Opinion
D076212
06-11-2020
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. GUILLERMO GARCIA, Defendant and Appellant.
Edward J. Haggerty, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Jason M. Anderson, District Attorney, and James R. Secord, Deputy District Attorney, for Plaintiff and Respondent. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Thomas S. Patterson, Assistant Attorney General, Tamar Pachter and Nelson R. Richards, Deputy Attorneys General, as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. FSB802136-2) APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Bernardino County, Kyle S. Brodie, Judge. Reversed with directions. Edward J. Haggerty, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Jason M. Anderson, District Attorney, and James R. Secord, Deputy District Attorney, for Plaintiff and Respondent. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Thomas S. Patterson, Assistant Attorney General, Tamar Pachter and Nelson R. Richards, Deputy Attorneys General, as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.
I.
INTRODUCTION
In 2018, the Legislature passed, and the Governor signed into law, Senate Bill No. 1437 (Senate Bill 1437). Senate Bill 1437 prospectively altered the mens rea requirements for the offense of murder by amending Penal Code sections 188 and 189 to restrict the circumstances under which a defendant can be found guilty of murder under the felony-murder rule or under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015.) Senate Bill 1437 also established a procedure permitting certain qualifying persons who were previously convicted of murder pursuant to the felony murder rule or the natural and probable consequences doctrine to seek retroactive relief. (See § 1170.95.)
Unless otherwise specified, all subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code.
" '[T]he felony-murder rule makes a killing while committing certain felonies murder without the necessity of further examining the defendant's mental state' vis-à-vis an intent to kill." (People v. Wear (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 1007, 1021.)
" '[U]nder the natural and probable consequences doctrine, an aider and abettor is guilty not only of the intended crime, but also "for any other offense that was a 'natural and probable consequence' of the crime aided and abetted." ' " (People v. Gastelum (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 772, 777, review granted Jan. 22, 2020, S259025.)
In February 2019, Guillermo Garcia filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to section 1170.95. In his petition, Garcia declared that he had been "convicted of [second] degree murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or under the [second] degree felony murder doctrine and [he] could not now be convicted of murder because of changes to . . . [section] 188, effective January 1, 2019."
The People filed a motion to strike Garcia's petition on the ground that Senate Bill 1437 is unconstitutional for the following four reasons: (1) Senate Bill 1437 invalidly amended Proposition 7, a voter initiative that increased the punishment for persons convicted of murder (Prop. 7, as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 1978) (Proposition 7)); (2) Senate Bill 1437 invalidly amended Proposition 115, a voter initiative that augmented the list of predicate offenses for first degree felony-murder liability (Prop. 115, as approved by voters, Primary Elec. (June 5, 1990) (Proposition 115)); (3) section 1170.95 violates the separation of powers doctrine; and/or (4) section 1170.95 deprives crime victims of the rights afforded them by the Victims' Bill of Rights Act of 2008, commonly known as Marsy's Law (Prop. 9, as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4, 2008) (Marsy's Law)). The trial court granted the People's motion to strike Garcia's petition, ruling that section 1170.15 "violates the constitutional rights of victims to 'finality in their criminal cases,' " under Marsy's Law.
In People v. Lamoureux (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 241 (Lamoureux) and a companion case, People v. Superior Court (Gooden) (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 270 (Gooden), this court rejected the same challenges to the constitutional validity of Senate Bill 1437 that the People raise in this case. Specifically, in Lamoureux, we explained that the retroactive relief provision of Senate Bill 1437 (§ 1170.95) does not violate the rights of crime victims under Marsy's law or contravene separation of powers principles. (Lamoureux, supra, at p. 246.) In Gooden, we concluded that Senate Bill 1437 does not invalidly amend Proposition 7 or Proposition 115. (Gooden, supra, at p. 232.) We agree with Lamoureux and Gooden, and apply those decisions in rejecting the People's challenges to the constitutional validity of Senate Bill 1437. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order granting the People's motion to strike and remand the matter with directions to the trial court to consider Garcia's petition in a manner consistent with this opinion.
Lamoureux and Gooden were both decided after the trial court granted the People's motion to strike, while Garcia's appeal was pending. Numerous other decisions have endorsed our reasoning in Lamoureux and Gooden. (See, e.g., People v Johns (June 8, 2020, E072412) ___ Cal.App.5th ___ [2020 Cal.App. Lexis 498, *18] [citing Lamoureux and Gooden and stating, "like every other court of appeal to consider the same question, we conclude their analysis is unimpeachable and join and adopt it"].)
II.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. The underlying criminal case
We summarized the facts giving rise to Garcia's murder conviction in our prior opinion as follows:
"Defendants Daniel Uruiza, . . . Garcia, and Raymond Sullivan . . . confronted the victim and his friend by declaring their gang affiliation and challenging the victim to a fight. During the confrontation, Uruiza pulled out a knife and stabbed the victim in the neck, killing him." (People v. Uruiza (May 23, 2012, D059014) [nonpub. opn.].)
As explained in footnote 7, post, we take judicial notice of our prior opinion in this matter, People v. Uruiza, supra, D059014.
On or about June 8, 2010, a jury found Garcia guilty of one count of second degree murder (§ 187) (count 1) and one count of active participation in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (a)) (count 2). The jury also found true the allegation that the murder was committed for the benefit of, in association with, or at the direction of, a criminal street gang under section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1).
On count 1, the trial court sentenced Garcia to a term of 15 years to life for the murder. The court also imposed, but stayed, a 10-year term for the 186.22, subdivision (b)(1) gang enhancement. With respect to count 2, the court imposed a sentence of two years on the active participation offense, but stayed execution of the sentence pursuant to section 654.
On appeal, this court modified Garcia's sentence by striking the stayed 10-year gang enhancement (§ 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)) and imposing a 15-year minimum parole eligibility period pursuant to section 186.22, subdivision (b)(5). In all other respects, we affirmed the judgment. 2. Garcia's petition for resentencing pursuant to section 1170 .95
In February 2019, Garcia, acting in propria persona, filed a form petition for resentencing pursuant to section 1170.95, as outlined in part I, ante.
3. The People's motion to strike
In March 2019, the People filed a motion to strike Garcia's petition on the ground that Senate Bill 1437 is unconstitutional for the reasons outlined in part I, ante.
4. The trial court's order granting the People's motion to strike
After Garcia filed an opposition and the trial court held a hearing, the court issued a lengthy written order granting the People's motion. In its May 2019 order, the court concluded that "section 1170.95 violates the constitutional rights of victims to " 'finality in their criminal cases. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (a)(6).)' " The court reasoned in part:
Garcia's counsel submitted the opposition.
Article I, section 28, subdivision (a)(6) of the California Constitution was adopted pursuant to Marsy's Law.
"The Court is also unaware of any authority specifically construing the scope of a victim's right to finality, and the parties have not cited any.
"But if the constitutional right of victims to finality means anything, then it means the [L]egislature cannot grant petitioner the relief he seeks. There is no way to reconcile a victim's interest with section 1170.95. The key facts are undisputed. [Garcia] was properly convicted of murder. His conduct made him responsible for the victim's death under the law, and the evidence was sufficient to prove his guilt. His trial contained no defects which warranted reversing the judgment. He was sentenced consistently with the law in effect at the time of his actions. The victim's family was entitled to rely on the integrity of that judgment."
The trial court did not address the People's other arguments against the constitutional validity of Senate Bill 1437.
5. The appeal
Garcia timely appealed the trial court's order granting the People's motion to strike. On appeal, the San Bernardino County District Attorney appeared as lead counsel for the People, pursuant to an agreement with the Attorney General.
While Garcia's appeal was pending, the People filed a motion for judicial notice in which they requested that we take judicial notice of the ballot statements related to Propositions 7 and 115, certain pieces of legislative history related to Senate Bill 1437, and this court's prior opinion in this case (People v. Uruiza, supra, D059014). We grant the unopposed request.
The Attorney General filed an amicus brief in support of Garcia in which the Attorney General takes the position that Senate Bill 1437 is constitutional.
III.
DISCUSSION
A. The trial court erred in concluding that section 1170 .95 violates Marsy's Law
Garcia claims that the trial court erred in concluding that section 1170.95 violates Marsy's Law. We agree.
In Lamoureux this court concluded that section 1170.95 does not violate the rights of crime victims under Marsy's law. (Lamoureux, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at pp. 264-266.) The Lamoureux court reasoned in part:
"Marsy's Law established a victim's right to a 'prompt and final conclusion' to postjudgment proceedings. [Citation.] And, in furtherance of that right, it substantially amended Penal Code provisions pertaining to parole. [Citations.] But it did not foreclose post-judgment proceedings altogether. On the contrary, it expressly contemplated the availability of such postjudgment proceedings, including in section 28, subdivision (b)(7) of the Constitution, which affords victims a right to reasonable notice of 'parole [and] other post-conviction release proceedings,' and in subdivision (b)(8), which grants victims a right to be heard at 'post-conviction release decision[s] . . . .'
"Both the Legislature and courts have recognized that victims may exercise these rights during postjudgment proceedings that existed at the time the electorate approved Marsy's Law, as well as postjudgment proceedings that did not exist when Marsy's Law was approved. [Citations.] It would be anomalous and untenable for us to conclude, as the People impliedly suggest, that the voters intended to categorically foreclose the creation of any new postjudgment proceedings not in existence at the time Marsy's Law was approved simply because the voters granted crime victims a right to a 'prompt and final conclusion' of criminal cases. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (b)(9).)" (Id. at pp. 264-265.)
The Lamoureux court also concluded that section 1170.95 does not violate California Constitution, article I, section 28, subdivision (a)(6). The Lamoureux court reasoned in relevant part:
"Next, the People argue section 1170.95 conflicts with [a] provision[ ] in section 28, subdivision (a) of article I of the Constitution, setting forth the voters' findings and declarations. Th[at] provision[ ] provide[s] as follows: ' . . . (6) Victims of crime are entitled to finality in their criminal cases.' (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (a). . . (6).) However, . . . the enforcement provision of section 28 only applies to the substantive rights enumerated in subdivision (b)—not the findings and declarations set forth in subdivision (a). (Id., subd. (c).) In light of this structure, it is clear to us the findings and declarations in subdivision (a) 'represent only a general statement of a problem identified by [the] Legislature, and the goal the Legislature hoped to achieve,' not an independent source of enforceable rights." (Lamoureux, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 266.)
We agree with this aspect of Lamoureux as well. Accordingly, and for the reasons more fully stated in Lamoureux, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at pages 264-266, we conclude that the trial court erred in concluding that section 1170.95 violates Marsy's Law. B. Section 1170.95 does not contravene separation of powers principles
As noted in part I, ante, Lamoureux was decided while this appeal was pending and thus, the trial court did not have the benefit of our decision in that case in considering the People's motion.
As an alternative ground for affirming the trial court's order, the People contend that section 1170.95 contravenes the separation of powers doctrine by permitting the vacatur of a final judgment, which results in the interference of a core judicial function. This argument was also comprehensively discussed and rejected in Lamoureux, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at pages 256-264.
The Lamoureux court distinguished case law such as People v. King (2002) 27 Cal.4th 29, in which the California Supreme Court struck down, on separation of powers grounds, a law that authorized the refiling of criminal charges against a defendant that was enacted after the defendant had obtained a judgment of dismissal. (Id. at p. 31.) The Lamoureux court reasoned that the separation of powers doctrine is designed chiefly to protect individual liberty interests (Lamoureux, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 260), and that, "[u]nlike legislation authorizing the refiling of criminal charges against a previously-acquitted defendant . . . section 1170.95 does not present any risk to individual liberty interests." (Id. at p. 261.) As additional support for its conclusion that section 1170.95 does not violate separation of powers principles, the Lamoureux court observed that there "is substantial precedent for remedial legislation authorizing the ameliorative reopening of final judgments of conviction to benefit criminal defendants." (Lamoureux, supra, at p. 262.)
We agree with the Lamoureux court's analysis. Accordingly, we conclude that Senate Bill 1437 does not contravene separation of powers principles. (See Lamoureux, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at pp. 256-264.) C. Senate Bill 1437 does not invalidly amend Proposition 7
As an additional alternative ground for affirming the trial court's order, the People contend that Senate Bill 1437 invalidly amended Proposition 7. This argument was specifically rejected in Gooden, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at pages 279 through 286.
The Gooden court summarized its analysis by stating:
"[T]he voters who enacted Proposition 7 considered and approved increased punishments for persons convicted of murder, including additional means by which such persons could be punished by death or [life without the possibility of parole]. However, the text of the initiative and the ballot materials for the initiative do not demonstrate an intent to freeze the substantive elements of murder in place as they existed in 1978. Therefore, Senate Bill 1437—which did not address the issue of punishments for persons convicted of murder—cannot be considered an amendment to Proposition 7." (Gooden, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 286.)
We agree with the Gooden court. Accordingly, we conclude that Senate Bill 1437 does not invalidly amend Proposition 7. (See Gooden, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at pp. 279-286.) D. Senate Bill 1437 does not invalidly amend Proposition 115
As a final alternative argument for affirming the judgment, the People contend that Senate Bill 1437 invalidly amended Proposition 115. This argument was also specifically rejected in Gooden, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at pages 286-289.
The Gooden court observed that Senate Bill 1437 "did not augment or restrict the list of predicate felonies on which felony murder may be based, which is the pertinent subject matter of Proposition 115." (Gooden, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 287.) The Gooden court also rejected the argument that, merely because Proposition 115 "reenacted section 189 in full" (Gooden, supra, at p. 287), the Legislature was restricted in amending "any portion of section 189, even those portions of section 189 that the initiative did not change in any substantive way." (Ibid.)
Again, we agree with the Gooden court. Accordingly, we conclude that Senate Bill 1437 does not invalidly amend Proposition 115. (See Gooden, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at pp. 286-289.)
IV.
DISPOSITION
The order granting the People's motion to strike is reversed. The matter is remanded with directions to consider Garcia's petition in a manner consistent with this opinion.
AARON, J. WE CONCUR: McCONNELL, P. J. DATO, J.