Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. CRF062385
ROBIE, J.
A jury found defendant Ronald Merle Fear II guilty of resisting a police officer by threat or violence and failure to appear. The jury also found true two sentencing enhancement allegations, one for a prior prison term and a second for committing a felony while released on bail.
On appeal, defendant contends the conviction for the failure to appear should be reversed because there was no substantial evidence to support a finding that he intended to evade the process of the court. Finding there was substantial evidence to support the conviction, we will affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On the morning of October 2, 2006, Officers John Sadlowski and Chad Lizardo of the Yuba City Police Department were attempting to serve an arrest warrant on defendant. Upon arriving at defendant’s residence, Officer Sadlowski knocked on the door and identified himself as the police. A male voice in the house responded by screaming that the police “were not going to arrest him, that [the police would] have to kick in the door to arrest him.” Officer Sadlowski was able to identify the source of the voice as defendant because Sadlowski saw defendant peek his head out from behind the blinds in the front window. Officer Sadlowski asked defendant to open the door numerous times over the course of 15 to 20 minutes. Defendant responded by stating that the police “would have to use lethal force to take him out of the house. And if [the police] attempted to use lethal force on him, that he would use lethal force on [the police].” Due to the potential threat defendant posed, additional units were requested.
Additional officers responded and set up a perimeter around the house. Defendant continued to issue threats about use of lethal force against the police and the necessity of using lethal force against him. When it became apparent the police could not diffuse the situation, a forced entry was made. Upon entering the house, Officer Sadlowski observed defendant holding a large butcher knife. Defendant pointed the knife at Officer Sadlowski and Officer Nick Morawcznski. Defendant ran into another room in the house and closed the door. The Yuba City SWAT team was called in to extract defendant. The SWAT team forced its way into the room and took defendant into custody.
A complaint was filed against defendant for felony resisting a police officer by threat or violence. Defendant posted a bond for his release. A trial readiness conference was called on June 18, 2007, around 1:30 p.m. The jury trial was set to begin the next day. Defense counsel, Philippa Lauben, stated that defendant was not ready for trial and wanted a continuance and also wanted to represent himself. Defendant said that he was bleeding from the rectum and was suffering from severe nose bleeds that day. The trial court put the motion for continuance on second call pending an update from defendant’s physician stating that he was medically unable to go to trial. Defendant failed to show for the second call. An information was filed on July 6, 2007, charging defendant with felony failure to appear. The felony resisting case and the failure to appear case were consolidated. Two Marsden hearings were held for defendant due to his requests to represent himself. Trial commenced on October 2, 2007. Defendant was tried in absentia.
Defendant has AIDS and hepatitis A, B, and C.
People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118.
Kristy Garza, the court bailiff, testified at trial that defendant was sitting in the hallway around 2:00 p.m. in the afternoon of June 18, 2007. Defendant was agitated and yelling in the hallway outside the courtroom. Garza heard defendant state that he was leaving. When Garza asked defendant if he was done with court, he responded “[n]o.” Garza stated that Lauben then went to have a conversation with defendant to tell him they were confirmed for the next day. According to Garza, Lauben tried to get defendant to stay because “they weren’t done and that he needed to come back in” but “it was a go for tomorrow.” Defendant insisted that he was “not staying” and he was “outta here.” Garza was certain that Lauben told defendant that the proceedings were not done and that he needed to come back to court. Defendant then rode his bike home.
Sherry Snow testified regarding seeing defendant at his home during the day of June 18, 2007. Snow stated that she saw defendant riding home on his bike at 1:15 p.m. screaming, “‘I’m home. I’m home. Call the cops. I’m home.’” Snow stated that defendant was home until 6:00 p.m. because she heard him yelling and playing music in his house. She then called the district attorney’s office to inform them that defendant was at home. When asked whether she gets confused about the time of day or what day something happens, Snow responded that she has “to write things down a lot of times.” Snow also admitted that she wrote down her recollections of June 18 the day before the trial began. She said she wrote it down because it is difficult for her to remember things. She stated that she remembered June 18 because of an incident she had with defendant the day before on June 17, which she wrote down on the day it occurred.
Carlton Dinwiddie, a senior criminal investigator for the Sutter County District Attorney’s Office, testified regarding his involvement in defendant’s failure to appear on June 18, 2007. Dinwiddie stated that the call from Snow was received after defendant failed to appear at second call. He then contacted Snow three days later on June 21, 2007. He stated that Snow said she saw defendant riding his bicycle yelling, “‘Call the cops. I’m home. Call the cops. I hate the fucking cops. The cops can go fuck themselves.’”
Snow testified that she called the district attorney’s office at 1:15 p.m. However, the failure to appear did not occur until around 3:45 p.m.
Snow testified that she could “not recollect” when she saw Dinwiddie because she “didn’t write that down in [her] calendar book,” but it was “maybe a week or two” after June 18, 2007.
Philippa Lauben testified at trial regarding the events of June 18, 2007. She stated that the pretrial conference was put on second call. She spoke to defendant in the hallway outside the courtroom around 3:30 to 3:45 p.m. He was visibly bleeding and other people did not want to sit near him. Lauben stated that she told defendant that she did not anticipate the motion to continue would be granted because there had not been a response from defendant’s doctor. She believed that defendant said he was leaving.
Lauben was counsel for defendant at the June 18, 2007, pretrial hearing. However, she was recused from further involvement because she had a conflict of interest due to her capacity as a witness regarding the failure to appear charge.
At the second call on June 18, 2007, Lauben stated that defendant “indicated he was leaving and would go to Death Row.”
The jury found defendant guilty of resisting a police officer by threat or violence and of failure to appear. The jury also found that defendant was previously found guilty of resisting arrest by means of threat or violence. Defendant was sentenced to five years and eight months for the felony resistance and the failure to appear, as well as the enhancements of the prior prison term and committing a felony while released on bail. Defendant made this timely appeal.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, defendant contends there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction for failure to appear for the purpose of evading the process of the court. (Pen. Code, § 1320.5.) Specifically, defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to prove he intended to evade the process of the court. We disagree.
I
Sufficiency Of The Evidence
“‘The standard of review is well settled: On appeal, we review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence--that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value--from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.] “‘[I]f the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, we must accord due deference to the trier of fact and not substitute our evaluation of a witness’s credibility for that of the fact finder.’” [Citation.] “The standard of review is the same in cases in which the People rely mainly on circumstantial evidence. [Citation.] ‘Although it is the duty of the [finder of fact] to acquit a defendant if it finds that circumstantial evidence is susceptible of two interpretations, one of which suggests guilt and the other innocence [citations], it is the [finder of fact], not the appellate court which must be convinced of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’”’ [Citation.]
“‘An appellate court must accept logical inferences that the [finder of fact] might have drawn from the circumstantial evidence.’ [Citation.] ‘Before the judgment of the trial court can be set aside for the insufficiency of the evidence, it must clearly appear that on no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support the verdict of the [finder of fact].’” (People v. Sanghera (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1567, 1572-1573.)
II
Substantial Evidence Supported Defendant’s Conviction
Defendant contends “the evidence presented to the jury was insufficient to prove that he intended to evade the processes of the court.” Defendant correctly states that to be criminally liable for failure to appear, the person charged must intend to fail to appear and must intend “the failure to appear to ‘achieve some additional purpose,’ i.e., ‘evade the process of the court.’” (People v. Sutton (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 795, 800, quoting People v. Wesley (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 519, 522.) As we shall explain, the evidence at trial supported a finding that defendant intended to fail to appear for the purpose of evading the process of the court.
“Perhaps the most fundamental rule of appellate law is that the judgment challenged on appeal is presumed correct, and it is the appellant’s burden to affirmatively demonstrate error. [Citation.] Thus, when a criminal defendant claims on appeal that his conviction was based on insufficient evidence of one or more of the elements of the crime of which he was convicted, we must begin with the presumption that the evidence of those elements was sufficient, and the defendant bears the burden of convincing us otherwise.” (People v. Sanghera, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 1573.)
In viewing the evidence, a reasonable trier of fact could have found defendant intended to evade the process of the court when he failed to appear. Defendant said, “I’m not staying” and told his attorney that he was leaving. This evidences intent to evade the process of the court. He left the courthouse after the bailiff stated that defendant should not leave. This further supports his intent to evade the process of the court because an officer of the court, the bailiff, specifically told him he should not leave. He was then seen riding his bike home screaming, “‘I’m home. I’m home. Call the cops. I’m home.’” A jury could reasonably infer he was screaming that because he knew that not appearing at the second call was a criminal offense. All of these acts in combination could lead a jury to find that defendant possessed the requisite purpose and intent.
Defendant places weight on the fact that he showed up to court the next morning. However, the fact that he showed up to court the next day does not have any bearing on his intent to evade process of the court on June 18, 2007, when he did not appear for the second call. Similarly, defendant argues that he was confused by his attorney and did not know what to do. However, defendant sat at the courthouse waiting for the second call for at least 2 hours. He then, for some reason, left 10 to 15 minutes before second call and did not appear. The point is, a reasonable trier of fact could find that his statements to those at the courthouse that he was leaving, the fact that he was waiting at the court for the second call, and his statements while riding home, were enough to infer intent to evade the process of the court. Defendant has not met his burden and shown this court that substantial evidence did not support the conviction.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: NICHOLSON, Acting P.J., MORRISON, J.