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People v. Corrales

California Court of Appeals, Second District, Fourth Division
Sep 16, 2008
No. B200499 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 16, 2008)

Opinion

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. NA073440, Tomson T. Ong, Judge.

Cheryl Barnes Johnson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters and Peggy Z. Huang, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.


WILLHITE, Acting P. J.

Guillermo Corrales appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial in which he was convicted of possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)), with the finding by the jury that he suffered two prior convictions in violation of Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(1) and served two prior prison terms within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b). The court determined the two prior convictions found true by the jury came within the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law (Pen. Code, §§ 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d) & 667, subds. (b)-(i)) and sentenced appellant to prison for a life term with a minimum sentence of 25 years plus two years for the two prior prison term enhancements. Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to strike one or both of his prior felony convictions. For reasons explained in the opinion, we affirm the judgment.

The strike priors were his conviction in January 1993 in case number NA014214 of assault with a deadly weapon and by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)) with the admission that he personally used a deadly weapon, a knife, and his conviction in December 1995, of assault with a deadly weapon and by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury with the admission that he personally used a deadly weapon, to wit, a baseball bat.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 15, 2007, Los Angeles Police Officer Erick Rogers was working in the San Pedro area investigating a tip regarding narcotics activity. He was in an apartment conducting a search of the living room when appellant entered the apartment holding some money. Appellant also had a large bulge in his right rear pants pocket. Officer Rogers searched appellant and recovered an electronic scale with residue, which Officer Rogers believed to be methamphetamine. Appellant was then arrested, handcuffed and transported to the Harbor Police Station in the officer’s minivan. While Officer Rogers drove the van, he observed in his rearview mirror that appellant “was continuously moving about. He was twisting from side to side. He was partially lifting himself off the seat.”

Officer Rogers’s partner, Officer Ross Nemeroff, moved to the back of the van where he could have a better view of appellant. Upon arriving at the police station and as appellant exited the van, Officer Nemeroff said, “He dumped meth on the seat.” Appellant’s fist was clenched and when he finally opened his hand, appellant was holding a clear cellophane wrap that was twisted at one end and ripped open on the other. Officer Rogers scooped up the material on the van’s seat and collected it into a small baggie. The substance weighed 0.27 grams and chemical tests indicated the presence of methamphetamine. This quantity of methamphetamine was a useable amount. Prior to using the van, Officer Nemeroff had cleaned its seats.

DISCUSSION

Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to strike one of his prior felony convictions. We disagree.

At the hearing on the motion to strike, appellant asserted with reference to his 1995 prior conviction, that he used a baseball bat to vandalize his girlfriend’s sister’s car but that he did not hurt her with the bat and that she was not in the car when he broke out the vehicle’s windows. Appellant argued that his two prior strike convictions were 12 and 15 years old and that while the crimes were of a violent nature, there had not been any type of violence alleged since then. Appellant also claimed he had a drug problem, which started when he was in prison, and had never received any treatment. Appellant argued that his parole violations over the last decade had only been for using drugs and for that reason the court should strike one or both of his prior strikes and place him in a Proposition 36 program. Appellant argued he had paid his debt for what he had done in the past and that he now had a drug problem. The prosecution argued appellant was ineligible for a Proposition 36 program because appellant had been in prison within five years of the date of the instant offense. The prosecution also represented that according to the policy of the District Attorney’s Office the case was a presumptive second strike case. Therefore, the prosecution asked the court to strike one of appellant’s strikes. The court responded that the District Attorney’s policy was not the law and that once a verdict had been rendered and findings made, it was the court’s opinion that the matter was governed by People v. Romero and People v. Williams.

People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497; People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148.

In deciding whether to strike a prior conviction, the court stated, “The first question is whether or not the defendant would have a law-abiding future. I think that’s a significant factor in this particular case whether or not the defendant is one that will follow the law or someone that will continue to violate the law.” The court observed appellant “had been in and out of prison . . . he has not had a law-abiding past.” The court noted further that during “sidebar where [their backs were to appellant,] in a nonlaw-abiding behavior, [appellant] flashed to the jury his 25 to life sign. Admittedly the jury picked up only five to life on the legal pad, but just the same that fact that he is willing to nullify the jury to get sympathy or to prejudice the jury or to get compassion from the jury, as opposed to just try this case, speaks volumes.” Based on the instant case, appellant’s background and the facts of the prior strikes, the court declined to strike either strike.

The probation report reflects that in 1986, a juvenile petition was sustained for burglary (Pen. Code § 459) and receiving stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496.1) and appellant was placed in camp community placement. In 1987, a juvenile petition was sustained for possession of a controlled substance and he was placed in the California Youth Authority. In 1991, he was convicted of obstructing/resisting a public officer (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)) and placed on probation. In 1993, he was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon or force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)) and sentenced to prison for two years. He received a parole violation on October 20, 1994 and was returned to prison on a new commitment on December 13, 1995. Also in 1995, he was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon or force likely to produce great bodily injury and sentenced to prison for seven years. He received a parole violation on May 25, 2001, April 3, 2002, November 21, 2002, October 17, 2003, December 14, 2003 and April 5, 2005, and was discharged from parole on May 24, 2005. In 1995, he was additionally convicted of battery and sentenced to 180 days in jail. In 2001, he was convicted of the unlawful possession of a hypodermic needle or syringe and placed on probation.

The court clarified that among its reasons for denying appellant’s motion to strike strikes, it was not considering defense counsel’s strategy to discuss search and seizure issues in front of the jury.

“[I]n ruling whether to strike or vacate a prior serious and/or violent felony conviction allegation or finding under the Three Strikes law, on its own motion, ‘in furtherance of justice’ pursuant to Penal Code section 1385(a), or in reviewing such a ruling, the court in question must consider whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of his present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be treated as though he had not previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or violent felonies.” (People v. Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th 148, 161.)

A court’s failure or refusal to dismiss or strike a prior conviction allegation under Penal Code section 1385 is subject to review under the deferential abuse of discretion standard. (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 375.) “In reviewing for abuse of discretion, we are guided by two fundamental precepts. First, ‘“[t]he burden is on the party attacking the sentence to clearly show that the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary. [Citation.] In the absence of such a showing, the trial court is presumed to have acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, and its discretionary determination to impose a particular sentence will not be set aside on review.”’ [Citations.] Second, a ‘“decision will not be reversed merely because reasonable people might disagree. ‘An appellate tribunal is neither authorized nor warranted in substituting its judgment for the judgment of the trial judge.”” [Citations.] Taken together, these precepts establish that a trial court does not abuse its discretion unless its decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.” (Id. at pp. 376-377.) Our review of the record indicates the trial court understood it had the discretion to strike priors, and its decision was neither irrational nor arbitrary.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

We concur: MANELLA, J., SUZUKAWA,


Summaries of

People v. Corrales

California Court of Appeals, Second District, Fourth Division
Sep 16, 2008
No. B200499 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 16, 2008)
Case details for

People v. Corrales

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. GUILLERMO CORRALES, Defendant and…

Court:California Court of Appeals, Second District, Fourth Division

Date published: Sep 16, 2008

Citations

No. B200499 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 16, 2008)