Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. VA113712. Philip H. Hickok, Judge.
Law Offices of David W. German and David W. German, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Stephanie A. Miyoshi and Ellen Birnbaum Kehr, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
DOI TODD, J.
Appellant Jorge Cisneros Garcia appeals from the judgment entered upon his conviction by jury of forgery (Pen. Code, § 475, subd. (b)). He was sentenced to three years in state prison (two-year midterm plus one year for his prior conviction). He contends that his forgery conviction must be reversed because there was insufficient evidence of his intent to defraud. We disagree and affirm.
The jury acquitted appellant of unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)). Appellant admitted that he had suffered a prior conviction for the same offense.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On January 10, 2010, Francisco Alvarez parked his pickup truck in front of his house, leaving his checkbook inside the truck. The next day his truck was missing. Alvarez called the police and filed a stolen vehicle report. That same day, Alvarez spotted his truck in the parking lot of a local motel. Deputies Nancy Zavala and Lucy Chavez of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department went to the motel. They checked the truck’s license plate number to verify that it was stolen.
Deputy Zavala spoke with the motel manager, who informed her that the person he saw driving the truck was in room 26. Deputy Zavala knocked on the door of room 26 and appellant answered. Two other people were in the room—a transvestite whom Deputy Chavez knew from previous contact, and another man. All three people were detained.
The manager testified that he did not tell the deputy he had seen anyone driving the truck, but that he had directed her to room 26 because that was the only occupied room.
Deputy Zavala searched appellant and recovered two checks from his pants pocket. One of the checks was made out for $200 and had “plumbing” handwritten on the memo line. The other two occupants were searched, but no items associated with the theft of Alvarez’s truck were recovered from them. Appellant was arrested. Sometime later the deputies showed the recovered checks to Alvarez. Alvarez testified that the checks came from his checkbook, the handwriting on the check was not his, he did not know appellant, he had not given appellant permission to posses or write on his checks, and he was not having any plumbing work done.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review.
When determining whether the trial evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction, “our role on appeal is a limited one.” (People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206.) We review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether a rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (Ibid.) This standard applies whether direct or circumstantial evidence is involved. (People v. Thompson (2010) 49 Cal.4th 79, 113.) “[I]t is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination depends.” (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 403.) Even when there is a significant amount of countervailing evidence, the testimony of a single witness can be sufficient to uphold a conviction. (People v. Barnwell (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1038, 1052.) So long as the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s finding, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant reversal of the judgment. (People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 11.) Reversal is not warranted unless it appears that “‘upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the conviction].’ [Citation.]” (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.)
II. Sufficient Evidence Supports the Verdict.
Penal Code section 475, subdivision (b) provides: “Every person who possesses any blank or unfinished check, note, bank bill, money order, or traveler’s check, whether real or fictitious, with the intention of completing the same or the intention of facilitating the completion of the same, in order to defraud any person, is guilty of forgery.” The jury was so instructed with CALCRIM No. 1931. The same jury instruction explained, “Someone intends to defraud if he or she intends to deceive another person either to cause a loss of money, or goods, or services, or something else of value, or to cause damage to, a legal, financial, or property right.”
The “‘intent to defraud is a question of fact to be determined from all the facts and circumstances of the case.’” (Perry v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 276, 285.) As appellant acknowledges, the intent to defraud “may be, and usually must be, inferred circumstantially.” (Ibid.) “‘“[I]ntent is inherently difficult to prove by direct evidence. Therefore, the act itself together with its surrounding circumstances must generally form the basis from which the intent of the actor may legitimately be inferred.” [Citation.]’” (People v. Smith (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1458, 1469.)
Here, the act was appellant’s possession, on his person, of two checks from Alvarez’s checkbook. Appellant did not merely possess checks belonging to someone else. The checks were from Alvarez’s checkbook left inside his truck, which was stolen the day before appellant was arrested. One of the checks had “plumbing” handwritten in the memo line. The evidence showed that Alvarez was not having any plumbing work done at the time, the handwriting on the check was not his, and he did not know appellant nor had he authorized appellant to possess his checks. The inference can easily be made that appellant was planning to use the check for a purpose not intended by Alvarez.
Moreover, although the jury acquitted appellant of unlawful driving or taking a stolen vehicle, Alvarez’s stolen truck was recovered from the parking lot of a motel where appellant was found in the only occupied room. Deputy Zavala testified that the motel manager told her that the person he had seen driving the truck was in that room. The other two people with appellant did not possess any property connected with the theft of Alvarez’s truck. These circumstances corroborate the inference of appellant’s intent to defraud based on his possession of checks from Alvarez’s checkbook.
Accordingly, we find the evidence was sufficient to support appellant’s intent to defraud.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: BOREN, P. J., CHAVEZ, J.