Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Gregg L. Prickett, Judge, Super. Ct. No. 05NF1179.
Martha L. McGill, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, David Delgado-Rucci and Ronald A. Jakob, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
BEDSWORTH, ACTING P. J.
Rande Ladd Crissinger was convicted by a jury on 12 counts of unlawful sexual conduct involving two minors, both of whom were his sons. The court sentenced Crissinger to consecutive terms of 15 years to life on the 6 counts charging violations of Penal Code section 288, subdivision (a) (counts 1-3and 6-8). On count 4, alleging a violation of section 288a, subdivision (b)(2), the court sentenced Crissinger to the middle term of 2 years; and on the remaining counts (5 and 9-12) the court imposed terms of 8 months each (one-third of the middle term), to run consecutively to the term imposed on count 4.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
The jury specifically found Crissinger had committed a violation of section 288, subdivision (a), against more than one victim, qualifying him for a mandatory sentencing enhancement under section 667.61, subdivision (e)(5).
On appeal, Crissinger challenges only his sentence, arguing the court could not properly sentence him to separate terms of 15 years to life on counts 1 through 3 and 6 through 8, because the information did not specifically allege that each of those charged offenses had occurred on separate occasions, and the jury did not specifically declare that the particular acts it found Crissinger guilty of had occurred on different occasions. (Former Pen. Code, § 667.61, subd. (g).) He also argues the court could not sentence him consecutively on the remaining counts without a jury’s determination of the factors to be weighed by the court in deciding whether those sentences should run consecutively or concurrently. We agree, in part.
Although the evidence in this case was more than sufficient to support a verdict Crissinger had engaged in lewd acts against each of his sons on numerous separate occasions within the time periods charged in counts 1 through 3 (the elder son) and 6 through 8 (the younger son), it is equally sufficient to support the conclusion that he engaged in 2 separate counts of lewd acts against his elder son on any one occasion, and that he engaged in 3 separate counts of lewd acts against his younger son on any one occasion. Consequently, on this record, it is impossible to discern whether the jury found Crissinger guilty of committing lewd acts against his elder son on more than 2 separate occasions in counts 1 through 3, or whether it found Crissinger guilty of committing lewd acts against his younger son on more than one occasion in counts 6 through 8.
Because the record is equally supportive of the conclusion the acts Crissinger was found guilty of in counts 1 through 3 each occurred on separate occasions, and the conclusion 2 of those acts occurred on a single occasion, the court erred in simply assuming, for purposes of sentencing, that the jury reached the former conclusion. Likewise, because the record is equally supportive of the conclusion the acts Crissinger was found guilty of in counts 6 through 8 each occurred on separate occasions, and the conclusion that all 3 of those acts occurred on a single occasion, the court erred in simply assuming the jury reached the former conclusion. In light of those errors, the case must be remanded to the trial court for resentencing on those counts.
By contrast, we find no error in the court’s decision to impose consecutive sentences on the remaining counts. As our supreme court has recently held, the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial does not apply to a trial court’s decision about whether to sentence multiple counts consecutively or concurrently.
FACTS
At the time this case went to trial, the amended information charged Crissinger with 12 counts of unlawful sexual conduct involving his sons. As to the first son, he was charged with 3 counts of committing a lewd act against a child under the age of 14 (§ 288, subd. (a)), all occurring between the dates of July 4, 1995 and May 29, 1998 (counts 1-3); one count of oral copulation with a minor under the age of 16 (§ 288a, subd. (b)(2)), occurring between the dates of May 30, 1999 and May 29, 2001 (count 4); and one count of oral copulation of a minor (§ 288a, subd. (b)(1)), occurring between the dates of May 30, 2001 and May 29, 2003 (count 5). As to the second son, Crissinger was charged with 3 counts of committing a lewd act upon a child under the age of 14 (§ 288 subd. (a)), all occurring between the dates of January 1, 2002 and May 18, 2003 (counts 6-8); 2 counts of oral copulation with a minor under the age of 16 (§ 288a, subd. (b)(2)), both occurring between the dates of May 19, 2003 and December 20, 2004 (counts 9-10); and 2 counts of sodomy of a person under the age of 16 (§ 286, subd. (b)(2)), occurring between the dates of October 1, 2004 and December 20, 2004 (counts 11-12).
The complaint also included special allegations that as to all counts, Crissinger had committed his lewd acts on more than one victim, and had substantial sexual conduct with both of his victims while they were under the age of 14, rendering section 1203.066, subdivision (a) applicable. And as to counts 1 through 8, it was alleged as an enhancement that Crissinger qualified for a mandatory sentence of 15 years to life under section 667.61, subdivision (e)(5).
Crissinger’s elder son, who was born in May of 1985, testified at trial. He explained that his father had begun engaging in oral copulation with him when he was approximately seven years old. The son described the incidents as including Crissinger having him put his mouth on Crissinger’s penis, and then Crissinger putting his own mouth on the son’s penis. The son explained that the incidents began while Crissinger, his wife, and two sons were all living together in Corona, California.
Crissinger and his wife divorced when the elder son was approximately 11 years old, and the wife retained physical custody of the boys. However, the boys visited with Crissinger every other weekend, and the elder son testified that the incidents of oral copulation between he and Crissinger continued during those visits – although not every time. Instead, the oral copulation took place “maybe like every other time or once every three or four times . . . .” The son also stated that the incidents “would only happen once in a weekend,” but that for “a while” each incident included Crissinger and the son orally copulating each other. However, by about the time the son was 15 or 16, he was no longer orally copulating Crissinger, and the incidents were restricted to Crissinger orally copulating him.
At one point, when the elder son was about 13 or 14, Crissinger told him to orally copulate his younger brother, who was then about nine years old, and to have the younger brother orally copulate him. They complied, and did so again on several occasions, for a total of what the elder son estimated was 5 to 10 times.
The elder son also testified that he moved into Crissinger’s home at about age 17, when he was a senior in high school. The incidents of oral copulation continued about once per month after that, but finally stopped after the son graduated from high school.
The elder son estimated that the incidents of oral copulation occurred “at least five times within each year” from the time he was 11 years old until he was 13 years old, approximately “three or four” times a year when he was 14 to 15 years old, and “maybe once or twice” per year when he was 16 to 18 years old .
Crissinger’s younger son, who was born in May of 1989, also testified. He stated he had no clear memory of when Crissinger first started molesting him, and speculated that he “might have some suppressed memories . . . .” He initially stated he could recall incidents occurring back to when he was “[m]aybe about 13,” but later had his recollection refreshed regarding incidents occurring as early as when he was 12. The son described how Crissinger would “call me back to his room, almost every weekend that I went down to his house.” When the younger son went into the room, Crissinger would lock the door and ask the son to take off his clothes. He would then touch and rub the son’s penis with his hands, and suck it with his mouth. Crissinger would then remove his own clothes, and ask his son to touch Crissinger’s penis with his hand and his mouth. The son did those things. The son described these incidents as occurring regularly until about December of 2004, when he stopped visiting Crissinger.
The younger son also testified that approximately five months before he stopped visiting, Crissinger had begun sodomizing him as well as engaging him in oral copulation during each incident. That occurred about once per month during the five-month period.
Finally, the younger son also recalled incidents in which Crissinger had him and his older brother orally copulate each other, while Crissinger watched. The younger son had no recollection of when those incidents occurred, and believed they had occurred “only once or twice.”
In his closing argument, the prosecutor described the elements of each crime, and emphasized that as to each count, it was important for the jury to find that the act alleged had occurred during the specified time period. He then explained that “[e]ach one of those acts is a separate crime, ladies and gentlemen. When he orally copulated the boys, that’s a crime. When he had the boys orally copulate him, that’s a crime. When he had [his younger son] orally copulate [the elder], that’s another crime. When he had [the elder son] orally copulate [the younger], that’s another crime. There are way more crimes that happened than are charged in this case, ladies and gentlemen, way more.”
The court instructed the jury as to the elements of each charged count, and then explained: “The People have presented evidence of more than one act to prove that the defendant committed these offenses. [¶] You must not find the defendant guilty unless: [¶] One, you all agree that the People have proved that the defendant committed at least one of these acts, and you all agree on which act he committed for each offense. [¶] Or, two, you all agree that the People have proved that the defendant committed all of the acts alleged to have occurred during this time period and have proved that the defendant committed at least the number of offenses charged.”
The jury found Crissinger guilty as charged on all 12 counts.
The court held the sentencing hearing on December 8, 2006. At that hearing, Crissinger’s counsel objected to the prosecution’s request that Crissinger be sentenced to 6 separate terms of 15 years to life for counts 1 through 3, and 6 through 8, because the jury was never asked to determine that the particular lewd acts it found Crissinger had committed against his sons to establish his guilt on each of those counts had occurred on separate occasions. (People v. Jones (2001) 25 Cal.4th 98.) As counsel explained, “the testimony at trial was that there were multiple acts on any given occasion. There were also multiple occasions. But the jury was never asked to make any finding that the acts in counts 1 through 3 or 6 through 8 occurred on different occasions.”
The prosecutor disagreed, stating “I believe that the testimony was clear that these incidents happened at a minimum of two weeks apart. The boys would go to visit their father, every other weekend at the most. And it’s clear that these incidents happened numerous times, way more times than were charged. And they were separate and distinct incidents, each one of the allegations. And I believe that would support consecutive sentences.”
The court ultimately agreed with the prosecutor, and sentenced Crissinger to 6 terms of 15 years to life, one term for each of counts 1 through 3 and 6 through 8. The court explained that contrary to the argument made by Crissinger’s counsel, it believed “that there [were] sufficient facts to clearly delineate that these are separate occurrences, and because of that, the court will be sentencing consecutively.”
With respect to the remaining counts, the court noted that it was “mandated to sentence independently,” and imposed “the midterm of two years” on count 4, plus “one-third the midterm or eight months as to counts 5, 9, 10, 11 and 12,” Those terms were also specified to run consecutively to the term imposed for count four.
I
Crissinger argues the court erred in sentencing him to 6 separate terms of fifteen years to life under section 667.61 – one for each of counts 1 through 3 and 6 through 8. As Crissinger points out, former section 667.61, subdivision (g), specified that only one such term could be imposed for “any offense or offenses committed against a single victim during a single occasion. If there are multiple victims during a single occasion, the term specified in subdivision (a) or (b) shall be imposed on the defendant once for each separate victim. Terms for other offenses committed during a single occasion shall be imposed as authorized under any other law, including Section 667.6, if applicable.” (Former § 667.61, subd. (g).)
Section 667.61 was substantially revised in 2006. However, as applicable to this case, former section 667.61 provided in pertinent part: “(b) Except as provided in subdivision (a), a person who is convicted of an offense specified in subdivision (c) under one of the circumstances specified in subdivision (e) shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life and shall not be eligible for release on parole for 15 years except as provided in subdivision (j). [¶] (c) This section shall apply to any of the following offenses: [¶] . . . [¶] (4) A violation of subdivision (b) of Section 288. [¶] . . . [¶] (e) The following circumstances shall apply to the offenses specified in subdivision (c): [¶] . . . [¶] (5) The defendant has been convicted in the present case or cases of committing an offense specified in subdivision (c) against more than one victim. [¶] . . . [¶] (g) The term specified in subdivision (a) or (b) shall be imposed on the defendant once for any offense or offenses committed against a single victim during a single occasion. If there are multiple victims during a single occasion, the term specified in subdivision (a) or (b) shall be imposed on the defendant once for each separate victim. Terms for other offenses committed during a single occasion shall be imposed as authorized under any other law, including Section 667.6, if applicable.”
The general rule is that multiple sex offenses occurred on a “single occasion” under section 667.61 if they “were committed in close temporal and spatial proximity.” (People v. Jones, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 107.) Under this rule, a single sentence, rather than multiple sentences, is appropriate for “a sequence of sexual assaults by defendant against one victim that occurred during an uninterrupted time frame and in a single location.” (Ibid.)
The current version of section 667.61 contains different language regarding the court’s authority to sentence for crimes occurring during a “single occasion.” Subdivision (i) of the current statute provides: “For any offense specified in paragraphs (1) to (7), inclusive, of subdivision (c), the court shall impose a consecutive sentence for each offense that results in a conviction under this section if the crimes involve separate victims or involve the same victim on separate occasions as defined in subdivision (d) of Section 667.6.” We express no opinion regarding how this appeal might be resolved under the current statute.
In the instant case, Crissinger was charged, and found guilty of, 3 separate counts of violating section 288, subdivision (b) with his elder son, all during the period of July 4, 1995 and May 29, 1998 (counts 1-3). He was also charged with, and found guilty of, 3 separate counts of violating that same statute, with his younger son, all during the period of January 1, 2002 and May 18, 2003 (counts 6-8).
Because the testimony of Crissinger’s sons was “generic” – meaning they were unable to meaningfully describe details which distinguished the numerous lewd acts committed upon them from each other, let alone assign specific dates to those acts (See People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294) – the jury was instructed that a guilty verdict on each count must be based upon either unanimous agreement as to which specific lewd act it found Crissinger to have committed for purposes of that count, or unanimous agreement that Crissinger committed all of the acts alleged by his sons to have occurred during a pertinent time period, and that those acts amounted to “at least the number of offenses charged.”
As our supreme court explained in People v. Jones, supra, 51 Cal.3d 294, “Child molestation cases frequently involve difficult, even paradoxical, proof problems. A young victim . . ., assertedly molested over a substantial period by a parent or other adult residing in his home, may have no practical way of recollecting, reconstructing, distinguishing or identifying by ‘specific incidents or dates’ all or even any such incidents. (Indeed, even a mature victim might understandably be hard pressed to separate particular incidents of repetitive molestations by time, place or circumstance. (See People v. Luna (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 726.) Accordingly, any constitutional principles or evidentiary standards we develop should attempt to assure that the resident child molester is not immunized from substantial criminal liability merely because he has repeatedly molested his victim over an extended period of time.” (People v. Jones, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 305.) Thus, “[i]t must be remembered that even generic testimony (e.g., an act of intercourse ‘once a month for three years’) outlines a series of specific, albeit undifferentiated, incidents, each of which amounts to a separate offense, and each of which could support a separate criminal sanction.” (Id. at p. 314.) The Jones court concluded the evidence is sufficient if the victim “describe[s] the kind of act or acts committed with sufficient specificity, both to assure that unlawful conduct indeed has occurred and to differentiate between the various types of proscribed conduct (e.g., lewd conduct, intercourse, oral copulation, or sodomy). Moreover, the victim must describe the number of acts committed with sufficient certainty to support each of the counts alleged in the information or indictment (e.g., ‘twice a month’ or ‘every time we went camping’). Finally, the victim must be able to describe the general time period in which these acts occurred (e.g., ‘the summer before my fourth grade,’ or ‘during each Sunday morning after he came to live with us’), to assure the acts were committed within the applicable limitation period. Additional details regarding the time, place or circumstance of the various assaults may assist in assessing the credibility or substantiality of the victim’s testimony, but are not essential to sustain a conviction.” (Id. at p. 316.) Where a victim specifies the type of conduct involved and its frequency, and confirms that such conduct occurred during the limitation period, “[n]othing more is required to establish the substantiality of the victim’s testimony in child molestation cases.” (Ibid.)
As the court instructed: “The People have presented evidence of more than one act to prove that the defendant committed these offenses. [¶] You must not find the defendant guilty unless: [¶] One, you all agree that the People have proved that the defendant committed at least one of these acts, and you all agree on which act he committed for each offense. [¶] Or, two, you all agree that the People have proved that the defendant committed all of the acts alleged to have occurred during this time period and have proved that the defendant committed at least the number of offenses charged.”
As explained in Jones, “[i]n a case in which the evidence indicates the jurors might disagree as to the particular act defendant committed, the standard unanimity instruction should be given. [Citation.] But when there is no reasonable likelihood of juror disagreement as to particular acts, and the only question is whether or not the defendant in fact committed all of them, the jury should be given a modified unanimity instruction which, in addition to allowing a conviction if the jurors unanimously agree on specific acts, also allows a conviction if the jury unanimously agrees the defendant committed all the acts described by the victim. [¶] As pointed out recently in People v. Moore [(1989)] 211 Cal.App.3d [1400,] 1414, because credibility is usually the ‘true issue’ in these cases, ‘the jury either will believe the child’s testimony that the consistent, repetitive pattern of acts occurred or disbelieve it. In either event, a defendant will have his unanimous jury verdict [citation] and the prosecution will have proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed a specific act, for if the jury believes the defendant committed all the acts it necessarily believes he committed each specific act [citations].’” (People v. Jones, supra, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 321-322.)
In light of this instruction, then, the jury’s guilty verdicts on counts 1 through 3 and 6 through 8 conveyed 1 of 2 conclusions relating to each of Crissinger’s sons: either it unanimously determined that Crissinger committed 3 specific lewd acts upon the son during the relevant time period, or it determined he committed every one of the unspecified (but greater than 3) number of lewd acts which each son described as having occurred on a regular basis during the relevant period.
The problem is, we cannot (and the trial court could not) say which of those conclusions is the one actually reached by the jury. Only the jury knows. Moreover, if the jury reached the former conclusion, and assigned a specific, unanimously agreed-upon act as the pertinent violation for each count, only the jury knows whether all of those specific acts occurred on separate occasions from each other or on the same occasion.
The evidence in this case suggests that Crissinger committed as many as 2 distinct lewd acts against his elder son on any given occasion during the period described in counts 1 through 3 (the elder son testified that each incident generally included reciprocal acts of oral copulation); and 3 distinct lewd acts against his younger son on any given occasion during the period described in counts 6 through 8 (the younger son testified that each incident generally consisted of Crissinger touching the son’s genitals with his hands, plus reciprocal acts of oral copulation). Consequently, it is possible to construe the jury’s “guilty” verdict on all 3 counts as to each son as reflecting only 2 distinct “occasions” of lewd conduct involving the older son, and only 1 distinct “occasion” involving the younger.
Of course, as the trial court suggested, the evidence in this case was clearly sufficient to support convictions on numerous additional counts charging Crissinger with violations of section 288, subdivision (b), during the relevant periods, and to justify the conclusion the various counts occurred on distinct occasions. However, when the defendant’s guilt is decided by a jury, the court cannot impose punishment based upon its independent assessment of what crime may have been established by the evidence. Instead, the court can only impose punishment for the specific criminal acts of which the jury actually found the defendant guilty.
People v. Hiscox (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 253, is instructive. In Hiscox, the defendant was charged with 11 counts of violating section 288. As the court explained, “The jury was instructed that Hiscox was accused of committing the charged offenses ‘on or about a period of time between 1992 and 1996,’ and that ‘in order to find the defendant guilty, you must unanimously agree upon the commission of the same specific act or acts constituting the crime or all of the acts described by the alleged victim[s] within the period alleged. It is not necessary that a particular act or acts committed so agreed upon be stated in the verdict.’” (Id. at pp. 257-258.)
Upon his conviction on all charges, Hiscox was sentenced to consecutive terms of 15 years to life under section 667.61. However, as the appellate court noted, the effective date of section 667.61 was November 30, 1994, and it thus covered only a part of the time frame in which Hiscox’s offenses were committed. As the court explained, “It is clear that neither the prosecution, the defense, nor the court realized that the effective date of section 667.61 presented a problem of proof regarding when the charged offenses were committed. The prosecutor did not ask the victims to identify when they were molested with any specificity. The evidence did not reliably connect the various charges to any time frame other than the period between 1992 and 1996. The court did not instruct the jury that its findings under section 667.61 were restricted to offenses committed on or after November 30, 1994, and defense counsel raised no ex post facto objection.” (People v. Hiscox, supra, 136 Cal.App.4th at p. 258.)
On appeal, Hiscox argued it was improper for the trial court to have sentenced him under section 667.61, when it was unclear whether all (or even any) of the acts of which the jury found him guilty had occurred after its effective date. The appellate court agreed. “Any failure to establish whether Hiscox’s offenses occurred before or after the effective date of section 667.61 could not be cured at the sentencing hearing, either in the first instance or on remand from this court. . . .[¶] . . . A prosecutor who relies on generic testimony to support a child molestation charge must establish a time frame for the offenses sufficient to bring them within the scope of any statutory or constitutional limitation on punishment. We do not believe the Jones court, when it laid out the quantum of proof necessary for generic testimony to comply with the requirements of due process, contemplated that a failure to establish the minimum prerequisites at trial could be cured by judicial factfinding at the sentencing hearing. Such a procedure would raise serious Sixth Amendment concerns. The right to a jury trial requires that ‘[a]ny fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.’ (United States v. Booker (2005) 543 U.S. 220, 224.) ‘When a judge inflicts punishment that the jury’s verdict alone does not allow, the jury has not found all the facts “which the law makes essential to the punishment,” [citation], and the judge exceeds his proper authority.’ (Blakely v. Washington [(2004)] 542 U.S. 296, 304.)” (People v. Hiscox, supra, 136 Cal.App.4th at pp. 259-260, italics added.)
In this case, like Hiscox, the jury’s verdict alone does not establish that each of the 3 lewd acts which it necessarily found Crissinger to have committed against his elder son between the dates of July 4, 1995 and May 29, 1998 (counts 1-3) occurred on 3 separate occasions. Based upon the elder son’s testimony, the jury could have concluded that 2 of the 3 lewd acts occurred on a single occasion, and if so, the jury’s verdict on counts 1 through 3 demonstrated only 2 separate “occasions,” and thus supported only 2 separate sentences under section 667.61. Similarly, the jury’s verdict alone does not establish that each of the lewd acts which it necessarily found Crissinger to have committed against his younger son between the dates of January 1, 2002 and May 18, 2003 (counts 6-8) occurred on separate occasions. Based upon the younger son’s testimony, the jury could have concluded that all 3 such acts occurred on a single occasion, and if so, the jury’s verdict on counts 6 through 8 supported only one separate sentence under section 667.61.
In light of the forgoing, we agree with Crissinger’s contention that the court erred in sentencing him to a separate term of 15 years to life under former section 667.61 for each of counts 1 through 3 and 6 through 8. Given that the jury was not asked to decide that each of these counts occurred on a distinct “occasion,” neither we nor the trial court can simply infer such a conclusion from its verdict.
However, based upon the evidence adduced at trial, the court could have properly concluded that the specific acts underlying the jury’s verdict on each of counts 1 through 3 necessarily occurred on at least 2 distinct occasions, because Crissinger’s elder son testified to only 2 specific lewd acts occurring on any particular occasion. By contrast, the younger son testified to 3 separate lewd acts on a given occasion, and thus the court would have no basis to conclude that any of the specific acts underlying the jury’s verdict on each of counts 6 through 8 necessarily occurred on separate occasions. Consequently, the court could have imposed only two separate terms of 15 years to life on counts 1 through 3, and only 1 term of 15 years to life on counts 6 through 8. Any of those counts for which the court did not impose the 15 years to life term would then be sentenced in accordance with the terms of former section 667.61, subidivision (g), which specifies that “[t]erms for other offense committed during a single occasion shall be imposed as authorized under any other law, including Section 667.6, if applicable.”
II
Crissinger also argues the court erred in imposing consecutive sentences on counts 5, 9, 10, 11 and 12, because the determination as to whether those sentences should run consecutively or concurrently requires the weighing of certain factors (see § 669; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.425), and those factors must be determined by a jury, rather than the court. (See Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466; Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 856.) However, as the Attorney General points out, this argument has been squarely rejected by our supreme court, for the second time, in People v. Black (2007) 41 Cal.4th 799, 821 (Black II) [People v. Black (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1238]: “the high courts of several states have held, consistently with our opinion in Black I, that a trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences does not violate a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to jury trial.” We consequently must reject the argument as well.
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded to the trial court for the limited purpose of resentencing Crissinger on counts 1 through 3 and 6 through 8. Based upon the jury’s verdict, Crissinger is eligible for a sentence of 15 years to life on no more than 2 of the counts denominated 1 through 3, and is eligible for a sentence of 15 years to life on no more than 1 of the counts denominated 6 through 8. For any of those 6 counts for which a sentence of 15 years to life is not imposed, the court shall resentence in accordance with the terms of former section 667.61, subdivision (g).
WE CONCUR: ARONSON, J., IKOLA, J.