Opinion
Submitted December 14, 1999
January 31, 2000
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Rienzi, J.), rendered October 31, 1996, convicting him of attempted criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence.
Arthur Fryar, Pittsburgh, Pa., appellant pro se.
William L. Murphy, District Attorney, Staten Island, N Y (Karen F. McGee and David Frey of counsel), for respondent.
DAVID S. RITTER, J.P., WILLIAM D. FRIEDMANN, SANDRA J. FEUERSTEIN, NANCY E. SMITH, JJ.
DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant's contention that the Supreme Court should have granted his motion to withdraw his plea of guilty because it had failed to inform him that he faced increased punishment and would not be allowed to withdraw his plea if he failed to appear for sentencing is not preserved for appellate review, as he never moved to withdraw his plea on this ground (see, People v. Brown, 242 A.D.2d 337). In any event, the claim is without merit, as the court sentenced the defendant to the originally-promised sentence (cf., People v. Kazepis, 101 A.D.2d 816 ).
Because the court did not specify whether the defendant's sentence on the instant crime was to run concurrently with or consecutively to the sentence imposed on the conviction of an unrelated crime in Pennsylvania, the sentence for the former must run consecutively to the sentence for the latter (see, Penal Law § 70.25[4]; Cachoian v. New York State Dept. of Corrections, 239 A.D.2d 118, 119 ; Matter of Rayborn v. Coughlin, 202 A.D.2d 591 ).
The defendant's remaining contention is without merit.
RITTER, J.P., FRIEDMANN, FEUERSTEIN, and SMITH, JJ., concur.