Opinion
June 15, 1993
Appeal from the Supreme Court, New York County (Jerome Hornblass, J.).
After running a red light, defendant was apprehended in possession of a recently stolen automobile. Testimony by the owner concerning the car's condition and mileage prior to the theft, by the police concerning its condition when recovered, and by an expert appraiser established beyond a reasonable doubt that its value was well in excess of $3000, the monetary threshold for criminal possession of stolen property in the third degree (see, People v. Brown, 174 A.D.2d 448, affd 80 N.Y.2d 361; People v Diaz, 184 A.D.2d 327, lv denied 80 N.Y.2d 928). Since defendant never requested submission of criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth degree as a lesser included offense, the court's failure to submit such offense, sua sponte, was not error (CPL 300.50). In any event, no reasonable view of the evidence supported submission of the lesser offense (see generally, People v. Glover, 57 N.Y.2d 61). Also unpreserved is defendant's argument that he was deprived of a fair trial by the court's failure to give an expert witness instruction, and we decline to review in the interest of justice. While the court erred in telling the jury, "it should be as easy for you to say the word `guilty' as is `not guilty' if you are basing it [reasonable doubt] on objective standards on the law as I have given it to you and the evidence or lack thereof", defendant's challenge to the first part of this instruction is unpreserved, and the remainder of the instruction, viewed against the court's charge taken as a whole, did not convey an improper definition of reasonable doubt.
Concur — Murphy, P.J., Sullivan, Milonas, Asch and Nardelli, JJ.