Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. CRF06-720.
BLEASE, J.
Following the denial of his motion to suppress evidence (Pen. Code, § 1538.5), defendant Ivan Jay Dixon entered a negotiated plea of nolo contendere to possessing a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)). He was sentenced to three years in state prison and ordered to pay a $200 restitution fine (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)); a $200 restitution fine suspended unless parole is revoked (§ 1202.45); a $50 criminal laboratory analysis fee (Health & Saf. Code, § 11372.5), plus a $140 penalty assessment; and a $150 drug program fee (Health & Saf. Code, § 11372.7), plus a $420 penalty assessment. He appeals, contending the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress and in failing to breakdown the $140 and $420 penalty assessments it imposed.
Further undesignated references are to the Penal Code.
Finding defendant waived his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress as part of his negotiated plea agreement, we shall dismiss that portion of the appeal, affirm the judgment, and remand the matter to the trial court for a breakdown of the $140 and $420 penalty assessments it imposed.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The facts underlying defendant’s conviction are not necessary to the resolution of this appeal. It is sufficient to note that defendant was charged by information with transporting a controlled substance; possessing a controlled substance; unlawfully using a controlled substance, a misdemeanor; and resisting or obstructing a peace officer, a misdemeanor. It was also alleged that defendant had one prior strike conviction and had served three prior prison terms.
Defendant moved to suppress evidence of “certain tangible and intangible things seized from him without a warrant and in violation of the Fourth Amendment,” including a blood sample taken from him, any analyses of that sample, “.20 grams of an alleged crystalline substance, suspected to be methamphetamine,” any analyses of that substance, and a tape recording of a statement he made after his arrest.
The trial court denied the motion, and defendant entered into a written plea agreement in which he agreed to plead nolo contendere to possessing a controlled substance in exchange for a three year stipulated prison term and dismissal of the remaining counts and enhancement allegations. In doing so, he executed a “Declaration and Order Regarding Plea of NO CONTEST to a Felony” (plea agreement) in which he agreed to “waive all right to appeal on both the judgment of the [c]ourt and any decisions on motions which precede this plea or judgment.” He also represented that “[m]y lawyer explained this form and its entire contents to me and I understand what I have said in this [d]eclaration and the consequences thereof.” At the end of the agreement, defendant’s attorney executed a declaration, confirming that she had reviewed the entire form with defendant and explained the consequences of the plea to him.
Following the denial of defendant’s motion to suppress, the trial court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss the transporting a controlled substance count (§ 995).
At the change of plea hearing, the trial court asked defendant if he had reviewed the plea agreement with his counsel and had an opportunity to speak to his counsel about its consequences, and defendant indicated that he had. The court confirmed that the initials and signature on the plea agreement belonged to defendant. The court found defendant understood the consequences of his plea and was “understandingly and voluntarily pleading . . . .”
While this case was pending on appeal, defendant’s appellate counsel sent a letter to the trial court requesting the court “breakdown the exact calculation of the $140 and $420 assessments” and amend the abstract of judgment to include the breakdown. At the hearing on the matter, the trial court explained that it was unable to grant defendant’s request because “[t]he dollar amounts were provided by the probation department,” and probation did not provide the court with a breakdown.
DISCUSSION
I.
Defendant claims the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence. The People respond that defendant waived his right to appeal the denial of the motion as part of the plea agreement, and thus, the appeal must be dismissed. We agree.
A defendant may waive the right to appeal the denial of a suppression motion as part of a negotiated plea agreement. (People v. Castrillon (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 718, 721-722 (Castrillon); see also People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 80 (Panizzon).) “To be enforceable, a defendant’s waiver of the right to appeal must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. [Citations.] Waivers may be manifested either orally or in writing. [Citation.] The voluntariness of a waiver is a question of law which appellate courts review de novo.” (Panizzon, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 80 .)
A defendant’s signature on a waiver form upon the advice of counsel, and the confirmation of his understanding of the consequences of the waiver by the trial court, furnishes adequate evidence of a knowing and voluntary plea. (Panizzon, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 84.) “So long as the waiver form contains sufficient information, and both the defendant and his counsel attest to its valid execution, the judge may, in his discretion, dispense with further explanation to the defendant of his rights.” (In re Ibarra (1983) 34 Cal.3d 277, 286, disapproved on other grounds, People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1174-1175.) In other words, the written waiver of rights is sufficient unless events during the plea hearing raise a doubt that defendant understood and knowingly waived his rights. (Castrillon, supra, 227 Cal.App.3d at p. 722.)
The record in this case clearly establishes that defendant knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived his right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion. In executing the plea agreement, he agreed to “waive all right to appeal on both the judgment . . . and any decisions on motions which precede this plea or judgment.” He also indicated that he understood each initialed item, and that his attorney had explained the document and its entire contents to him. Moreover, his attorney attested to reviewing the document with him and explaining the consequences of the plea to him. Both defendant and his attorney attested to the document’s valid execution, and the in-court questioning of defendant and his attorney raised no doubts as to defendant’s understanding of his rights and the consequences of his plea. There is nothing in the record to raise a doubt that defendant understood his rights and the consequences of his plea and knowingly waived his rights, so as to prompt additional inquiry by the court. (Castrillon, supra, 227 Cal.App.3d at p. 722.)
As we understand it, defendant argues that because the trial court admonished him concerning his constitutional rights but failed to admonish him concerning his right to appeal, “the written waiver of issues should [not] control and the court should address the merits of his argument.” As previously mentioned, “a court may rely upon a defendant’s validly executed waiver form as a proper substitute for a personal admonishment.” (Panizzon, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 83-84 [trial court’s failure to admonish the defendant regarding the right to appeal was of no consequence where the defendant waived that right in his plea agreement].)
We are satisfied that defendant’s waiver of the right to appeal any decisions on motions which preceded the plea or judgment, including the denial of his motion to suppress, was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary even though the trial court did not admonish him regarding the right to appeal. Accordingly, defendant’s appeal of the denial of his motion to suppress is dismissed. (Panizzon, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 90.)
II.
Defendant next contends that “the matter must be remanded to the [trial] court so that it can break down the penalty assessments imposed on top of the [criminal laboratory analysis] fee and the drug program fee.” The People agree, and so do we.
The abstract of judgment filed by the trial court must “separately list, with the statutory basis, all fines, fees and penalties imposed[.]” (People v. High (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1192, 1201.) “Although . . . a detailed recitation of all the fees, fines and penalties on the record may be tedious, California law does not authorize shortcuts. . . . At a minimum, the inclusion of all fines and fees in the abstract may assist state and local agencies in their collection efforts. [Citation.] Thus, even where the Department of Corrections [and Rehabilitation] has no statutory obligation to collect a particular fee, . . . the fee [and penalty assessments] must be included in the abstract of judgment. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 1200.)
Here, the abstract of judgment does not “separately list, with the statutory basis,” the component parts of the $140 and $420 “penalty assessments” it imposed in association with the criminal laboratory analysis and drug program fees. Health and Safety Code sections 11372.5 (criminal laboratory analysis fee) and 11372.7 (drug program fee), cited by the trial court, do not provide a basis for the penalty assessments, only the base fees. Thus, we will direct the court to amend the abstract of judgment to include such a breakdown, complete with the statutory basis. To the extent that information is in the possession of the probation department, it is incumbent upon the trial court to obtain it.
DISPOSITION
The portion of the appeal challenging the denial of the motion to suppress is dismissed, and the judgment is affirmed. The trial court is directed to amend the abstract of judgment to separately state the fee, penalty assessments, and surcharges associated with the criminal laboratory analysis and drug program fees, and to forward a certified copy of the amended abstract to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
We concur: SCOTLAND, P. J., BUTZ, J.