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People v. F.U.

California Court of Appeals, Second District, Sixth Division
Apr 16, 2009
No. B208592 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 16, 2009)

Opinion

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Superior Court of Ventura County No. 2008002949, Manuel J. Covarrubias, Judge

Miriam R. Arichea, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Susan D. Martynec, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Robert M. Snider, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.


COFFEE, J.

F.U. appeals from the juvenile court's order sustaining the allegations of a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition that he disturbed the peace by challenging another person to fight. (Pen. Code, § 415, subd. (1).) The court set the maximum term of confinement at 14 months and ordered that appellant serve 30 days in the juvenile justice center, "on EM [electronic monitoring]." It further ordered that appellant remain on probation, subject to several terms, including participation in anger management education. Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the sustained wardship petition, and that section 415, subdivision (1) is unconstitutionally overbroad. We affirm.

All statutory references are to the Penal Code.

FACTS

In September, 2007, appellant attended a public high school and associated with the Eastside gang. Members of a rival gang, Little Boyz (LBZ), attended the same school. On September 19, while appellant stood in the school cafeteria line, J., an LBZ member, pushed him from behind. J. then pushed another student into appellant's back.

Although the record does not consistently specify which students were members and which were associates of either gang, we refer to them as members.

Appellant left the cafeteria and walked toward the area of the quad where J. and other LBZ members were sitting. LBZ members always occupied that area. Ordinarily, upon leaving the cafeteria, appellant used a different path to reach the Eastside gang section, in another area of the quad. In reaching the LBZ area, appellant addressed J., and said, "Let's get down you fucking lames." J. responded by flashing "LBZ" signs at appellant. J. looked angry or upset and said, "What," stood and raised his arms to challenge appellant to fight. J.'s friend told him to sit down. Appellant walked away, toward the Eastside gang area.

During the incident, appellant seemed angry and the Eastside members stood on benches, appeared to be agitated, and looked intently toward the LBZ members. The school resource officer explained that when a student walks by a rival gang's area, it is "very confrontational” and that many fights have started with such conduct.

DISCUSSION

Appellant first contends that there is not substantial evidence to sustain the finding that he disturbed the peace in violation of section 415, subdivision (1) We disagree.

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence we draw all reasonable inferences in support of the judgment. We do not weigh the evidence or decide the credibility of witnesses. (People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 11; People v. Poe (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 826, 830.)

A person is guilty of disturbing the peace if he or she “unlawfully fights in a public place or challenges another person in a public place to fight,” (§ 415 , subd. 1) or “uses offensive words in a public place which are inherently likely to provoke an immediate violent reaction” (id., subd. 3).

Viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment, the evidence discloses that appellant regularly associated with the Eastside gang and sat in its area of the quad; that he did not usually frequent the rival LBZ gang's area of the quad; and that on September 19, J., a member of LBZ, shoved appellant twice as they stood in the cafeteria line. There is also evidence that when appellant left the cafeteria on September 19, he looked angry as he walked to the LBZ area of the quad, while Eastside gang members stood on benches, appeared to be agitated, and looked intently toward the LBZ gang. Appellant addressed J., who was in the LBZ area, and said something like, "Let's get down, you fucking lames." J. responded, "What," standing and raising his arms to challenge appellant to fight.

In arguing that the evidence does not support the finding that he violated section 415, subdivision (1), appellant claims there is no "evidence that others... in fact [got] involved in any physical, violent confrontation, or even that others had to be stopped from getting so involved." This claim requires the addition of an element to section 415, subdivision (1), i.e., that the challenge to fight triggers, or nearly triggers, a physical confrontation. We decline to rewrite the statute. Our primary task in construing a statute is to ascertain the intent of the Legislature. We make this determination by looking to the words of the statute and giving them their plain meaning. If there is no ambiguity in the language of the statute, then we presume the Legislature meant what it said. (Villa De Las Palmas Homeowners Assn. v. Terifaj (2004) 33 Cal.4th 73, 82.) Had the Legislature intended to include additional elements in section 415, subdivision (1), it would have done so.

Appellant also claims that there is no evidence that he intended to provoke a violent reaction. The record which we have just described belies this claim. Viewing the entire context of appellant's words and conduct, the evidence is sufficient to support the court's finding that he disturbed the peace in violation of section 415, subdivision (1).

We also reject appellant's contention that section 415, subdivision (1) is unconstitutionally overbroad and punishes innocent, protected conduct. Appellant's argument is based on the false premise that words that challenge someone to fight do not "by their very utterance... tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace." (Lewis v. City of New Orleans (1974) 415 U.S. 130, 133.) The words of a challenge to fight inherently tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. Section 415, subdivision (1) addresses the threat of violence inherent in an express challenge to fight. (See In re Alejandro G. (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 44, 50.)

In asserting that section 415, subdivision (1) is overbroad, appellant stresses that it lacks qualifying language comparable to that in section 415, subdivision (3), which proscribes using offensive words in a public place only if the words "are inherently likely to provoke an immediate violent reaction." Such qualifying language would be redundant in a statute that prohibits challenging someone to fight in a public place.

The judgment is affirmed.

We concur: GILBERT, P.J. YEGAN, J.


Summaries of

People v. F.U.

California Court of Appeals, Second District, Sixth Division
Apr 16, 2009
No. B208592 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 16, 2009)
Case details for

People v. F.U.

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. F.U., Defendant and Appellant.

Court:California Court of Appeals, Second District, Sixth Division

Date published: Apr 16, 2009

Citations

No. B208592 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 16, 2009)