Opinion
F085943
04-08-2024
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CARLTON DWAYNE FIELDS, Defendant and Appellant.
Robert L. S. Angres, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth N. Sokoler and Sean M. McCoy, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Fresno County. No. F11903982 Houry A. Sanderson, Judge.
Robert L. S. Angres, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth N. Sokoler and Sean M. McCoy, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
THE COURT [*]
Defendant Carlton Dwayne Fields contends on appeal that his sentence must be vacated and remanded for resentencing because the trial court erred by failing to conduct a full resentencing hearing. The People agree. We agree with the parties.
We vacate defendant's sentence and remand for full resentencing. In all other respects, we affirm.
PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
This is the fifth time defendant is before our court seeking modification of his sentence.
See People v. Fields (Oct. 2, 2014, F066617 [nonpub. opn.]) (Fields I); People v. Fields (Aug. 18, 2016, F071381 [nonpub. opn.]) (Fields II); People v. Fields (Apr. 10, 2017, F074900 [app. dism.]) (Fields III); and People v. Fields (Nov. 27, 2019, F078855 [nonpub. opn.]) (Fields IV). We take judicial notice of the appellate records, briefs, and opinions in Fields I through IV. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d)(1), 459, subd. (a); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.147; see People v. Vizcarra (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 422, 426, fn. 1.).
Defendant's First Appeal
In December 2012, defendant pleaded no contest to the following charges: corporal injury on a spouse with a prior conviction (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (e)(1);count 1); mayhem (§ 203; count 2); battery causing serious bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (d); count 3); assault with a deadly weapon, specifically, a knife (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count 4); criminal threats (§ 422; count 5); and vandalism (§ 594, subd. (a)(2); count 6). As to count 1, defendant admitted personally inflicting great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (e)). Defendant also admitted having suffered a prior strike (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)), a prior serious felony (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), and a prior prison term (former § 667.5, subd. (b)).
All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.
Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced defendant to 18 years in state prison on count 1, as follows: four years (the middle term), doubled pursuant to the "Three Strikes" law, plus five years for the prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), plus five years for the great bodily injury enhancement (§ 12022.7, subd. (e)). It struck the prior prison term conviction (former § 667.5, subd. (b)) pursuant to People v. Jones (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1142, 1152, and stayed the terms for the other felony counts pursuant to section 654. Defendant was awarded 350 days of presentence confinement credit. The trial court also imposed a restitution fine in the amount of $5,320 and suspended a parole revocation fine in the same amount. (§§ 1202.4, subd. (b)(1), 1202.45.)
Defendant appealed. Our court vacated his sentence and remanded so the trial court could correct several sentencing errors and properly apply section 654. (Fields I, supra, F066617, at p. 20.) We found no error in the trial court's decision to deny defendant probation, nor did we find defendant was deprived of effective assistance of counsel at his sentencing hearing. (Id. at pp. 14-15.) However, we concluded there were several procedural errors and that the trial court should have stayed punishment for count 1 and should have made count 2 the principal term because it carried the longest potential prison term. (Id. at pp. 15-16.) Additionally, we concluded the trial court failed to impose judgment as to count 6 and made several errors in calculating defendant's presentence custody award and in the abstract of judgment and minute order for the sentencing hearing. (Id. at pp. 17-20.)
Defendant's Second Appeal
On March 24, 2015, the trial court resentenced defendant on count 2 to eight years (the upper term), doubled pursuant to the Three Strikes law, plus five years for the prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)), for an aggregate term of 21 years. On the remaining counts, he was sentenced as follows: on count 1, four years (the middle term), doubled pursuant to the Three Strikes law, plus five years for the great bodily injury enhancement (§ 12022.7), consecutive, and one year for the prior prison term (former § 667.5, subd. (b)); and on counts 3, 4, and 5, the upper terms for each, concurrent to count 1. However, the trial court stayed the terms on counts 2 through 5 pursuant to section 654. As to count 6, the trial court sentenced defendant to a concurrent term of credit for time served. It also stayed punishment for the prior prison conviction (former § 667.5, subd. (b)). Defendant was awarded 619 days of presentence confinement credit, and the court imposed a restitution fine of $6,300 and stayed a parole revocation fine in the same amount. (§§ 1202.4, subd. (d), 1202.45.)
Defendant appealed. We remanded the matter so that the trial court could correctly recalculate his presentence custody credits. (Fields II, supra, F071381, at pp. 17-18.) We also ordered the trial court to impose a restitution fine that did not violate the double jeopardy clause of the California Constitution. (Id. at pp. 18-20.)
Defendant's Third Appeal
On December 7, 2016, the trial court resentenced defendant to the correct custody credits and fines and imposed the original restitution fine of $5,320. (§§ 1202.4, subd. (b)(1), 2900.5, 2933.1.)
On December 23, 2016, defendant appealed his sentence, but subsequently abandoned the appeal pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.316. We ordered the appeal dismissed. (Fields III, supra, F074900.)
Defendant's Fourth Appeal
Defendant appealed the 2016 resentencing and his appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. We affirmed the judgment. (Fields IV, supra, F078855.)
Postconviction Proceedings and Defendant's Current Appeal
In 2022, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) informed the trial court that defendant was potentially eligible for relief pursuant to section 1172.75, subdivision (b).
Section 1172.75 was formerly numbered as section 1171.1.
On July 28, 2022, defendant filed a pro se petition for resentencing under section 1172.75. On December 22, 2022, the Fresno County District Attorney filed an opposition. Thereafter, briefs were filed on defendant's behalf first by appointed counsel, then by retained counsel.
On March 1, 2023, the trial court determined that, because the enhancement under former section 667.5, subdivision (b) was part of a stayed sentence, defendant was not eligible for resentencing under section 1172.75, and declined to resentence defendant.
On March 16, 2023, defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
The facts of the underlying offenses are not relevant to the issues raised on appeal.
Defendant contends the trial court erred by not conducting a full resentencing hearing. He argues his enhancement under former section 667.5, subdivision (b) for his prior prison conviction does not fall outside the ameliorative scope of section 1172.75, despite it being stayed. The People agree, as do we.
A. Background
On February 23, 2022, the CDCR informed the trial court that defendant was potentially eligible for relief under section 1172.75, subdivision (b), as an "incarcerated individual[] who [is] potentially eligible for resentencing pursuant to Senate Bill … 483 [(2021-2022 Reg. Sess.)]."
On July 28, 2022, defendant filed a pro se petition for resentencing under section 1172.75.
The prosecution filed an opposition, arguing that section 1172.75 did not extend to defendant's former section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancement for his prior prison conviction because it was stayed by the trial court. It contended the plain language of the statutory scheme of section 1172.75 precluded the extension of relief to those whose prior prison convictions were stayed. The prosecution also argued the extension of relief for stayed enhancements under former section 667.5, subdivision (b) would be contrary to the legislative history that motivated the passage of section 1172.75.
Defense counsel filed a brief arguing that the plain language of section 1172.75 included stayed enhancements and, accordingly, that defendant qualified for relief. Defense counsel also argued that relief under section 1172.75 required the trial court to reconsider modifying other aspects of defendant's sentence to his benefit. In a supplemental brief, replacement defense counsel reiterated these arguments.
On March 23, 2022, at the hearing on the matter, the prosecution stated, "Senate Bill [No.] 483 and [section] 1172.75 do provide some retroactive relief to individuals that do have a qualifying prison prior that was imposed that they are serving time for that now needs to be dismissed; and it does reopen the door to a full resentencing. However, we are not through that door in this case because [defendant] is not serving a term for a prison prior. Therefore, the Court unfortunately-or fortunately, depending how you look at it, does not have jurisdiction to walk through that door and to resentence [defendant]."
The trial court declined to resentence defendant. It found the plain language of section 1172.75 indicated it did not apply to defendant's former section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancement because it was stayed, stating it did "not believe [defendant was] eligible for a recall under 1172.75 given he has a stayed sentence and that his sentence was long already passed [sic] any further reconsiderations."
B. Law
"Questions of law, including application and interpretation of statute, are reviewed de novo." (Kern County Dept. of Child Support Services v. Camacho (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1035.)
"Prior to January 1, 2020, section 667.5, subdivision (b) required trial courts to impose a one-year sentence enhancement for each true finding on an allegation the defendant had served a separate prior prison term and had not remained free of custody for at least five years. (Former § 667.5, subd. (b).)" (People v. Burgess (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 375, 379-380.)
In 2020, "Senate Bill No. 136 [(2019-2020 Reg. Sess.)] amend[ed] section 667.5, subdivision (b) to limit its prior prison term enhancement to only prior prison terms for sexually violent offenses, as defined in Welfare and Institutions Code section 6600, subdivision (b)." (See former § 667.5, subd. (b); Sen. Bill No. 136 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) ch. 590, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2020; People v. Jennings (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 664, 681.) As Senate Bill No. 136 is an ameliorative change in the law, providing for the possibility of a reduced sentence, it applies to all judgments that were not final as of January 1, 2020. (People v. Keene (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 861, 865; see In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 744-745 [ameliorative change applies to judgments not yet final].)
Effective January 1, 2022, the Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 483 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), which added former section 1171.1 (now renumbered as § 1172.75, eff. June 30, 2022) to the Penal Code and made the changes to former section 667.5, subdivision (b) retroactive. (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 3; Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 12; People v. Burgess, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 380.) Section 1172.75, subdivision (c), requires trial courts to provide a full resentencing to any defendant currently serving time on a judgment that includes a sentencing enhancement described in subdivision (a). The enhancements described in section 1172.75, subdivision (a) are those that were "imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to [former] subdivision (b) of Section 667.5" for a prior conviction so long as that prior conviction was not for a sexually violent offense. (§ 1172.75, subd. (a).) Pursuant to section 1172.75, subdivision (b), the "Secretary of the [CDCR]" and the administrators for each county jail "shall identify those persons in their custody currently serving a term for a judgment that includes an enhancement described in subdivision (a)." (§ 1172.75, subd. (b)(1) & (2).) At any such resentencing, the court shall "apply any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing." (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2).)
The plain language of a statute dictates how it is to be interpreted. (Alford v. Superior Court (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1033, 1040 ["[b]ecause the statutory language is generally the most reliable indicator of that intent, we look first at the words themselves, giving them their usual and ordinary meaning"], disapproved on other grounds in Facebook, Inc. v. Superior Court (2020) 10 Cal.5th 329, 345, fn. 6.) Courts deem a statute's words as the most reliable indicator of legislative intent. (John v. Superior Court (2016) 63 Cal.4th 91, 95-96.) Courts also "interpret relevant terms in light of their ordinary meaning, while also taking account of any related provisions and the overall structure of the statutory scheme to determine what interpretation best advances the Legislature's underlying purpose." (Los Angeles County Bd. of Supervisors v. Superior Court (2016) 2 Cal.5th 282, 293.)
"If the statute is ambiguous, we may consider a variety of extrinsic aids, including legislative history, the statute's purpose, and public policy." (People v. Gonzalez (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1118, 1126.)
" 'Defendants are entitled to sentencing decisions made in the exercise of the "informed discretion" of the sentencing court.'" (People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391.)" 'A court which is unaware of the scope of its discretionary powers can no more exercise that "informed discretion" than one whose sentence is or may have been based on misinformation regarding a material aspect of a defendant's record.'" (Ibid., citing People v. Belmontes (1983) 34 Cal.3d 335, 348, fn. 8.) Courts have held that in such circumstances, the appropriate remedy is to remand for resentencing unless the record" 'clearly indicate[s]'" that the trial court would have reached the same conclusion" 'even if it had been aware that it had such discretion.'" (Gutierrez, supra, at p. 1391; accord, People v. Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th 371, 431-432.)
When "the resentencing court has jurisdiction to modify every aspect of the sentence, and not just the portion subjected to the recall[,]" courts label this principle as "the 'full resentencing rule.'" (People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893 (Buycks).)
C. Analysis
Here, we agree with the parties that section 1172.75 applies to defendant's stayed former section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancement, and that the trial court accordingly failed to apply the full resentencing rule when it declined to resentence defendant pursuant to section 1172.75.
Defendant's enhancement under former section 667.5, subdivision (b), was part of the imposed and stayed sentence, and the same prior conviction underlies both that enhancement under former section 667.5, subdivision (b), and his enhancement under section 667, subdivision (a).
"By its plain terms, section 1172.75 requires a full resentencing, not merely that the trial court strike the newly 'invalid' enhancements." (People v. Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 402; see also Buycks, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 893 ["when part of a sentence is stricken on review, on remand for resentencing 'a full resentencing as to all counts is appropriate, so the trial court can exercise its sentencing discretion in light of the changed circumstances' "].) As observed by the appellate court in People v. Christianson (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 300, review granted February 21, 2024, S283189 (Christianson):
"[T]he statutory scheme at issue here involves statutory amendments expressly aimed at reducing sentences by retroactively eliminating a sentencing enhancement described as exacerbating 'existing racial and socio-economic disparities in our criminal justice system.' (Sen. Rules Com., Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 136 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended Sept. 3, 2019, p. 5; see also Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 1 ['in order to ensure equal justice and address systemic racial bias in sentencing, it is the intent of the Legislature to retroactively apply … Senate Bill [No.] 136 … to all persons currently serving a term of incarceration in jail or prison for these repealed sentence enhancements'].) Consistent with that intent, the other provisions of the statute require that the trial court conduct a full resentencing for those defendants impacted by the now invalid enhancement in light of all associated sentencing reform. Specifically, section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(2) requires the trial court to apply 'any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.' Subdivision (d)(3) further permits the trial court to consider a broad range of postconviction factors 'and evidence that reflects that circumstances have changed since the original sentencing so that continued incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice.' (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(3).) Thus, it appears the Legislature intended to provide broad relief to all defendants impacted by the now invalid section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancements." (Christianson, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 314.)
In Christianson, the court found that section 1172.75 applies to imposed and stayed enhancements under former section 667.5, subdivision (b), as well as imposed and executed enhancements. (Christianson, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 316.) There, the CDCR identified the defendant as being eligible for resentencing and the defendant's sentence included imposed, but stayed, enhancements under former section 667.5, subdivision (b). (Id. at p. 307.) The trial court determined that the defendant was not" 'currently serving an additional year in prison'" because the enhancements were part of a stayed term. (Id. at p. 308.) Accordingly, the court elected to administratively correct the now unauthorized sentence to remove them. (Ibid.) The appellate court reversed and remanded for a full resentencing, finding the defendant's stayed enhancement was part of the sentence actually imposed within the meaning of section 1172.75. (Id. at pp. 315- 317.)
As the Christianson court found, there is no reason here to differentiate between defendants serving an additional term based specifically on a now invalid enhancement and those for whom the enhancement was imposed but stayed. Here, as in Christianson, the presence of the enhancement was a component considered by the sentencing court in pronouncing defendant's overall sentence. (Christianson, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 315.) Accordingly, even though defendant's now invalid enhancement under former section 667.5, subdivision (b) was stayed, the Legislature chose to mandate a full resentencing for those individuals impacted by the change, including defendant.
Accordingly, we agree with the parties that, even though resentencing may not affect the imposed and executed sentence defendant is presently serving, defendant is entitled to full resentencing, including consideration of the application of new laws to sentences that were previously final. (See People v. Monroe, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 402; see also Buycks, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 893.)
DISPOSITION
The sentence is vacated and remanded for a full resentencing. In all other respects, we affirm.
[*] Before Meehan, Acting P. J., Snauffer, J. and De Santos, J.