Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Superior Court County of Ventura No. 2006012977, Vincent O'Neill, Judge
Lyn A. Woodward, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Ryan D. McCarroll, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
GILBERT, P.J.
Maxwell Lee Coulson appeals a judgment following conviction of possession of methamphetamine, with a finding that he served a prior prison term. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a); Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b).) We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In April 2006, Coulson resided on East Poplar Street in Oxnard with his mother, Sonia Castillo. In February or March, 2006, Coulson's parole officer visited the home and saw a trailer parked in the backyard. Coulson informed his parole officer that "the trailer is a place where he hangs out."
On April 5, 2006, Oxnard police officers searched the home and trailer. Initially, Coulson was cooperative during the search, but became angry and agitated when police officers stated that they intended to search the trailer. He shouted at his mother "to tell [the police] not to search."
During a search of the trailer, police officers discovered three small packages of methamphetamine on a shelf over the sink. They also found torn plastic that could be used as packaging. Subsequent laboratory tests later confirmed that the packages contained 1.46 grams of methamphetamine.
Coulson testified that he did not place the methamphetamine in the trailer. He admitted to using methamphetamine from time to time between 1989 and 2003. Coulson stated that he watched television in the trailer several times a week. He also explained that he became upset during the police search because police officers escorted his mother outside.
Coulson's nephews testified that they entered the trailer frequently to entertain friends with video games. One nephew testified that an acquaintance of a friend mentioned that he left an article inside the trailer. Upon his return to the trailer, the acquaintance was unable to locate the article.
Prior to trial, the trial court excluded evidence that Coulson had been on parole and that his parole officer had searched the Poplar Street residence previously. The parties then stipulated that the April 5, 2006, search was lawful.
The jury convicted Coulson of possession of methamphetamine. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a).) In a separate proceeding, Coulson admitted that he served a prior prison term within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b). The trial court sentenced Coulson to three years' imprisonment, but later recalled the sentence and granted him probation pursuant to Penal Code section 1210.1 ("Proposition 36").
Coulson appeals and contends that 1) there is insufficient evidence of his knowledge and possession of the methamphetamine; 2) his conviction without sufficient evidence violates federal guarantees of due process of law; and 3) the trial court erred by not instructing with his proposed response to a jury request for clarification of the elements of the charged offense.
DISCUSSION
I.
Coulson argues that there is insufficient evidence that he had knowledge of and exercised dominion and control over the methamphetamine on the shelf in the trailer. (People v. Glass (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 772, 774 [evidence must establish that defendant exercised control or had the right to exercise control over contraband and that he had knowledge of its presence and nature].) He asserts that the prosecutor established only that he had joint access to the trailer. Coulson cites and discusses many judicial decisions finding or not finding sufficient evidence of knowing possession, but concedes that the decisions are factually specific. (People v. Redrick (1961) 55 Cal.2d 282, 287 ["[N]o sharp line can be drawn to distinguish the congeries of fact which will and that which will not constitute sufficient evidence of a defendant's knowledge of the presence of a narcotic in a place to which he had access, but not exclusive access, and over which he had some control, but not exclusive control."].) He asserts that his lack of cooperation with the police search of the trailer is insufficient to establish his knowledge of the methamphetamine. (People v. Roberts (1964) 228 Cal.App.2d 722, 728 [evidence that defendant and others in automobile became agitated and moved around inside automobile was a mere suspicious circumstance and not proof of knowing presence of narcotics].)
In determining the sufficiency of evidence to support a judgment, we review the entire record and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom to determine if reasonable and credible evidence exists from which a reasonable trier of fact could find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 66.) We do not reweigh the evidence or redetermine the credibility of witnesses. (Ibid.) The standard of review is the same where the prosecutor relies upon circumstantial evidence. (Ibid.)
To establish unlawful possession of narcotics, the prosecutor must prove that defendant exercised dominion and control over the narcotics, with knowledge of their presence and nature. (People v. Redrick, supra, 55 Cal.2d 282, 285.) Proof of access to a place where contraband is discovered, without more, will not support a finding of unlawful possession. (Ibid.) A reasonable inference of dominion and control exists, however, "when the contraband is discovered in a place over which the defendant has general dominion and control: his residence [citation], his automobile [citation], or his personal effects [citation]." (People v. Jenkins (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 579, 584.)
Sufficient evidence supports Coulson's conviction of possession of methamphetamine. Police officers discovered the methamphetamine in a trailer in the backyard of Coulson's residence. He had admitted to his parole officer that he "hangs out" in the trailer. At trial, he testified that he watched television in the trailer several times a week. The reasonable inference of dominion and control "is easily made" when the contraband is discovered in defendant's residence. (People v. Jenkins, supra, 91 Cal.App.3d 579, 584.)
Moreover, when police officers announced that they intended to search the trailer, Coulson became "upset," "agitated," "just angry," and "uncooperative." He also "kept telling his mother to tell [police officers] not to search." The trier of fact could easily infer that Coulson's angry reaction and statements to his mother reflected consciousness of guilt and that he knowingly possessed the methamphetamine in the backyard trailer. (People v. Hutchinson (1969) 71 Cal.2d 342, 345-346 [reasonable inference of consciousness of guilt where defendant fled through bedroom window after marijuana discovered in his bedroom].) The trier of fact was not required to accept Coulson's explanation for his anger and lack of cooperation. (Id. at p. 346.)
II.
Coulson argues that his conviction violates federal guarantees of due process of law because it rests upon insufficient evidence. (Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 315.) We reject Coulson's contention because the federal standards for review of sufficiency of the evidence are the same as discussed in I., ante. (People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 11.)
III.
Coulson contends that the trial court erred by not instructing with his proposed response to a jury question for "more definition and better explanation of 1. the defendant possessed a controlled substance. 2. the defendant knew of its presence." Coulson's proposed response stated: "A full requirement to establish constructive possession includes that a defendant has knowledge of the drugs but also executed dominion and control over the substance. If a defendant knows something illegal is present in a room he has access to, but he did not place it there, nor controls it, he is not in possession of it." The trial court responded to the jury inquiry by defining actual and constructive possession, defining "knew of its presence," and instructing that knowledge of presence alone or access to the trailer alone is insufficient to convict. Coulson asserts that the trial court's failure to clarify the concepts of possession and knowledge was prejudicial under any standard of review.
Penal Code section 1138 requires the trial court to inform the jurors of the law applicable to the case and assist them in understanding the legal principles they must apply. The court is not required, however, to elaborate on the standard instructions. (People v. Beardslee (1991) 53 Cal.3d 68, 97; People v. Montero (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1170, 1179.) "Where the original instructions are themselves full and complete, the court has discretion under section 1138 to determine what additional explanations are sufficient to satisfy the jury's request for information. [Citation.] Indeed, comments diverging from the standard are often risky. [Citation.]" (People v. Beardslee, supra, 53 Cal.3d 68, 97.)
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by giving its additional instructions and refusing Coulson's instruction. Its additional instructions included an explanation of actual possession and constructive possession, a definition of "knew of its presence," and an explanation of the significance of evidence of access to the trailer. The trial court also reiterated that the prosecutor was required to prove all elements of the crime of possession of methamphetamine. (CALCRIM No. 2304.) "CALCRIM No. 2302 captures all of the elements of the crime of possession for sale. It correctly states the elements of possession and knowledge in a manner reasonable jurors are able to understand." (People v. Montero, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th 1170, 1177.) The trial court considered the jury's request for additional instruction and appropriately responded. (People v. Beardslee, supra, 53 Cal.3d 68, 97 [discussion of trial court's duties regarding requests for reinstruction].)
The trial court elaborated: "[Y]ou may not convict simply based on access to the trailer, but you may consider who had access as part of the evidence in determining whether the defendant knowingly had actual or constructive possession of the controlled substance."
The jury request also requested an explanation of the difference between the first two sentences of an instruction regarding access to the trailer. The trial court properly responded by reinstructing that the jury may not convict based upon access to the trailer alone.
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: YEGAN, J. COFFEE, J.