Opinion
534 KA 16–00005
05-04-2018
BRIDGET L. FIELD, ROCHESTER, FOR DEFENDANT–APPELLANT. DARNELL CREDELL, DEFENDANT–APPELLANT PRO SE. KRISTYNA S. MILLS, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, WATERTOWN (HARMONY A. HEALY OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
BRIDGET L. FIELD, ROCHESTER, FOR DEFENDANT–APPELLANT.
DARNELL CREDELL, DEFENDANT–APPELLANT PRO SE.
KRISTYNA S. MILLS, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, WATERTOWN (HARMONY A. HEALY OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., CARNI, DEJOSEPH, NEMOYER, AND TROUTMAN, JJ.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.
Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him, upon a jury verdict, of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree ( Penal Law § 220.39[1] ) and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree (§ 220.16[1] ). At trial, a confidential informant identified defendant as the man who sold him drugs. This testimony was corroborated by an audio recording of the transaction, as well as by the undisputed fact that the informant entered the subject apartment with buy money and exited it with crack cocaine. Moreover, while testifying in his own defense, defendant essentially admitted to being the informant's drug dealer. There is no basis to disturb the jury's credibility determinations. Thus, contrary to defendant's contention, we conclude that, viewing the evidence in light of the elements of the crimes as charged to the jury (see People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 349, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 [2007] ), the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence on the element of identity (see generally People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 [1987] ). In fact, a different verdict would have been unreasonable (see generally id. ).
Contrary to defendant's further contention, County Court properly admitted evidence of his prior uncharged drug sales to prove his intent to sell in connection with the crimes charged, as well as to complete the narrative of events leading up thereto (see People v. Whitfield, 115 A.D.3d 1181, 1182, 982 N.Y.S.2d 242 [4th Dept. 2014], lv denied 23 N.Y.3d 1044, 993 N.Y.S.2d 258, 17 N.E.3d 513 [2014] ; People v. Ray, 63 A.D.3d 1705, 1706, 880 N.Y.S.2d 837 [4th Dept. 2009], lv. denied 13 N.Y.3d 838, 890 N.Y.S.2d 454, 918 N.E.2d 969 [2009] ; People v. Tabora, 139 A.D.2d 540, 541, 527 N.Y.S.2d 36 [2d Dept. 1988], lv denied 72 N.Y.2d 925, 532 N.Y.S.2d 859, 529 N.E.2d 189 [1988] ). We reject defendant's related contention that the prejudicial effect of such evidence outweighed its probative value (see People v. Lee, 129 A.D.3d 1295, 1298, 13 N.Y.S.3d 581 [3d Dept. 2015], lv denied 27 N.Y.3d 1001, 38 N.Y.S.3d 111, 59 N.E.3d 1223 [2016] ; Whitfield, 115 A.D.3d at 1182, 982 N.Y.S.2d 242 ). In any event, any error in admitting the disputed evidence is harmless (see People v. Graham, 117 A.D.3d 1584, 1585, 984 N.Y.S.2d 791 [4th Dept. 2014], lv denied 23 N.Y.3d 1037, 993 N.Y.S.2d 250, 17 N.E.3d 505 [2014] ).
Defendant next contends that the court erred in refusing to suppress a scale recovered pursuant to a search warrant. Even assuming, arguendo, that the scale should have been suppressed, we conclude that any error is harmless (see People v. Burdine, 147 A.D.3d 1471, 1472, 47 N.Y.S.3d 591 [4th Dept. 2017], amended on rearg 149 A.D.3d 1626, 51 N.Y.S.3d 468 [4th Dept. 2017], lv denied 29 N.Y.3d 1076, 64 N.Y.S.3d 166, 86 N.E.3d 253 [2017] ). The sentence is not unduly harsh or severe. We have considered defendant's remaining contentions, including those raised in his pro se supplemental brief, and we conclude that none warrants relief.
Finally, we note that the uniform sentence and commitment form must be corrected to reflect that defendant was convicted of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree under count two of the indictment and not under count one, as it currently states.