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People v. Craft

Court of Appeals of California, Sixth District.
Nov 6, 2003
No. H024648 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 6, 2003)

Opinion

H024648.

11-6-2003

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. PHILIP MICHAEL CRAFT, JR., Defendant and Respondent.


A jury found Philip Michael Craft guilty of theft by false pretenses (Pen. Code, §§ 484, 487, subd. (a)), conspiracy to violate section 532, subdivision (a) (§ 182, subd. (a)(1)), and conspiracy to obtain money by false pretenses (§ 182, subd. (a)(4)). The charges arose from two real estate loans obtained by defendant.

All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

Section 532, subdivision (a), provides: "(a) Every person who knowingly and designedly, by any false or fraudulent representation or pretense, defrauds any other person of money, labor, or property, whether real or personal, or who causes or procures others to report falsely of his or her wealth or mercantile character, and by thus imposing upon any person obtains credit, and thereby fraudulently gets possession of money or property, or obtains the labor or service of another, is punishable in the same manner and to the same extent as for larceny of the money or property so obtained."

Following these verdicts, defendant successfully moved for a new trial on the ground that the jurys verdicts were contrary to the evidence. (§ 1181, subd. (6).) The People appeal from the order granting the new trial. (§ 1238, subd. (a)(3).)

We affirm.

A. Factual and Procedural Background

1. Evidence

The evidence at trial showed the following. In 1996, defendant, who was a police officer with the City of San Jose, met Jaye Cherques. In 1997, he bought a condominium on Colony Knoll Drive in San Jose. Jaye worked at Prudential Realty at the time and he used a realtor and a loan agent in her office for the transaction. In 1998, defendant put title to the property in both their names.

In 1999, when Jaye and defendant, who had been previously married, were planning on getting married and starting a family, they decided to sell the condominium and purchase a house on Hesket Court in San Jose. Two sales contracts on the condominium fell through and they had to come up with funds for the down payment on the Hesket Court property. Jaye borrowed money from her mother for the down payment. Defendant obtained a mortgage loan, secured by a deed of trust on the Hesket Court property, from Express Lending to close the transaction.

In late July 1999, defendant obtained a $51,000 loan, secured by a deed of trust on the Colony Knoll condominium, from U.S. Bank. The documents supporting the U.S. Bank loan included two income verification forms; one concerned defendants employment with the City of San Jose and the other concerned employment with the Caribbees Mobile Home Park. The income verification form for the mobile home park misrepresented that defendant had worked there and earned income in 1999. He had actually stopped working there in May 1998.

In August 1999, defendant and Jaye sold their condominium. Defendant and Jaye brought small claims actions against the persons who had breached the earlier condominium purchase contracts. Defendant initiated the suits and went to court with Jaye when necessary.

In late 2000, defendant obtained a loan, secured by a deed of trust on the Hesket Court property, from Downey Savings and Loan ("Downey Savings"). The initial handwritten loan application, dated July 26, 2000, misrepresented that defendant had worked a second job for 5 Star Security from February 1998 to present and he earned a monthly income of $5100 in that position. It was stipulated at trial that 5 Star Security did not exist and the mailing address given for the company was the mailing address of defendant and his wife Jaye.

Defendant represented in a letter to Downing Savings that he had married on May 21, 2000.

False pay stubs and W-2s, which overstated defendants earnings as a San Jose police officer, were submitted to Downey Savings. False pay stubs and false W-2s from 5 Star Security were submitted to Downey Savings. A false credit union verification of deposit form, which overstated defendants balances, was also submitted. The request for verification of deposit came from Jaye Cherques on behalf of Fidelity Capital Mortgage Banker. It was stipulated that the credit union had never employed a Henry or H. Cole, the ostensible signatory verifying the deposit.

The final, typed loan application was signed and initialed in a number of places by defendant and dated November 3, 2000. The typed application stated, consistent with the initial application, that defendant held a second job with 5 Star Security, which provided monthly income of $5100 and additionally specified "other" income of $5100 in two places on the application. Both the July and November applications indicated that they had been taken in a face-to-face interview by Jaye Cherques, an employee of Fidelity Capital Mortgage in Gilroy.

Jaye Craft, formerly Jaye Cherques, testified that she had worked as an account manager for W.M.C., a wholesale lender, from 1997 to 2000. She was responsible for processing the regional managers residential loan files. Miguel Rocha was one of the brokers sending her loans on a regular basis. In January 2000, she went to work for Fidelity Capital and worked with Amado Gutierrez.

Jaye testified that she contacted Rocha in regard to obtaining a line of credit loan on the Colony Knoll condominium. The loan was her idea and the purpose was to consolidate loans and reduce monthly payments. According to Jaye, Rocha told her that he knew of a company that worked fast and took the loan application information over the phone. A loan application for the U.S. Bank loan was made in defendants name alone because of problems with Jayes credit.

Jaye testified that, about a week and a half later, toward the end of the loan process, Rocha told her that they needed additional income for defendant to qualify. Jaye testified that she told Rocha that defendant had worked on and off for Caribees Mobile Home Park. Rocha asked whether the employer would verify additional income and indicated that a verification of employment had to be sent to the bank that day to close the loan. Jaye stated that she picked up the form, which was in a manila envelope with Rochas fax number on the outside, from Rochas office and drove it to Dennis Catalinas office.

Jaye remembered that Rocha, who knew the income necessary to qualify, had already filled out the information regarding employment and income. Jaye admitted at trial that she knew defendant had not worked at the mobile home park in 1999. However, she knew that Rocha was going to show defendant had worked there in 1999 because it was necessary to establish additional current income. The form showed defendant earned income working at the park in 1997, 1998, and 1999. According to Jaye, she left the form with Catalinas secretary with instructions to fax the form to the telephone number provided.

Jaye testified that her conversations with Rocha and her travels to his office and Catalinas office occurred during regular working hours while defendant was at work, participating in a training program. She received a telephone call from Rocha that night or the next morning confirming that the form had been received and the loan was going to close within a day or two. At trial, she stated that she never had any discussions with defendant regarding the need for additional income, she did not communicate to defendant that she was going to bring the verification form to Catalina for his signature, she did not tell defendant prior to closing of the loan that the form had been requested, prepared or submitted, and she had never told defendant about the verification form before the police investigation into the U.S Bank and Downey Savings loans began.

Jaye testified that she and defendant paid Miguel Rocha broker fees in connection with the U.S. Bank loan. Defendant signed two checks to Rocha, totaling over $1,000.

Dennis Catalina, the manager of Caribbees Mobile Home Park, indicated defendant had done security work for the park as an off-duty police officer. Although defendant had stopped working for the park in 1998, Catalina signed the "Request for Verification of Employment" form, dated July 22, 1999. The parties stipulated that accounting records show that defendant worked at Caribbees Mobile Home Park at various times from early April 1994 until May 18, 1998.

Catalina initially testified that defendant brought him the employment verification form and asked him to sign the blank form. Catalina indicated he signed it because defendant was a friend and a police officer and defendant had worked for him. He could not remember if defendants wife Jaye had delivered the form and could not remember Jaye personally handing him the form. He stated that he did not personally fax the document anywhere.

However, Catalina acknowledged there was a possibility that someone besides defendant had brought the form and it had already been filled out. Catalina acknowledged that it was possible that the employment verification form provided to U.S. Bank was not the form that defendant had personally brought to him. He believed that defendant had brought an employment verification form to him when defendant was buying the condo and acknowledged that there may have been two different occasions involving an employment verification form. Catalina acknowledged that it was possible that the employment verification form provided to U.S. Bank may have been signed by him and then directly faxed to the lender by someone at the mobile home park. He identified the phone number in the fax header on that verification form as the mobile home parks main phone number, which was usable for faxing.

Miguel Rocha testified that he was the broker of record for First Rate Capital, a small mortgage company. He stated that the income verification form was completed based on information given by Jaye Craft. According to Miguel Rocha, all of his dealings on the U.S. Bank loan were through Jaye Craft and he had never dealt with defendant. Miguel Rocha admitted that he notarized defendants signature on the U.S. Bank Deed of Trust even though defendant did not sign in his presence.

Guadalupe Rocha, Jr., testified that he worked for his brother Miguel Rocha as a loan processor at First Rate Capital. He recalled that his brother Miguel gave him the income figures, which he typed into the employment verification form. Jaye came alone to their office and picked up the document.

Defendant testified that he did not take any employment verification form to Dennis Catalina in connection with the U.S. bank loan. Defendant stated that he had never seen the income verification form "as part of any paperwork that was presented to [him] to sign as part of the U.S. Bank transaction," he did not discuss such a form with Catalina, and he did not know it existed until a detective showed it to him after the criminal investigation had begun. During the latter part of July 1999, defendant was working as a new member of a SWAT team for the MERGE (Mobile Emergency Group and Equipment) unit and going through training and sniper school. He was working 14 or 16-hour days.

Defendant acknowledged signing the loan documents necessary to secure the U.S. Bank loan but indicated that was the extent of his participation. He recalled that Lupe Rocha came to his Hesket Court home and he signed the documents at the kitchen table. The verification of employment form signed by Catalina was not part of the paperwork presented for his signature.

Jaye indicated that defendant was involved in the initial fix up of the Hesket Court house and, once Jaye got all the estimates, defendant gave the go-ahead with the lowest bid as suggested by Jaye. Defendant wrote checks paying for the family bills and recorded them in a check journal and Jaye did the online checking and balanced the checkbook.

In regard to the 2000 Downey Savings loan, a regional operations manager for Downey Savings testified that defendant obtained a loan of $431,250, secured by a deed of trust on his Hesket Court property, for the purpose of paying off an existing first mortgage and a secondary line of credit. She indicated that defendant would not have qualified for the loan based upon his real income.

Jaye testified that she signed defendants name on the original handwritten application for the Downey Savings loan and did not show it to defendant. She did not tell him she was going submit "fake" W-2s and pay stubs for his job that would indicate that he earned more than he really did. She did not tell him about the "fake" company, Five Star Security.

Jaye testified that she prepared the bogus verification of deposit and made up the name Henry Cole and signed it. She stated that she and Amado Gutierrez conceived of the idea of "fake" income. She testified that she made up the name "5 Star Security." She revealed that she figured out what income he would need to qualify for the loan and faxed those numbers to Gutierrez. She acknowledged worrying about using the "fake" pay stubs and W-2s and having trouble sleeping the week before November 3. When asked whether defendant noticed, she stated that he did not notice because he was the new guy in MERGE, was working very hard, and was gone before sunup until nighttime. She indicated that she did not confide what she was doing to anyone other than Amado Gutierrez and testified that she "made a huge mistake" and ruined her marriage and family.

Jaye indicated that, when defendant signed the final documents, she simply directed him where to initial or sign and flipped the page. She indicated she was very concerned that he might notice 5 Star Security on the application and would refuse to go through with the loan.

Amado Gutierrez, testifying under a promise of immunity, testified that he was a self-employed mortgage and real estate broker and his business was known as Fidelity Capital Mortgage. Gutierrez learned from Jaye, whom he had met when she was working for a lender and who had later worked for Gutierrezs company, that she had submitted a loan application to Downey Savings. At some point, he became aware of a problem with the loan because Jaye and her husband did not have enough income to qualify.

Gutierrez testified that he and Jaye agreed that he would assist her with obtaining some false W-2s and pay stubs to show more income and he knew someone, whom he had previously used, who could do it. He testified that he dealt with Jaye and she provided the necessary information and he had no dealings with defendant. At some point, he received the phony pay stubs and W-2s and gave or faxed them to Jaye. Gutierrez acknowledged that he was charged with felony violations as a result of these transactions and pled no contest to the charges.

Defendants father, Philip Michael Craft, Sr., testified that he had not seen his son in 11 years. He claimed that during April 1991, defendant asked to borrow $20,000. Defendant planned to use the money for a down payment on a house. Craft, Sr., stated there was no discussion of gift tax or tax consequences during his first conversation with defendant about the $20,000, and it was understood that the money was merely being loaned. He maintained that he never spoke to anyone about making a gift of money to defendant and his former daughter-in-law to help them buy a house and he never spoke with his former daughter-in-laws mother about the tax consequences of giving money.

According to Craft, Sr., during a celebration of his grandson Brandons birthday, he wrote two $10,000 checks, one to defendant and one to defendants then wife. Craft, Sr., claimed that, when he wrote the checks, he confirmed the understanding that the money was a loan with defendant. Copies of two $10,000 checks, one written to defendant and one to Tina Craft and both dated April 23, 1991, which were admitted into evidence, appear to have a printed date of April 23, 1991 below the payees signature on the back of each check.

According to Craft, Sr., two days after his grandsons birthday party, he wrote a second set of checks because defendant needed to show checks to the mortgage company and the bank had placed a five-day hold on the original checks. Defendant told Craft, Sr. that he would tear up the second set of checks. Craft, Sr. testified that defendant asked him to represent to the mortgage company that the checks were gifts but he refused to sign the gift letter forms. This was the last time he had seen defendant prior to trial.

Copies of two uncashed checks, one to defendant and one to defendants former wife Tina, both dated April 22, 1991 and from Craft, Sr., were admitted into evidence.

Copies of two gift letters representing that Craft, Sr. had given $20,000, $10,000 to his son and $10,000 to his former daughter-in-law and containing a signature "Philip M. Craft," which were dated April 23, 1996, were admitted into evidence. Craft, Sr., testified that he did not sign the forms and did not give anyone his permission to sign on his behalf. He testified that he had never given his son permission to sign his name before April 1991. He acknowledged he had sued his son over the $20,000.

Craft, Sr., testified that he had lived in San Jose until he retired to South Lake Tahoe about two and a half years prior to trial. He admitted that, in addition to not seeing defendant for approximately 11 years, he had not seen his two grandsons for the same period of time. He acknowledged that he had not seen either his mother or a brother Frank, who both lived in San Jose, for possibly about six years. He had not seen another brother David for many years and stated he did not know where David lived. Craft, Sr., agreed that he was estranged from all these people.

Craft, Sr. acknowledged that he was aware that defendant or defendants former wife Tina had a filed a police report in early June 1991 alleging that Craft, Sr. had made certain threatening statements and a court had issued a restraining order restricting his contact with the family. He admitted that he went to the police to report that defendant was refusing to repay a $20,000 loan only after he was served with the temporary restraining order.

Defendant testified that Craft, Sr., had given him and his former wife a $20,000 gift to help with purchase of a home and Craft, Sr., had written two separate $10,000 checks, one to him and the other to his former wife, for tax purposes. According to defendant, Craft, Sr. wrote a second set of checks for him on April 27, 1991, the date of his sons birthday party, because defendant understood the loan company needed to verify the funds. Defendant testified that, on that same date, he asked Craft, Sr., to sign the gift letters, Craft, Sr., replied that defendant could do it as well as he could, and defendant had signed his fathers name. Defendant stated he was not surprised that Craft, Sr. told him to sign because he had "done it quite a few times before." Defendant indicated that he gave the second set of checks to his former mother-in-law to photocopy and, at some point after she had returned the originals, he had ripped them up.

Defendant testified that, after his sons birthday party, a conflict erupted between defendants former wife and Craft, Sr., regarding defendants and Craft, Sr.s role and rights as a grandparent. During an argumentative conversation between defendant and Craft, Sr., Craft, Sr., threatened to kill his former daughter-in-law, stating something to the effect, "`The newspaper will read, "A Cops Wife Dies." If I cant do it, for a thousand dollars theres plenty of people that will[.] "Defendant learned after the restraining order had issued that Craft, Sr., was claiming he wanted the money back and it had not been a gift.

Defendants former wife Tina testified that in late 1990 or early 1991, her mother raised the possibility of selling a rental home to defendant and her. She testified that, to assist with the purchase, her parents asked a low price and gave them money. She recalled that Craft, Sr., "really wanted to help because [her] parents were helping" and "[h]e wanted to match the money that they were giving." Craft, Sr., never made any suggestion to her, or in her presence, that the $20,000 was a loan. She immediately deposited the two checks written by Craft, Sr. because they needed to have the "funds in the bank by a certain time."

Tina recalled that a second set of checks was written at her sons birthday party on April 27, 1991. She testified that defendant had signed the gift letters concerning the checks because Craft, Sr., had said at the party, "`You can sign it as well as I can." She had previously seen defendant sign his fathers name with his knowledge and permission to other paperwork.

Tina indicated that she had become very uncomfortable because Craft, Sr., was overly involved in raising her oldest son and she and Craft, Sr., were not getting along. Craft, Sr.s claim that the money given to them was a loan came up after they sought a restraining order against him.

Tinas mother testified regarding the plan to sell a rental property to her daughter and defendant and help them with the purchase. According to her, Craft, Sr., became involved in the discussions because he had been visiting at defendants home on several occasions at the same time as she and her husband. It was her understanding that Craft, Sr. was going to give $20,000 and, when she told him that was a really nice offer, Craft, Sr., responded something to the effect: "`If I cant give it to my own kid, who am I going to give it to? I dont need the money. You know, I have a home already, and I dont go and do things that cost a lot. If I cant give it to my son, hey, what else am I going to do with it?"

Tinas mother stated that, at some point, Craft, Sr., indicated to her that he was unsure about the tax consequences of his $ 20,000 gift and she offered to call her CPA. She spoke with her accountant and then told Craft, Sr., that tax law allowed a gift of only $10,000 per person per tax year.

Tinas mother testified that the second set of checks was made out at the time of her grandsons birthday party. She took the second set of checks home with her, brought them to her work on Monday April 29, 1991, copied them, and faxed them to the bank. She also faxed gift letters that had no cursive signature. She believed that the gift letters were actually signed sometime thereafter. She recalled being at defendants home with Craft, Sr., during a discussion regarding the necessity of a signature on the gift letters and hearing Craft, Sr., tell defendant to go ahead and sign for him.

Defendants grandmother testified that she first became aware that her son, Craft, Sr., was going to give defendant and his former wife $20,000 around the time of the birthday party. Her understanding was that the money was a gift "because [defendants inlaws] were giving them money and [Craft, Sr.,] just didnt want to be outdone." After the big fight between Craft, Sr., and defendants former wife, Craft, Sr., "decided he was going to claim it was a loan."

Defendants grandmother testified that, at that time, Craft, Sr., was living in her house and he exerted pressure on her to support his claim that the money was merely loaned. She stated that Craft, Sr., frightened her. She explained that Craft, Sr., was a very threatening person, he had threatened to kill her oldest son David, and "for the five years he lived at [her] house, [she] wasnt allowed to have [her] other children over, except for [her] youngest son."

Defendants grandmother acknowledged that she had previously stated that the money was a loan on a number of occasions, including to police in 1991, in 1993 deposition testimony, and to a defense investigator during January 2002. She explained that her current testimony was the truth and stated: "I prayed about it because I didnt feel comfortable with what I had said and done. And I asked God to help me to really remember and to do the right thing. And its hard to admit that you did do something wrong, especially when it concerns your grandson. And so I just wanted to make things right." She indicated that what she had said during the 1993 deposition was not "all factual because [Craft], Sr., was pressuring [her] all the time to be on his side." She described Craft, Sr., as a bully and stated he was "manipulative and likes to play with your mind."

Defendants grandmother testified that her son Craft, Sr., moved out of her house in approximately February 1997. She had not seen or heard from Craft, Sr., since that day and had no idea where he had moved.

2. Trial Courts Ruling

In granting the new trial motion, the court explained: "Im aware that it is my responsibility to independently weigh the evidence, while at the same time having due respect for the decision of the jury and recognizing that there is a presumption of correctness as it relates to the verdict." The court confirmed that it had independently reviewed all the evidence and would make some comments but could not "comment on all the evidence."

The court indicated that Dennis Catalinas "testimony was not particularly conclusive" and believed that "the particular [employment verification] form used, as it relates to [the U.S. Bank] loan, was one prepared by the Rochas, with the assistance of Jaye Craft, without the involvement of the defendant." The court further stated: "As to both loans and as to the credibility of the witnesses, as it pertains to Philip Craft, Sr., I found his testimony to be unbelievable. He came across as an outcast within his own family. His position was refuted by others. I found very little reliability in anything he said. [¶] In considering the testimony of the defendant in this case, I found his testimony to be credible. I was persuaded he did not have the required mens rea necessary for any of these offenses. [¶] As it pertains to Mrs. Craft and her description of how these transactions occurred, I believed her when she said that the defendant was not aware of what was going on. [& para;] In essence, what I believe occurred here is Mrs. Craft, perhaps because shes ambitious, perhaps because shes dishonest, probably both, an individual who was experienced in real estate loan transactions, motivated by desire to gain some advantage, conspired with others, but not the defendant. She conspired with people like Amado Gutierrez, Mr. Gutierrez designated forger, probably at least one of the Rochas, to accomplish what she did. And in the process, she duped her own husband, who trusted her and relied on her expertise . . . ."

While the court remarked that it was convinced the jury was "incorrect," it made clear that it was "not persuaded" that the prosecution was barred from retrying defendant.

Respondent claims that the trial court should have barred any retrial because it in effect concluded that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law. To the contrary, the court made clear that retrial was permissible, implicitly determining that the evidence was not insufficient as a matter of law. While double jeopardy may bar retrial when a trial court determines under the substantial evidence test that the prosecution failed to prove its case as a matter of law (see People v. Lagunas (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1030, 1038, fn. 6), the trial court made no such determination in this case.

B. Motion for New Trial

Penal Code section 1181, subdivision 6, provides in pertinent part: "When a verdict has been rendered or a finding made against the defendant, the court may, upon his application, grant a new trial, in the following cases only: . . . [¶] 6. When the verdict or finding is contrary to law or evidence . . . ." "Under subdivision 6 of section 1181 of the Penal Code the trial judge on motion for new trial must consider the probative force of the evidence. This duty must be contrasted with that of an appellate court which must resolve all conflicts in favor of the judgment; the trial court must give the defendant the benefit of its independent conclusion as to the sufficiency of the credible evidence. (People v. Robarge [1953] 41 Cal.2d 628, 634 ; see Witkin, Cal. Criminal Procedure, supra, pp. 574- 575.)" (People v. Redmond (1969) 71 Cal.2d 745, 759-760.)

"In reviewing a motion for a new trial, the trial court must weigh the evidence independently. (People v. Serrato (1973) 9 Cal.3d 753, 761 [109 Cal.Rptr. 65, 512 P.2d 289].) It is, however, guided by a presumption in favor of the correctness of the verdict and proceedings supporting it. (People v. Martin (1970) 2 Cal.3d 822, 832 [87 Cal.Rptr. 709, 471 P.2d 29].) The trial court `should [not] disregard the verdict . . . but instead . . . should consider the proper weight to be accorded to the evidence and then decide whether or not, in its opinion, there is sufficient credible evidence to support the verdict. (People v. Robarge (1953) 41 Cal.2d 628, 633 .)" (People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 523-524.)

"A trial court has broad discretion in ruling on a motion for a new trial, and there is a strong presumption that it properly exercised that discretion. `"The determination of a motion for a new trial rests so completely within the courts discretion that its action will not be disturbed unless a manifest and unmistakable abuse of discretion clearly appears." (People v. Williams (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1268, 1318 [248 Cal.Rptr. 834, 756 P.2d 221].)" (People v. Davis, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 524.)

The People contend that the trial court could not grant a new trial because the probative force of the evidence does not support the trial courts analysis. In regard to count one, they argue that "there is no credible evidence, and no reasonable inference to be drawn," to support a finding that the employment verification form, which Catalina recalled being personally given to him by defendant, involved defendants 1997 condominium purchase. The People note the lack of any affirmative evidence that such an employment verification form actually existed. They point to Catalinas testimony that he believed defendant had brought over the U.S. Bank loan employment verification form when it was blank and Catalina had signed it and Catalina had given that information to the detective prior to trial. The People also point out that Catalina did not specifically recollect receiving the verification form from Jaye or faxing the form to the lender. They claim that defendants asserted lack of involvement in the U.S. Bank loan application process was inconsistent with the evidence that defendant had admittedly brought an employment verification form to Catalina at some point, defendant was actively involved in the two small claims suits arising from the breach of the initial purchase contracts on the condominium, and defendant wrote checks to Miguel Rocha to pay for the loan fees on the U.S. Bank loan.

In regard to counts two and three, the People argue that "there is no credible evidence, and no reasonable inference to be drawn, to support the trial courts acceptance of the defense explanations . . . ." The People point to the evidence that defendant had been previously involved in a number of real estate transactions, he participated in his familys financial matters, and defendant initialed the loan application in several places near misstatements concerning his employment and income and signed the form.

As an example, the People note that the Hesket Court house was defendants fourth real estate purchase and defendant had previously obtained a number of loans and filed two homestead declarations. At trial, defendant indicated that the homesteads were filed on advice of counsel. He stated: "I had to retain a lawyer with the lawsuit with my dad after the whole restraining order business and whole argument there. And he suggested getting a homestead on the house, which I believe basically said if you get sued and lose, they cant take your home from you."

The "Acknowledgment and Agreement" paragraph in small print above his signature stated, among things, the borrower had a continuing obligation to amend the information provided in the application if any material fact changed and contained a certification that the information provided was true and correct.

The People argue that Jayes testimony, that she hid the fraud involved in securing the Downey Savings loan from defendant, was unbelievable because Jaye had him sign and initial the typed application misrepresenting his income even though the application did not need to be notarized and Jaye had signed his name to other documents and it is common sense that spouses discuss matters of this importance. They assert that either defendant "was alert to the need for an application and she was upset keeping the fraud from him or he was mindlessly following her direction while she handed him papers to approve" (italics omitted) and the defenses theory unreasonably required both scenarios to be true. The People maintain that defendant and his wife are not credible because their statements are inherently improbable and must be rejected.

As to the evidence regarding the money provided by Craft, Sr. in connection with defendants 1991 purchase of a home, the People maintain that the testimony of Craft, Sr., that defendant misrepresented to a lender in 1991 that the money was a gift not a loan, was "straightforward" while defendants testimony was "convoluted and inherently unreasonable." The People suggest that defendants version was inherently improbable in that it was based on an unreasonable and implausible set of facts.

The People contend that People v. Taylor (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 836 is the controlling case. In that case, the victim had been shot on the street by two men who had exited a white Cadillac and a jury found defendants guilty of attempted first degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder. (Id. at pp. 839, 844-845.) The trial court granted a motion by the defendants for a new trial on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdicts. (Id. at p. 839.)

On appeal, the reviewing court in Taylor, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th 836 found that the trial court abused its discretion by granting the motion because "the trial court failed to articulate any basis to support its conclusion that the verdict was not supported by sufficient credible evidence" (id. at p. 849) and "simply decided what result it would have reached if the case had been tried without a jury." (Id. at p. 848.) The appellate court found it significant that the trial court did not expressly find the eyewitnesss identification testimony to be unbelievable and noted her testimony was not inherently improbable or incredible because it conflicted with the defendants testimony. (Ibid.)

The appellate court stated: "[A]mple uncontradicted evidence supported [the eyewitnesss] testimony, including the fact that both [defendants] were arrested in the vicinity of the shooting within half an hour of the shooting in a car matching that of the shooters; [a defendant] admitted he had not loaned his car to anyone else. Thus, the only scenario which is consistent with [the eyewitness] being mistaken in her identification of the shooters and consistent with the defense theory of the case is that there were two similar Cadillacs, both white with dark-tinted windows, being driven in the vicinity at the time of the shooting. The jury impliedly rejected such scenario, and found [the eyewitnesss] testimony to be credible. The trial court failed to charge the jury with improperly weighing the evidence or determining the credibility of the witnesses." (Id. at p. 848.)

In this case, by contrast, the trial court discussed the weight and credibility of the evidence. The record indicates that the trial court applied the proper standard when it considered the new trial motion. The Peoples further argument that the defense evidence was inherently improbable and there is only one reasonable interpretation of the evidence, which points to guilt, is without merit. Testimony that merely discloses unusual circumstances or that might be subject to justifiable suspicion does not come within the category of inherently improbable evidence. (See People v. Mayberry (1975) 15 Cal.3d 143, 150.) A witnesss statements are inherently improbable if there is a physical impossibility that they are true or their falsity is apparent without resorting to inferences or deductions. (Ibid.) The People are merely advocating inferences and deductions, which they believe are more reasonable.

Here, the court independently reviewed the evidence, which was replete with conflicts and inconsistencies, considered its probative force, and determined there was insufficient credible evidence to support the verdicts. The court evidently disbelieved the testimony of Craft, Sr., found defendant and Jaye Craft to be credible witnesses, and found Catalinas testimony inconclusive. We have reviewed the evidence and do not discern a manifest and unmistakable abuse of discretion.

The order granting a new trial is affirmed.

WE CONCUR: WUNDERLICH, J. and MIHARA, J.


Summaries of

People v. Craft

Court of Appeals of California, Sixth District.
Nov 6, 2003
No. H024648 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 6, 2003)
Case details for

People v. Craft

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. PHILIP MICHAEL CRAFT, JR.…

Court:Court of Appeals of California, Sixth District.

Date published: Nov 6, 2003

Citations

No. H024648 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 6, 2003)