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People v. Figueroa

California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, Third Division
Apr 30, 2024
No. G062172 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2024)

Opinion

G062172

04-30-2024

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JORGE FIGUEROA, Defendant and Appellant.

Robert V. Vallandingham, Jr., under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Junichi P. Semitsu, Alan L. Amann and Eric A. Swenson, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.


NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Filed 5/16/24

Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Orange County,Super. Ct. No. 13NF0414 Kimberly Menninger, Judge. Affirmed.

Robert V. Vallandingham, Jr., under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Junichi P. Semitsu, Alan L. Amann and Eric A. Swenson, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

ORDER MODIFYING OPINION; NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT

It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on April 30, 2024, be modified as follows: On page 1, replace appellant's counsel's last name, spelled "Vallandingham," with "Vallandigham."

This modification does not change the judgment.

OPINION

MOTOIKE, J.

Defendant Jorge Figueroa appeals from a postjudgment order denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6 as to his conviction for attempted voluntary manslaughter. Figueroa argues section 1172.6 denies equal protection to people convicted of attempted voluntary manslaughter because it excludes them from its resentencing scheme which includes those convicted of murder, attempted murder, and manslaughter. We reject Figueroa's constitutional challenge to section 1172.6 and affirm.

All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Figueroa was charged in an information with conspiracy to commit murder (§ 187, subd. (a), count 1); attempted murder (§ 664, subd. (a), 187, subd. (a), count 2); and street terrorism (§ 186.22, subd. (a), count 3). As to counts 1 and 2, the information alleged Figueroa committed the offenses for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)); personally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)); and vicariously discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury (§ 186.22, subd. (b)). The information also alleged Figueroa served a prior prison term. (§ 667.5, subd. (b).)

The jury was unable to reach a verdict on count 1 and the trial court declared a mistrial as to that count. As to count 2, the jury found Figueroa guilty of the lesser included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter and found the gang enhancement allegation true. The jury found Figueroa guilty as charged on count 3.

The trial court granted the People's motion to amend the information as to count 2 to allege Figueroa personally used a firearm in the commission of that offense within the meaning of section 12022.5, subdivision (a). As part of a negotiated disposition, Figueroa admitted the alleged section 12022.5, subdivision (a) firearm enhancement as to count 2 and the alleged prior prison term. In accordance with the terms of a plea agreement, in January 2018, the trial court sentenced Figueroa to a total determinate prison term of 20 years 6 months by imposing the upper term of 5 years 6 months on count 2, a consecutive five-year term for the gang enhancement, and a consecutive 10-year term for the firearm enhancement. The trial court thereafter dismissed count 1 and the remaining enhancements, stayed the sentence on count 3 under section 654, and struck the prison prior for purposes of sentencing.

In September 2022, Figueroa filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to former section 1170.95 as to his conviction for attempted voluntary manslaughter, and counsel was appointed for him. The People filed a response to the resentencing petition, arguing it should be denied. At the prima facie hearing on the petition, the trial court found Figueroa had failed to establish a prima facie showing for relief and rejected his argument section 1172.6 violated his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection. Figueroa appealed.

Section 1170.95 was renumbered as section 1172.6 without change in the text, effective June 30, 2022 (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10).

DISCUSSION

I.

SECTION 1172.6

Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015; Senate Bill 1437) amended the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine as it relates to murder "'to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.'" (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959 (Lewis).) Senate Bill 1437 also created procedures "for convicted murderers who could not be convicted under the law as amended to retroactively seek relief." (Lewis, at p. 957.)

A subsequent amendment to former section 1170.95 extended relief to defendants convicted of attempted murder based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine or manslaughter. (Sen. Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.); Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2; Senate Bill 775.) The amendment did not add attempted voluntary manslaughter to section 1172.6 and did not authorize courts to apply the statute to unspecified offenses. (Senate Bill 775)

After receipt of a section 1172.6 resentencing petition, counsel shall be appointed upon petitioner's request. (§ 1172.6, subds. (b)(1)-(3).) The prosecutor must then file a response to the petition, and a reply may be filed by the petitioner. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) The trial court shall then "hold a hearing to determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief." (Ibid.)

II.

SECTION 1172.6 DOES NOT VIOLATE FIGUEROA'S RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION

Figueroa does not contend the crime of attempted voluntary manslaughter is listed as a qualifying offense for relief under section 1172.6. Instead, Figueroa solely argues on appeal "under well accepted principles of constitutional equal protection, he was entitled to the same statutory resentencing benefits as other defendants who have been convicted of murder and manslaughter."

"Both the state and federal Constitutions extend to persons the equal protection of law." (People v. Chatman (2018) 4 Cal.5th 277, 287 (Chatman); see U.S. Const., 14th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 7, subd. (a).) California Supreme Court precedent "has not distinguished the state and federal guarantees of equal protection for claims arising from allegedly unequal consequences associated with different types of criminal offenses." (Chatman, at p. 287.)

Where the law challenged does not draw a suspect classification or burden a fundamental right, "[w]e find a denial of equal protection only if there is no rational relationship between a disparity in treatment and some legitimate government purpose. [Citation.] This core feature of equal protection sets a high bar before a law is deemed to lack even the minimal rationality necessary for it to survive constitutional scrutiny. Coupled with a rebuttable presumption that legislation is constitutional, this high bar helps ensure that democratically enacted laws are not invalidated merely based on a court's cursory conclusion that a statute's tradeoffs seem unwise or unfair." (Chatman, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 288-289.)

The California Supreme Court has held: "In order to decide whether a statutory distinction is so devoid of even minimal rationality that it is unconstitutional as a matter of equal protection, we typically ask two questions." (Chatman, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 289.) The first question is whether "'"the state has adopted a classification that affects two or more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner." [Citations.] This initial inquiry is not whether persons are similarly situated for all purposes, but "whether they are similarly situated for purposes of the law challenged."'" (People v. McKee (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1172, 1202, italics omitted.)

The second question is "whether the challenged classification ultimately bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose." (Chatman, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 289.) "A classification in a statute is presumed rational until the challenger shows that no rational basis for the unequal treatment is reasonably conceivable." (Ibid.; see Kasler v. Lockyer (2000) 23 Cal.4th 472, 482 ["the state may recognize that different categories or classes of persons within a larger classification may pose varying degrees of risk of harm, and properly may limit a regulation to those classes of persons as to whom the need for regulation is thought to be more crucial or imperative"].)

As to the first question of the equal protection analysis, courts have generally held "'offenders who commit different crimes are not similarly situated' for equal protection purposes." (People v. Cervantes (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 884, 888.) We do not need to address whether the challenged classification of section 1172.6 affects two or more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner because, even were we to answer that question in the affirmative, section 1172.6's challenged classification bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. (See People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834, 848-850.)

Here, the Legislature could have reasonably determined there was no need to permit resentencing for attempted voluntary manslaughter convictions because that crime is generally subject to a lesser punishment. (Johnson v. Department of Justice (2015) 60 Cal.4th 871, 887 ["[T]he Legislature is afforded considerable latitude in defining and setting the consequences of criminal offenses"].) Attempted voluntary manslaughter is subject to 18 months, three years, or five years six months in state prison. (§§ 193, subd. (a), 664, subd. (a)). Voluntary manslaughter is subject to three, six, or 11 years in state prison (§ 193) and attempted murder is subject to a prison term of five, seven, or nine years (§ 664, subd. (a)). The exclusion of attempted voluntary manslaughter from the application of section 1172.6 is rational to the extent the Legislature could have reasonably intended to address only murder and manslaughter based on the punishment proscribed under each.

We therefore conclude section 1172.6 does not violate Figueroa's right to equal protection. The trial court did not err by denying his resentencing petition.

DISPOSITION

The postjudgment order denying Figueroa's resentencing petition under section 1172.6 is affirmed.

WE CONCUR: O'LEARY, P. J. MOORE, J.


Summaries of

People v. Figueroa

California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, Third Division
Apr 30, 2024
No. G062172 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2024)
Case details for

People v. Figueroa

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JORGE FIGUEROA, Defendant and…

Court:California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, Third Division

Date published: Apr 30, 2024

Citations

No. G062172 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2024)