Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo County Super. Ct. No. MI 04900 Roger T. Picquet, Judge
Jean Matulis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Paul M. Roadarmel, Jr., Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Rama R. Maline, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
COFFEE, J.
Appellant Deidra Davidson appeals from the trial court's order of commitment to the Department of Developmental Services (DDS) pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code, § 6500 et seq. Appellant waived her right to a jury trial, and the parties submitted the matter on the written reports. The trial court determined that appellant is mentally retarded, is a danger to herself and/or others and that her mental retardation is a substantial factor in causing her dangerousness. It ordered her committed to DDS for one year.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
Appellant contends the trial court erred in committing her without finding that her mental retardation caused her to have serious difficulty in controlling dangerous behavior as required by People v. Bailie (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 841, 847-850. We conclude that the court applied the correct legal standard, and the evidence shows that she had serious difficulty in controlling her dangerous behavior due to her mental retardation.
FACTS
Appellant, age 19, suffers from mild mental retardation, a schizoaffective disorder, attention deficit disorder, post traumatic stress disorder, and has a chromosome abnormality. She has been placed in crisis homes, psychiatric facilities and other community-based facilities, but none have been able to maintain her due to her dangerous behaviors. Many of her placements have been terminated due to the frequency of her leaving placements without permission, threatening harm to herself and her destruction of property.
Appellant's most successful placement was at Lakemary Treatment Center in Kansas from 2003 to 2006. She left this placement in January 2007 to live with her mother in Arkansas. She began having behavioral difficulties and, in June, her mother sent her to live with her father in Tulare, California.
Soon after moving in with her father, appellant was admitted to a mental health inpatient facility on a section 5150 hold due to auditory hallucinations. She was diagnosed with psychotic disorder, not otherwise specified. Appellant was discharged to her father's home, but soon began destroying property, writing on walls, breaking windows and making threats. In July 2007, she was placed in a group home, where she exhibited sexualized behavior, was aggressive and destructive. In September, she became aggressive toward another resident in the group home and went AWOL. She was hospitalized for a section 5150 hold, but again went AWOL. This resulted in her removal from the group home.
In October 2007, appellant was admitted to San Luis Obispo County Mental Health's inpatient facility. She was discharged to a group home in Oxnard. She went AWOL because she was angry at another resident. Appellant was placed on a 5150 hold in a Ventura County psychiatric facility and was later returned to the group home, but went AWOL again on the same day.
In November 2007, appellant was admitted to College Hospital in Cerritos. It is a locked facility, which has a program that addresses the needs of clients who have both developmental delays and mental health issues. There appellant was given an Axis I diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder, history of attention deficit disorder; an Axis II diagnosis of mild mental retardation, mild to moderate; and an Axis III diagnosis of Fragile X Syndrome.
Status Review Report
The Department of Social Services issued a status review report on December 3, 2007, shortly before appellant's 19th birthday. It indicated that, since her placement in College Hospital, she continued to have behavioral outbursts and to engage in sexually inappropriate behavior. One incident resulted in her being administered Haldol (an anti-psychotic) and Aptiva (a tranquilizer). Tri-Counties Regional Center was searching for an appropriate long-term placement for appellant that would address her psychiatric needs and developmental delays.
On December 21, 2007, the district attorney filed a petition for appellant's commitment pursuant to section 6500 and the trial court appointed the public defender to represent her.
Report of Doctor Powers
Dr. Bruce Powers is a psychologist with the Tri-Counties Regional Center. He interviewed appellant at College Hospital on February 18, 2008, and reported an Axis I diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder, attention deficit disorder, and post traumatic stress disorder, all by history. She had an Axis II diagnosis of mild mental retardation. Her thought processes, while limited, were logical and there was no evidence of hallucinatory behavior. Appellant's answers to questions were typically one word or short sentences, but she showed an ability to express her needs and desires. She understood that the interview was to assist the judge in deciding where she should live. Appellant was aware that her attorney's job is to "'talk for [her] in court.'"
Dr. Powers administered several tests which showed that appellant functioned within a mildly retarded range. This was consistent with prior psychoeducational evaluations completed throughout her school career. Her spelling and math skills were at a first grade level, and she read at a second grade level. She could tell time to one minute intervals, was able to recognize coins and add coins to a dollar, but was unable to add coins or bills together.
Appellant expressed a desire to be placed at Canyon Springs facility in Cathedral City and told Dr. Powers it would be good for her because she needed help with her anger and sexual behavior. However, the only sexual problem she could identify was that an individual with whom she had been sexually active was "too old" because he was age 38. She "[didn't] believe in" sexually transmitted diseases and had no knowledge of AIDS. Appellant did not use condoms and was not concerned about pregnancy because of "Depo," possibly a reference to Depo-Provera shots. In response to questioning, appellant indicated she has had no formal sex education or training.
Dr. Powers stated that appellant had no understanding of physical safety, how to assess risky situations or to determine whether a person is trustworthy. She could not describe how to avoid being raped, and seemed unaware that she could decline sex. If someone wanted to kiss her, she stated she would "'kiss them back.'" Dr. Powers noted that appellant had shown improved behavior during her stay at Lakemary Center in Kansas. However, the discharge summary indicated she should not be left unsupervised due to her sexual behaviors. Since her move to her mother's and father's homes, her psychiatric status and behavior have deteriorated.
It was Dr. Power's opinion that appellant should be placed in a structured setting which provides support for her challenging behaviors, can keep her safe, and provide education and skill training. In an addendum report, Dr. Powers opined that appellant is a mentally retarded person who is a danger to herself or others and her "mental retardation is a substantial factor in causing her difficulties controlling her behaviors."
Commitment Hearing
At the commitment hearing on February 28, 2008, appellant waived her right to a jury trial. The parties submitted the matter on the status review report and the psychological evaluation and addendum by Dr. Powers. The court granted the petition. It authorized placement at Canyon Springs facility in Cathedral City.
The court concurrently heard argument concerning dismissal of a section 300 dependency because appellant was age 19 and no longer qualified for child welfare services.
The trial court issued a written order in which it made three factual findings: that appellant is mentally retarded; she is a danger to herself and/or others; and that her "mental retardation is a substantial factor in causing her dangerousness." It made three conclusions of law: that the allegations in the petition are true; that appellant is mentally retarded and is dangerous to herself and/or others; and she is a proper and fit subject for commitment pursuant to section 6500 et seq. The court ordered her committed to DDS for one year.
DISCUSSION
In relevant part, section 6500 provides, "On and after July 1, 1971, no mentally retarded person may be committed to the State Department of Developmental Services pursuant to this article, unless he or she is a danger to himself or herself, or others." In People v. Quinn (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 1290, we held that section 6500 did not require that the dangerous condition be caused by mental retardation. (Quinn, at pp. 1293-1294.) We concluded that evidence of dangerousness and mental retardation were sufficient to authorize commitment under section 6500. (Quinn, at p. 1294.)
Subsequently, the Third District concluded that section 6500 should be construed to contain a requirement that the individual subject to commitment has "serious difficulty in controlling dangerous behavior." (People v. Bailie, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 850.) In reaching its conclusion, the court relied on our Supreme Court's decision in In re Howard N. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 117. There, the court considered a due process challenge to an extended civil detention scheme for juveniles discharged from a Division of Juvenile Justice (formerly Youth Authority) commitment. (§ 1800 et seq.) It determined that the "extended detention scheme should be interpreted to contain a requirement of serious difficulty in controlling dangerous behavior." (In re Howard N., at p. 132.) Such a requirement preserves the constitutionality of section 1800 because it ensures that involuntary civil commitments would be limited to "those who suffer from a volitional impairment rendering them dangerous beyond their control." (In re Howard N., at p. 128.)
We are bound by the Supreme Court's principles enunciated in Howard N. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455) and thus follow the holding in People v. Bailie, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th 841 . This, however, does not provide a basis for reversal because the trial court made a finding that appellant's "mental retardation is a substantial factor in causing her dangerousness." Dr. Powers applied the same standard in his psychological evaluation, concluding that "appellant's mental retardation is a substantial factor in causing her difficulties controlling her behaviors." The written reports overwhelmingly established that appellant had serious difficulty in controlling her dangerous behavior due to her mental retardation.
The judgment (order of commitment) is affirmed.
We concur: YEGAN Acting P.J., PERREN, J.