Opinion
November 28, 1988
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Goldman, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Initially, the defendant maintains that the court erred in failing to charge the jury with respect to the defense of extreme emotional disturbance. The defendant's failure to request such an instruction or to object on this ground to the charge, however, precludes this court's review of any error of law in this respect (see, CPL 470.05; People v. Guevara, 134 A.D.2d 518, 519, lv denied 71 N.Y.2d 897). In any event, we find that the evidence did not indicate that the defendant in fact acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance and that he had a reasonable explanation or excuse for his condition (see, People v. Casassa, 49 N.Y.2d 668, cert denied 449 U.S. 842; see generally, People v. Tabarez, 113 A.D.2d 461, affd 69 N.Y.2d 663). The defendant's "normal" appearance during a conversation with two witnesses immediately prior to the incident and his ability to skillfully drive his car backward and to negotiate a U-turn while in reverse in an effort to flee the scene is inconsistent with the loss of self-control associated with this defense (see, People v. Moye, 66 N.Y.2d 887, 890). Neither the defendant's jealousy and anger over the complainant's new boyfriend, nor the evidence that he had been drinking on the date of the stabbing constitutes a reasonable explanation or excuse for the proffered emotional disturbance defense (see, People v. Walker, 64 N.Y.2d 741, 743, rearg dismissed 65 N.Y.2d 924; People v. Deresky, 137 A.D.2d 704, 705, lv denied 71 N.Y.2d 1025; People v. Knights, 109 A.D.2d 910, 911).
Furthermore, we reject the defendant's contention that the court improperly denied his request to charge assault in the second degree as a lesser included offense of assault in the first degree. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant, we conclude that there was no reasonable view of the evidence which would have supported the submission of that offense to the jury. In any event, given the defendant's conviction on the top charge of attempted murder, any error in this regard was rendered harmless (see, People v. Boettcher, 69 N.Y.2d 174, 180; People v. Richette, 33 N.Y.2d 42, 45-46; People v Quintana, 135 A.D.2d 752, lv denied 71 N.Y.2d 901).
We have considered the remaining contentions raised by the defendant in his pro se supplemental brief and find them to be without merit. Lawrence, J.P., Spatt, Sullivan and Balletta, JJ., concur.