Opinion
F054768.
2-25-2009
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JOSE RAMON CORRALES, Defendant and Appellant.
Grace Lidia Suarez, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Louis M. Vasquez and Lloyd G. Carter, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Not to be Published in the Official Reports
OPINION
THE COURT
Before Levy, Acting P.J., Cornell, J., and Gomes, J.
Unless otherwise specified, all statutory references are to the Penal Code.
INTRODUCTION
On December 19, 2007 appellant, Jose Ramon Corrales, was charged in an information with transportation of cocaine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352, count one), possession of cocaine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351, count two), and using a false compartment to conceal or smuggle a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11366.8, subd. (a), count three). On February 5, 2008, the trial court denied appellants suppression motion brought pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5.1 On February 7, 2008, appellant pled no contest to count two, receiving a stipulated prison term of two years.
On appeal, appellant contends and respondent concedes the second stage of an inventory search of appellants car conducted without a search warrant was invalid under the Fourth Amendment and that the trial court erred in denying appellants suppression motion. We agree with the parties and will reverse the judgment.
FACTS
On November 29, 2007, Officer Brent Stratton of the Bakersfield Police Department was on duty at 4:15 p.m. when he saw that the center brake light of appellants car was not working. There were two people in the car. Appellant was the driver. When appellant told Stratton that he did not have a drivers license, Stratton arrested him. The passenger was arrested for having an outstanding warrant in Los Angeles.
Stratton told appellant that he was going to impound the car. The passenger made several requests to call friends and family members to find someone who could take possession of the car. This seemed unusual to Stratton because the passenger had no financial stake in the car. The passenger kept asking Stratton if the car could be released to a friend or relative. According to Stratton, the policy of the Bakersfield Police Department is to conduct a thorough inventory search of the entire vehicle when it is impounded. Stratton conducted the inventory search with his partner. No contraband was found at that time.
A tow company came to take the car. In route to the tow yard, however, Stratton asked the driver to take the car to the police department so a canine could be used to see if there was any contraband. Stratton, Detective Clayton Madden, and Maddens dog Gracie looked at the car. Madden told Stratton that Gracie alerted on the front passenger portion of the car. Stratton, his partner, Madden, and detectives conducted "a more thorough search of the vehicle."
As Stratton searched the front passenger seat of the car, he noticed an exposed wire and metal screw sticking out of the seat. The front seat was removed. Through a hole under the seat, Stratton could see what appeared to be a kilo of narcotics.
On cross-examination, Stratton said that although he had completed the inventory search of the car, he felt he was missing something not visible to his eye. Stratton explained that he "felt like there was something in there and we were conducting a search of the interior of the vehicle to find out if there was something in there." When asked if it was part of the standard policy, practice, and procedure to remove seats from vehicle during inventory searches, Stratton replied that he did not know if removing a seat "in and of [itself] is indicative of normal policies and practices or procedures; however, when there is obviously something in the there and thats been confirmed that there is something there, to get to the contraband, I believe that that would be normal in this case."
Stratton explained that based on the passengers conduct, he believed he was missing something and Gracie helped confirm that he was indeed missing something. It never occurred to Stratton that to conduct a more thorough search of the car he would need to get a search warrant. Stratton believed he was still conducting an inventory search of the car. Stratton said he had impounded close to one hundred vehicles. This was the first vehicle in which he removed the seats.
Defense counsel argued that Stratton had already completed an inventory search and removed the car. Because Stratton had a suspicion that there was something else in the car based on the passengers behavior, Stratton decided to get a dog. Defense counsel conceded that Stratton probably had probable cause to do something, but that he should have gone before a magistrate to get a search warrant. Defense counsel argued the search was therefore improper. The prosecutor argued that the stop at the police station was merely to complete the inventory search. The trial court denied the suppression motion without comment.
DISCUSSION
"[A]n inventory search is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment only if it is done in accordance with standard procedures that limit the discretion of the police." (Florida v. Wells (1990) 495 U.S. 1, 8 (Wells).) An inventory search is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment when used as a ruse to conduct an investigatory search. (Colorado v. Bertine (1987) 479 U.S. 367, 371-372 (Bertine); South Dakota v. Opperman (1976) 428 U.S. 364, 376; People v. Aguilar (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1049, 1053 (Aguilar).) Such a showing could be made, for instance, where the police choose to impound a vehicle to investigate suspected criminal activity. (See Bertine, supra, 479 U.S. at pp. 375-376.)
In Aguilar, the investigating officer testified that one purpose of a vehicle impound was to conduct an investigatory search. Aguilar found the resulting search unreasonable. (Aguilar, supra, 228 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1053-1054.) The focus of the appellate court is on the purpose of the impound rather than the purpose of the inventory. (People v. Williams (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 756, 761; Aguilar, supra, 228 Cal.App.3d at p. 1053.)
A warrantless search is presumed to be illegal. (Mincey v. Arizona (1978) 437 U.S. 385, 390; People v. Williams, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at p. 761.) When defendants move to suppress evidence, they must set forth the legal and factual basis for the motion. This obligation is satisfied in the first instance by making a prima facie showing that the police acted without a warrant. The prosecution then has the burden of proving some justification for the warrantless search or seizure. Afterward, the defendant can respond by pointing out any inadequacies in the prosecutions justification. (People v. Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, 136 (Williams).) Because of the risk that an inventory search will become a ruse for general rummaging, a valid inventory search must adhere to a preexisting policy or practice. (Wells, supra, 495 U.S. at p. 4; Williams, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 138.)
The parties agree that Officer Stratton and his partner acted reasonably in stopping appellants car, arresting him for not having a drivers license, and initially impounding his car. Stratton testified the police department had a policy to thoroughly search an impounded vehicle and that he conducted the inventory search in the field prior to having the car towed. Presumably, Strattons initial search was thorough in accordance with police department policy. There is agreement by the parties that up until this time, Stratton was acting reasonably.
The Fourth Amendment infirmity here is that Stratton, who admittedly already completed an inventory search, acted on a hunch that he missed potential contraband during his initial search of the appellants car. Stratton directed the tow truck driver to stop at the police station, procured the services of Detective Madden and his canine, Gracie, and continued the search of the car after Gracie alerted to the possible location of narcotics. Assuming arguendo that the use of Gracie was reasonable, at this stage investigators likely had probable cause to obtain a search warrant based on the behavior of the passenger and Gracies alert.
We do not decide the issue of whether the deployment of Gracie was reasonable.
Stratton admitted that he had never pulled the seats out of a car during some one hundred prior inventory searches. Stratton could not articulate a specific police department policy permitting investigators to remove the seats of a vehicle in an inventory search. Stratton explained he was acting on a hunch that there was still contraband in the car. Stratton testified that he, "felt like there was something in there and we were conducting a search of the interior of the vehicle to find out if there was something in there." Stratton admitted that one purpose of the second stage of the inventory search was to conduct an investigatory search based on his suspicion that there could be contraband in the car. This is precisely what the Aguilar court found to be unreasonable conduct by the officer in that case. (Aguilar, supra, 228 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1053-1054.)
The inventory search in the instant action went beyond the police department procedures for such a search described by Stratton. The second stage of the inventory search was not to inventory appellants property in the car but, as Stratton stated, the purpose of his search was to continue a criminal investigation. Under the facts of this case, the second stage of the inventory search was a ruse for general rummaging that was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. (Wells, supra, 495 U.S. at p. 4; Williams, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 138.) The prosecution failed to meet its burden of proof that the warrantless search of appellants car at the police station was justified. The trial court erred in denying appellants suppression motion.
We do not mean to suggest that an inventory search can only be conducted in one stage. Here, however, it was clear from the officers testimony that he had already completed an inventory search in the field prior to having the appellants car towed to the police station.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded to the trial court, which is directed to grant the motion to suppress.