Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. GA076487 Laura F. Priver, Judge.
Jonathan B. Steiner and Richard B. Lennon, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
KITCHING, J.
Jrmirol Dewond Duncan appeals from the trial court’s order denying his “motion to adjust sentencing credits.” We affirm the trial court’s order.
As this appeal is from a post-trial motion, the record does not include a discussion of the facts underlying the convictions.
In an information filed on June 22, 2009, Duncan was charged with four counts of assault with a deadly weapon in violation of Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(1), one count of battery with serious bodily injury in violation of section 243, subdivision (d), one count of misdemeanor battery in violation of section 243, subdivision (e)(1), and four counts of inflicting corporal injury on a spouse or cohabitant in violation of section 273.5, subdivision (a).
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
At a hearing held on July 30, 2009, Duncan made a motion to set aside the information pursuant to section 995. The trial court granted the motion as to count 1 (assault with a deadly weapon in violation of section 245, subdivision (a)(1)), and count 3 (battery with serious bodily injury in violation of section 243, subdivision (d)).
On September 29, 2009, Duncan entered into a negotiated plea agreement under the terms of which he was to plead guilty or no contest to count 9, the infliction of corporal injury on a cohabitant in violation of section 273.5, subdivision (a), and count 10, another count alleging the infliction of corporal injury on a cohabitant in violation of section 273.5, subdivision (a). In exchange, the remaining counts would be dismissed and Duncan would be sentenced to a term of three years in state prison.
After waiving his right to a trial by the court or a jury, his right to subpoena witnesses and present a defense, his right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him and his privilege against self-incrimination, Duncan pleaded no contest to two counts of inflicting corporal injury on a cohabitant which resulted in a traumatic condition upon her.
On the same day, September 29, 2009, the trial court sentenced Duncan to the mid-term of three years in state prison for his conviction of count 9, the “base count.” With regard to count 10, the trial court imposed a concurrent term of three years in prison. Duncan was ordered to pay a $30 court security assessment (§ 1465.8, subd. (a)(1)), a $30 criminal conviction assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373), a $400 domestic violence fee (§ 1203.097), a $200 restitution fine (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)), and a stayed $200 parole revocation restitution fine (§ 1202.45). The trial court then dismissed all of the remaining counts.
The trial court awarded Duncan presentence custody credit for 170 days actually served and 84 days of good time/work time, for a total of 254 days.
On July 16, 2010, Duncan, acting in propria persona, filed in the superior court a “motion to adjust sentencing credits.” In his motion, Duncan asserted that he was entitled to credit for 197 days actually served plus 197 days of conduct credit pursuant to “SB 18 or [the revised] section 4019.” Duncan argued, “If the legislatives (sic) aim was to reduce prison populations and conserve financial resources in view of the fiscal emergency, then the legislatives (sic) purpose can only achieve its maximum and most immediate effort through retroactive application” of the revised statute.
In response to Duncan’s motion, the trial court issued an order stating: “The court has read and considered defendant’s motion to adjust sentencing credits. The motion is denied. Defendant has not set forth sufficient facts to show he is entitled to the relief requested.”
On August 3, 2010, Duncan filed a second motion in the trial court, stating that he had “found an error in the number of days in question.” He indicated that at the time he was sentenced, he was granted presentence custody credit for 197 days actually served and 84 days of conduct credit. He again argued that “if the legislatives (sic) aim [is] to reduce prison populations and conserve financial resources in view of the fiscal emergency, the legislatives (sic) purpose can only achieve it’s (sic) maximum and most immediate effort through retroactive application. [¶] To this fact... (sic) I the defendant apply for a credit adjustment of (197 days actual +167 days local credit = 364 total days credit)”
In response to Duncan’s second motion, the trial court issued the following order: “The court has read and considered defendant’s second request for adjustment of custody credits. This request is also denied.”
Duncan filed a third motion for adjustment of his presentence custody credits on August 26, 2010. He again argued that, “if the legislative’s (sic) aim was to reduce prison populations and conserve financial resources in view of the fiscal emergency, then the legislatives (sic) purpose can only achieve it’s (sic) maximum and most immediate effort through retroactive application.” Duncan continued: “To this fact of present to the court (sic) I the defendant apply for a credit adjustment of (170 days actual + 170 days local credit = 340 total days credit)”
In an order filed on August 26, 2010, the trial court stated, “The court has read and considered the defendant’s third request to adjust custody credits. The request is again denied.”
On September 22, 2010, Duncan filed a notice of appeal from the trial court’s order.
On November 5, 2010, this court appointed the California Appellate Project as counsel to represent Duncan on appeal.
CONTENTIONS
After examination of the record, appellate counsel filed an opening brief which raised no issues and requested this court to conduct an independent review of the record.
By notice filed December 7, 2010, the clerk of this court advised Duncan to submit within 30 days any contentions, grounds of appeal or arguments he wished this court to consider. No response has been received to date.
REVIEW ON APPEAL
We have examined the entire record and are satisfied counsel has complied fully with counsel’s responsibilities. (Smith v. Robbins (2000) 528 U.S. 259, 278-284; People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 443.)
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order is affirmed.
We concur: KLEIN, P. J., ALDRICH, J.