Opinion
F078855
11-27-2019
THE PEOPLE, Petitioner and Respondent, v. CARLTON DWAYNE FIELDS, Defendant and Appellant.
Robert L. Angres, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Office of the State Attorney General, Sacramento, California, for Petitioner and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. F11903982)
OPINION
THE COURT APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Arlan L. Harrell, Judge. Robert L. Angres, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Office of the State Attorney General, Sacramento, California, for Petitioner and Respondent.
Before Poochigian, Acting P.J., Detjen, J. and Smith, J.
-ooOoo-
Appointed counsel for defendant Carlton Dwayne Fields asked this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Defendant was advised of his right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing of the opening brief. He responded, contending (1) the definition of dangerousness in Proposition 47 applies to Proposition 36, (2) Senate Bill No. 1393 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) requires that his five-year prior serious felony conviction enhancement be stricken, and (3) his sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
Background information is taken from the records and opinions in People v. Fields (Oct. 2, 2014, F066617) [nonpub. opn.] and People v. Fields (Aug. 18, 2016, F071381) [nonpub. opn.], of which we take judicial notice.
In May through July 2011, Jane Doe lived on and off with defendant in an apartment in Fresno. On the evening of July 2, 2011, she and defendant argued because defendant believed she had been unfaithful to him. During the argument, defendant repeatedly threatened to kill her as he paced back and forth from the living room to the kitchen holding a cake knife. At one point, defendant touched Doe on the stomach with the knife. Eventually, Doe left the apartment and defendant followed her outside where they continued arguing. Defendant then lifted Doe off the ground and slammed her on the ground. Doe walked back to the apartment to get her belongings to leave but ended up staying there.
We note this date was incorrect in both People v. Fields (Oct. 2, 2014, F066617) [nonpub. opn.] and People v. Fields (Aug. 18, 2016, F071381) [nonpub. opn.].
The following morning, defendant and Doe continued arguing. Defendant punched Doe in her right eye, blinding her in that eye. Defendant also grabbed Doe by the neck and slapped her face. Prior to these incidents, defendant had assaulted Doe on four or five other separate occasions.
On July 3, 2011, a police officer arrested defendant and transported him to jail. While the officer used a computer in the patrol car to make an arrest report, defendant kept asking for water. The officer told defendant to calm down. He said he would get defendant some water as soon as they entered the jail. Defendant told the officer that if he did not get him some water, he was going to kick the patrol car's window out. He then began kicking a rear window on the patrol car, damaging it.
On December 12, 2012, defendant pled no contest to corporal injury on a cohabitant with a prior conviction (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (e)(1); count 1), mayhem (§ 203; count 2), battery with serious bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (d); count 3), assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count 4), criminal threats (§ 422; count 5), and misdemeanor vandalism (§ 594, subd. (a)(2); count 6). He admitted personally inflicting great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (e)), having suffered a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)), having suffered a prior felony conviction within the meaning of the "Three Strikes" law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)), and having served a prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The trial court sentenced him to 18 years in prison.
We note this date was incorrect in People v. Fields (Aug. 18, 2016, F071381) [nonpub. opn.].
All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.
These prior felony conviction allegations were based on a 2005 conviction for assault with a deadly weapon other than a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)).
Defendant appealed. On October 2, 2014, we filed an opinion in People v. Fields (Oct. 2, 2014, F066617) [nonpub. opn.], rejecting defendant's contentions but concluding the trial court made sentencing errors. We remanded for resentencing.
On March 24, 2015, the court resentenced defendant to 21 years in prison.
Defendant appealed. On August 18, 2016, we filed an opinion in People v. Fields (Aug. 18, 2016, F071381) [nonpub. opn.], remanding for recalculation of defendant's presentence custody credits.
On December 7, 2016, the trial court recalculated the custody credits and reimposed the original restitution fine.
On September 28, 2018, defendant filed a motion for modification of his restitution and a motion for recall and resentencing. On October 11, 2018, the trial court denied both motions, noting the judgment had become final.
On December 24, 2018, defendant filed a motion for resentencing pursuant to "Proposition 47, 36." (§§ 1170.18, 1170.126.) On January 14, 2019, the trial court denied the motion on the ground that defendant's convictions did not qualify for relief.
On February 14, 2019, defendant filed a notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
We address both Proposition 36 and 47 because it is unclear the basis upon which defendant petitioned. We agree with the trial court that defendant was not eligible for relief. Defendant was not serving an indeterminate sentence, an express requirement of Proposition 36 (§ 1170.126). And none of his felony convictions were eligible for reduction to misdemeanors under Proposition 47, which applies only to certain drug- and theft-related offenses (§ 1170.18, subd. (a)).
Section 1170.126, subdivision (a) provides: "The resentencing provisions under this section and related statutes are intended to apply exclusively to persons presently serving an indeterminate term of imprisonment pursuant to paragraph (2) of subdivision (e) of Section 667 or paragraph (2) of subdivision (c) of Section 1170.12, whose sentence under this act would not have been an indeterminate life sentence."
Section 1170.18, subdivision (a) provides: "A person who, on November 5, 2014, was serving a sentence for a conviction, whether by trial or plea, of a felony or felonies who would have been guilty of a misdemeanor under the act that added this section ('this act') had this act been in effect at the time of the offense may petition for a recall of sentence before the trial court that entered the judgment of conviction in his or her case to request resentencing in accordance with Sections 11350, 11357, or 11377 of the Health and Safety Code, or Section 459.5, 473, 476a, 490.2, 496, or 666 of the Penal Code, as those sections have been amended or added by this act." --------
Defendant contends his five-year prior serious felony conviction enhancement (§ 667, subd. (a)) should be stricken pursuant to the newly enacted Senate Bill No. 1393. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1013, §§ 1-2.) Senate Bill No. 1393 amended sections 667 and 1385 to provide trial courts the discretion to strike prior serious felony conviction enhancements in the interest of justice. Senate Bill No. 1393 became effective on January 1, 2019, at which time defendant's December 7, 2016 sentence was already final and thus the law does not apply to him retroactively. (See People v. Garcia (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 961, 973 [Senate Bill No. 1393 applies to cases not yet final upon the law's effective date].)
Lastly, defendant argues his sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment because he is a mental health patient. Defendant's judgment has become final and the time for appealing this issue has passed.
Having undertaken an examination of the entire record, we find no evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel or any other arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.