conduct was not an independent intervening act because it was reasonably foreseeable. Second, we find no evidence to support an Establishment Clause violation. We therefore affirm. We, however, order the trial court to correct the abstract of judgment to reflect the correct amount of Ghuzi's custody credits.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Procedural History
Plaintiff and respondent the People of the State of California (People) charged Ghuzi with murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); count 1) and hit and run driving resulting in injury to another person (Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (b)(1); count 2). A jury found Ghuzi guilty of both counts, and the trial court sentenced Ghuzi to an indeterminate term of 15 years to life in prison on count 1 and a concurrent term of two years on count 2. Although the court awarded Ghuzi 550 days of custody credits, the abstract of judgment only awarded Ghuzi 500 days. At a subsequent restitution hearing, the court ordered that Ghuzi pay $1,052.28 to the California Victim Compensation Board (CVCB) for the victim's funeral expenses. Ghuzi timely appealed.
B. The Collision
North Texas Street, the scene of the collision, has five lanes: two northbound lanes, two southbound lanes, and a two-way left turn lane in the middle. On the southbound side, the lane closest to the center turn lane is called the number one lane and the lane to its right, closest to the sidewalk, is called the number two lane.
Shortly before 7:00 p.m., Darryl Mitchell was riding his bike southbound in the northbound lane of North Texas against traffic. He wore dark, non-reflective clothing and did not wear a helmet. His bike also had no reflectors or lights. Mitchell then rode across the two northbound lanes and slowed down as he entered the center turn lane. He looked over his right shoulder toward the southbound number one lane, which appeared empty, extended his right arm, and merged into that lane. He was traveling about five miles per hour (mph).
At this time, Ghuzi was driving southbound on North Texas in the number two lane at about 66 mph, over 30 mph faster than the 30 to 35 mph speed limit. His headlights were off even though it was getting dark. Ghuzi merged into the number one lane without using his turn signal and struck Mitchell's bike, causing him to fly up onto the hood and top of Ghuzi's car before being thrown into the air. Mitchell eventually landed over 100 feet away. After the collision, Ghuzi veered into the center turn lane, struck a concrete median, and drove off.
Several police officers arrived at the collision site. Soon after, a paramedic arrived, found Mitchell's body lying in the center turn lane, and pronounced him dead. Mitchell had a syringe and methamphetamine on his person.
After reviewing traffic video footage, the police identified Ghuzi as the registered owner of the car that struck Mitchell. After obtaining a search warrant for Ghuzi's house, the police began its search of that house around midnight that same evening. In Ghuzi's garage, the police discovered a car with damage to the front driver's side area. The windshield was shattered, and the driver's side airbag had been deployed. Officers also found empty alcohol containers in the car but no alcohol in Ghuzi's house.
Ghuzi was home during the search. His eyes were bloodshot, watery, and glossy. He refused to participate in any field sobriety or chemical tests. Officers therefore obtained a warrant for a blood test. Ghuzi's blood was drawn at 2:10 a.m. and revealed a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of 0.06 percent.
C. Prosecution Case
The prosecution presented five percipient witnesses and various video footage.
Joella B. testified that at the time of the collision, she was driving southbound on North Texas in the number two lane. She had her headlights on because it was getting dark. She saw Ghuzi's car in the number one lane, a few feet ahead of her. Joella B. also saw Mitchell on his bike but did not see any lights or reflectors on the bike. Immediately after she saw Mitchell, she saw Ghuzi's car hit him. According to Joella B., Mitchell "flew up in the air" and "fell down." Ghuzi, however, did not stop. Instead, he "swerve[d] to turn to the right." Joella B. then stopped in the middle of the intersection, turned on her emergency flashers, and called 911.
Officer Zachary Tuss testified that traffic video footage captured Ghuzi speeding, changing lanes in the middle of an intersection, and running a red light before the collision. The footage also showed Ghuzi making a turn without signaling, driving in and out of a lane, making an unsafe lane change, and cutting off multiple cars before pulling into a gas station. At the station, he walked into the convenience store but left without pumping gas.
A bit later, Ghuzi drove to a liquor store. The store's security video showed Ghuzi purchasing a beer and a shot. The video then showed Ghuzi talking to the store's security guard outside while drinking something. The security guard confirmed that Ghuzi had a small shot bottle and a beer in his hand. The guard believed that Ghuzi had been drinking before he arrived at the liquor store because he smelled of alcohol and was slurring his speech. Ghuzi drank his shot in front of the guard and started to open his beer, but the guard told Ghuzi not to drink in front of him. Ghuzi got in his car with his beer in a paper bag and drove off, hitting a curb on the way out of the parking lot.
About a half hour before the collision, traffic video footage captured Ghuzi running another red light while making a U-turn. He then stopped at another gas station. Joe B., who was also pumping gas at that station, testified that he complimented Ghuzi on the music he was playing. After a brief conversation, Joe B. thought Ghuzi was acting "weird" so he drove away. Joe B. did not, however, smell any alcohol on Ghuzi. Ghuzi then drove away from the gas station without his lights on.
A few minutes before the collision, Ghuzi was driving southbound on North Texas in the number one lane. He did not have his headlights on and veered between his lane and the number two lane. At one point, he even drove in the middle of both lanes. Based on his review of the traffic video footage, Officer Tuss opined that Ghuzi was impaired and could not safely operate a motor vehicle.
Right before the collision, Ghuzi switched from the number two lane to the number one lane without using his turn signal. During the lane change, he was driving about 65 to 66 mph. When he struck Mitchell, he was traveling about 67 mph. Before striking Mitchell, Ghuzi did not appear to brake.
In addition to the percipient witnesses and video, two experts and three traffic collision investigators testified for the prosecution.
A forensic pathologist who performed Mitchell's autopsy opined that Mitchell "died from multiple blunt force injuries" due to being struck by Ghuzi's car. Mitchell sustained fractures to his leg, ribs, and skull, and suffered internal bleeding in his chest and abdominal cavities. Although a high level of methamphetamine was found in Mitchell's system, the pathologist concluded that Mitchell "did not die from the" methamphetamine and that "his combination of injuries would have killed anybody, whether on drugs or not."
An expert in forensic alcohol analysis testified that a driver of Ghuzi's weight would have had a BAC of 0.15 percent at the time of the collision after drinking a shot of vodka and an ounce of beer at the time Ghuzi did within the hour before the collision. For purposes of this calculation, the expert assumed that the rate of elimination was 0.015 percent per hour and that Ghuzi did not drink after the collision.
Sergeant Jimmie Williams, one of the traffic collision investigators, testified that based on the traffic video footage, Mitchell committed traffic infractions when he rode against traffic on North Texas and without rear reflectors on his bike. But at the time of the collision, Mitchell was properly in the center turn lane. Sergeant Williams also observed that Mitchell appeared to look over his right shoulder to check for oncoming vehicles before merging into the number one lane. According to Sergeant Williams, Ghuzi's sudden lane change at a high speed would have made it difficult for any bicyclist "to reasonably gauge that lane at the time being unsafe or occupied or unoccupied."
Officer Sean Galey, another collision investigator, testified that whether Mitchell was under the influence of a controlled substance "[had] nothing to do with the collision." He opined that because Mitchell signaled with his arm and entered the number one lane when it was empty, he "owned the lane of traffic." He further testified that if Ghuzi had been driving at 35 mph-the speed limit-instead of 67 mph, "the accident would never have occurred."
Officer William Shaffer also testified that the accident would not have occurred if Ghuzi was driving at 35 mph. At the time of the collision, there was another car (likely Joella B.'s) in the number two lane about 40 feet behind Mitchell traveling close to 37 mph. According to Officer Shaffer, Mitchell was likely waiting for that vehicle to pass before moving from the number one to the number two lane. Based on his positional analysis, Officer Shaffer opined that Mitchell could have merged into the number two lane after the vehicle had passed and avoided Ghuzi's car if Ghuzi had been traveling at 35 mph. Officer Shaffer therefore concluded that Ghuzi's speed was "the primary collision factor" even though Mitchell's lack of visibility was a contributing factor.
D. Defense Case
Ghuzi presented one percipient witness and two experts.
Gladiys G. testified that she was driving southbound at about 35 mph in the number two lane of North Texas when she saw Mitchell through her driver's side window in the number one lane. He was about three-and-a-half feet away and was not wearing any reflective clothing. Mitchell startled Gladiys G., who told her son sitting next to her: "I almost hit that man." Right after she passed Mitchell, she heard a loud noise like glass being broken, pulled into a nearby parking lot, and told her son to call 911.
Daniel Vomhof, an expert in accident reconstruction, reviewed the traffic video footage and the traffic collision report and testified about Mitchell's role in the collision. Highlighting Mitchell's dark clothes, lack of headlights, and lack of reflective clothing, Vomhof testified that Mitchell's merger into the number one lane on Ghuzi's left side posed an unexpected hazard. This is because Ghuzi was likely looking to the right at that time because he was in the process of passing two cars (likely the cars of Joella B. and Gladiys G.) in the number two lane and because of the glare from the headlights of oncoming cars traveling northbound on North Texas. Vomhof also testified that Mitchell acted improperly when he did not signal that he was merging into the number one lane until he was already halfway in that lane. Mitchell's bike also had no "taillights," which further increased the risk of a collision. Based on these observations, Vomhof opined that Mitchell did not give oncoming vehicles "enough distance to recognize a hazard, react to it, and come to a stop prior to an impact occurring." As a result, any driver traveling above 25 mph lacked sufficient time to react to Mitchell and come to a stop before impact, even with headlights on. Vomhof, however, conceded that the slower a car moves, the lower the chances of a fatality during a collision.
Finally, Okorie Okorocha, an expert in forensic toxicology, testified that Mitchell had a high level of methamphetamine in his system at the time of the collision. According to Okorocha, a bicyclist with such a high amount of methamphetamine in his system might exhibit "risky behavior, speeding behavior, [and] confused behavior." That bicyclist may also suffer from paranoia and delusions. Based on the video footage, Okorocha opined that by crossing four lanes diagonally on a dark street, Mitchell acted as if he were under the influence of methamphetamine.
II. DISCUSSION
Ghuzi contends that there was insufficient evidence to support his second-degree murder conviction because Mitchell's unsafe conduct "immediately before the collision was an unforeseeable, independent intervening act, breaking the chain of causation." We disagree.
A. Law and Standard of Review
"In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine 'whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.' [Citation.] '[T]he court must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence-that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value-such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.'" (People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 509.)
"In homicide cases, a 'cause of the death of [the decedent] is an act or omission that sets in motion a chain of events that produces as a direct, natural and probable consequence of the act or omission the death of [the decedent] and without which the death would not occur.'" (People v. Cervantes (2001) 26 Cal.4th 860, 866.) "To be considered the proximate cause of the victim's death, the defendant's act must have been a substantial factor contributing to the result, rather than insignificant or merely theoretical." (People v. Briscoe (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 568, 583-584.) "[T]he contributing negligence of the victim or a third party does not relieve the criminal actor of liability, unless the victim's or third party's conduct was the sole or superseding cause of the death." (People v. Autry (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 360.)
B. Substantial Evidence Supports Ghuzi's Second-Degree Murder Conviction.
Ghuzi concedes that he caused the collision, resulting in Mitchell's death. He nevertheless argues that there is insufficient evidence to support his murder conviction because "Mitchell's conduct was an [independent] intervening act that went far beyond a" 'normal and foreseeable result'" of [Ghuzi's] original acts. We are not persuaded. In light of the evidence that Ghuzi's unlawful acts caused Mitchell's death (see People v. Wattier (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 948, 953 ["Facts attacking legal causation are only relevant if the defendant's act was not a substantial factor in producing the harm or injurious situation," italics in original]), we find that Mitchell's acts were not an independent intervening cause.
For an independent intervening cause to absolve a defendant of criminal liability, it "must be 'unforeseeable . . . an extraordinary and abnormal occurrence, which rises to the level of an exonerating, superseding cause.' [Citation.] On the other hand, a 'dependent' intervening cause will not relieve the defendant of criminal liability." (People v. Funes (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1506, 1523.) A dependent intervening cause is one that" 'is a normal and reasonably foreseeable result of defendant's original act .... "The precise consequence need not have been foreseen; it is enough that the defendant should have foreseen the possibility of some harm of the kind which might result from his act." '" (Ibid.)
Here, Mitchell's conduct was at most a dependent intervening cause given the nature of Ghuzi's unlawful acts. As established by the evidence at trial, Ghuzi, driving while drunk and without his headlights on even though it was getting dark, made a sudden lane change without signaling at a speed almost twice the speed limit, right before he struck Mitchell. Under these facts, it was more than reasonably foreseeable that Ghuzi would strike a bicyclist with his car even if that bicyclist had worn reflective gear and had reflectors on his bike. That Ghuzi struck a bicyclist who looked over his right shoulder to confirm that the lane was empty and signaled before merging into the lane only reinforces this conclusion. Indeed, Officer Galey testified that Mitchell effectively "owned" that lane when Ghuzi hit him and that the collision would not have occurred if Ghuzi had been driving at the speed limit. Because, as Officer Shaffer testified, Ghuzi's speed was "the primary collision factor," there is sufficient evidence that Mitchell's conduct was not an independent intervening cause. (Italics added.)
Although Officers Galey and Shaffer did not directly rebut the testimony of Vomhof, Ghuzi's accident reconstruction expert, this goes to the weight of their testimony-and not its admissibility. The jury was therefore free to credit that testimony over Vomhof's testimony.
C. The Restitution Order Did Not Violate Ghuzi's First Amendment Rights.
Ghuzi argues that the restitution order requiring him to pay the cost of Mitchell's cremation violated his rights under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. We are unpersuaded because there is no evidence, other than Ghuzi's speculation, that Mitchell was cremated.
The Establishment Clause prohibits the government from making any "law respecting an establishment of religion." (U.S. Const., 1st Amend.) Thus, the "government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in a way which 'establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.'" (Lee v. Weisman (1992) 505 U.S. 577, 587) Likewise, "[n]o person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs." (Everson v. Board of Education (1947) 330 U.S. 1, 15-16.)
Ghuzi contends that paying for Mitchell's cremation would violate his religious beliefs in violation of the Establishment Clause. But there is insufficient evidence that Mitchell was, in fact, cremated. At the restitution hearing, the CVCB requested $1,052.28 from Ghuzi for Mitchell's funeral expenses. Although Ghuzi assumed, based solely on the amount requested, that Mitchell was cremated, there is no evidence to support that assumption. Indeed, Ghuzi's counsel conceded that "we don't know for sure" that Mitchell was cremated. (Italics added.) But even if Mitchell had been cremated, the restitution order arguably did not require Ghuzi to engage in "an unclean practice" in violation of his religious beliefs because the order simply required him "to fully reimburse the victim for his or her economic losses." (People v. Jennings (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 42, 57.) Thus, the order did not punish Ghuzi for his religious beliefs.
Ghuzi argues that restitution can be considered a form of punishment if the impact is severe enough and cites to People v. Walker (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1013, 1024 and People v. Zito (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 736, 741 in support. Those cases address restitution fines, not direct victim restitution, and are therefore inapposite. (See People v. Harvest (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 641, 650 ["The purpose of victim restitution is compensation, which does not involve an affirmative disability or restraint, and which has not historically been regarded as punishment"].)
III. DISPOSITION
The trial court is ordered to correct the abstract of judgment to reflect that Ghuzi has 550 days of custody credits. The judgment is otherwise affirmed.
As the People point out, the abstract of judgment erroneously stated that Ghuzi had 500 days of custody credits.
We concur. SIMONS, ACTING P. J. BURNS, J.