Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, No. S.D. MH102411 Theodore M. Weathers, Judge.
NARES, J.
Darryl Dunsmore was charged with making a criminal threat (Pen. Code, § 422) and disobeying a court order (§ 273.6). After a court-ordered mental examination, the trial court found Dunsmore to be incompetent to stand trial. (§ 1368.) The court committed Dunsmore to the Department of Mental Health at Patton State Hospital and set his maximum period of incarceration at three years. Dunsmore appeals.
Statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.
FACTS
On March 15, 2008, Dunsmore allegedly threatened to kill his ex-girlfriend's roommate. He also allegedly violated a temporary restraining order issued on behalf of the ex-girlfriend.
On April 8 the trial court ordered an examination and determination of mental competency under section 1368.
On April 24 Dr. David Naimark examined Dunsmore in jail. Naimark diagnosed Dunsmore as suffering from psychosis and noted that he had multiple paranoid ideations about his caregivers, his ex-wife and others trying to harm him. Naimark also reported that Dunsmore "had a significant delusional web in place" and believed the criminal case had been orchestrated against him and someone was trying to kill him. Naimark opined that Dunsmore was not competent to stand trial because he would be unable to assist his attorney in a rational manner.
In a separate report to the court, Naimark recommended the court order involuntary antipsychotic medications.
DISCUSSION
Appointed appellate counsel has filed a brief setting forth evidence in the superior court. Counsel presents no argument for reversal, but asks that this court review the record for error as mandated by People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. Counsel has not referred us to any possible, but not arguable issues pursuant to Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738.
We granted Dunsmore permission to file a brief on his own behalf. He has responded.
Dunsmore claims: (1) he is innocent; (2) he is competent; (3) his due process rights have been violated; (4) the prosecutor committed Brady (Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83) error by not disclosing favorable evidence; (5) defense counsel had a conflict of interest because the public defender's office knew alleged victims and/or victims' relatives; (6) his right to a speedy trial has been violated; (7) the examining psychiatrist did not release exculpatory information to authorities; and (8) he never consented to treatment and he should be returned to court because he is refusing treatment.
As we shall explain, Dunsmore's claims either lack merit or are uncognizable in this appeal.
A defendant is mentally incompetent if, as a result of a mental disorder or developmental disability, he or she is unable to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational manner. (People v. Pennington (1967) 66 Cal.2d 508, 515-516.) "A person cannot be tried or adjudged to punishment while . . . mentally incompetent." (§ 1367, subd. (a).) A defendant's trial while he or she is incompetent violates state law and federal due process guarantees. (Pate v. Robinson (1966) 383 U.S. 375, 385; People v. Pennington, supra, 66 Cal.2d at p. 518.)
"The purpose of the proceeding . . . [is] to protect the accused. It is unfair to subject any defendant to criminal prosecution when he cannot understand the nature of the charges pressed against him or cannot assist in his own defense. Even when a defendant resists this protection by opposing the evidence of incompetency, it would be unfair to deny him the benefit of treatment for his condition before subjecting him to a potential loss of life or liberty in the criminal proceeding." (People v. Bye (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 569, 576.)
As a matter of due process, the trial court must conduct a section 1368 hearing to determine a defendant's competency whenever substantial evidence of incompetence has been introduced. (People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 951-952.) Substantial evidence means evidence that raises a reasonable doubt about the defendant's competence to stand trial. (People v. Ramos (2004) 34 Cal.4th 494, 507.) All proceedings are suspended until competency is determined. (§ 1368, subd. (c).)
A competency proceeding is "separate and distinct from the criminal action from which it arose." (Waldon v. Superior Court (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 809, 814.) In a competency proceeding, the sole issue is the defendant's mental competence to stand trial. An appeal from an order finding the defendant incompetent to stand trial is strictly limited to issues arising directly from the competency proceedings themselves, not from the underlying criminal action.
Accordingly, Dunsmore's contentions regarding his innocence, right to a speedy trial, Brady violations and defense counsel's conflict of interest are not cognizable in this appeal because they arise from the underlying criminal prosecution and not from the competency issues.
We review the trial court's determination of competency for substantial evidence to support that determination (People v. Hightower (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1111), viewing the record in the light most favorable to the trial court's finding (People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 31). We do not reweigh the evidence. The trial court's ruling was based upon the report by Naimark, the court appointed examining psychiatrist, which found defendant incompetent. That report by itself was sufficient to support the trial court's findings. (See People v. Leonard (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1370, 1391; see also People v. Hightower, supra, 41 Cal.App.4th at p. 1111 [substantiality of evidence of competence determined on submitted reports].) Thus, we reject Dunsmore's claim that he was competent to stand trial.
Relying on Welfare and Institutions Code section 5328.4, Dunsmore complains that Naimark did not satisfy his duty to inform law enforcement that he was a victim of the charged crime rather than the perpetrator. Dunsmore has misread the statute, which deals with persons involuntarily committed under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act and requires the physician in charge of such individuals to report to law enforcement crimes committed by or against such individuals in the treatment facility. Welfare and Institutions Code section 5328.4 did not apply to Dunsmore.
Dunsmore incorrectly references Penal Code section 5328.4.
As to Dunsmore's refusal to accept treatment, we note that under section 1370, the court can issue an order authorizing a treatment facility to involuntarily administer antipsychotic medication to a defendant if the following five factors are present: (1) the defendant is charged with a serious crime against the person or property; (2) involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication is substantially likely to render the defendant competent to stand trial; (3) the medication is unlikely to have side effects that interfere with defendant's ability to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings or assist counsel in conducting his defense in a reasonable manner; (4) less intrusive treatments are unlikely to have substantially the same results; and (5) the antipsychotic medication is in the defendant's best medical interest in light of his medical condition. (§ 1370, subd. (a)(1)(F)(2)(B)(ii)(III).)
A trial court's order authorizing involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication is reviewed for substantial evidence. (People v. O'Dell (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 562, 569.)
Substantial evidence supported the court's authorization for Patton State Hospital to administer antipsychotic drugs to Dunsmore without his consent. Dunsmore is charged with making a criminal threat, which is a serious crime against the person. Naimark reported to the court that the antipsychotic medication Zuprexa "is likely to restore the defendant to competence insofar as it is mostly positive psychotic signs that are affecting his ability to proceed and the medication is likely to target these signs." Naimark listed possible side effects of "weight gain, sedation, induction of metabolic side effects, extrapyramidal symptoms and orthostatic hypotension." Naimark reported there "are no specific alternative treatments for this diagnosis that would produce the same results as the suggested medication." Naimark noted the proposed treatment "is in the defendant's best medical interest in light of his medical condition whether or not he were facing legal problems."
Dunsmore's refusal to accept treatment does not warrant his return to court for trial. Dunsmore will be returned to the superior court for further criminal proceedings once it is found his competency to stand trial is restored. (§ 1372.)
A review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436 and Anders v. California, supra, 386 U.S. 738, has disclosed no reasonably arguable appellate issues. Competent counsel has represented Dunsmore on this appeal.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: BENKE, Acting P. J., AARON, J.