Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. BA250006, Carol H. Rehm Jr., Judge.
Law Offices of Allen G. Weinberg and Derek K. Kowata, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Susan D. Martynec and Ellen Birnbaum Kehr, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
SUZUKAWA, J.
Following a court trial, appellant was convicted of attempted second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 664/187, subd. (a)); mayhem (Pen. Code, § 203); corporal injury to a spouse (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a)); and assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)) and the findings that he used a deadly weapon and personally inflicted great bodily injury were found true. He was sentenced pursuant to the “Three Strikes” law (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (d) through (i) & 1170.12, subds. (a) through (d)) to life in prison with a minimum term of 29 years, consisting of, in count 1, 25 years plus three years for the great bodily injury enhancement and one year for the weapon enhancement. The remaining counts and allegations were stayed pursuant to Penal Code section 654.
On appeal, he challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s finding that two prior strike convictions were proven. He also argued that one prior strike allegation was found true even though it was not alleged in the amended information. On October 12, 2005, in case number B175868, we filed our opinion affirming appellant’s sentence as to the substantive offenses and the true finding regarding his May 1978 Alabama prior conviction for robbery but reversed to the extent appellant’s sentence was based on a second prior conviction under the Three Strikes law and remanded the matter for resentencing. We instructed that on remand, the prosecution be permitted to ask to reinstate the first prior alleged in the original information and the defense be permitted to present any argument in opposition. The trial court was then directed to rule on the evidence, exercise its sentencing discretion, and impose sentence accordingly.
Following issuance of the remittitur, appellant’s Romero motion was denied and the prosecution’s motion to reinstate the May 29, 1978, kidnapping conviction that was previously struck (Alabama case number CC-78-280) was granted. The court summarized the previous proceedings, stating, “there was an amendment of the information, and the court struck one of [appellant’s] alleged priors from Alabama. [¶] The court of appeal determined that amending the information as indicated had the effect of reversing the earlier ruling which struck defendant’s May 29th, 1978, Alabama conviction for kidnapping. And therefore, when the court sentenced the defendant under the information’s alleged priors, [appellant] was incorrectly sentenced in consideration of a strike which had been dismissed.”
People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497.
The court then resentenced appellant, pursuant to the Three Strikes law, to life in prison with a minimum term of 29 years, consisting of, as to count 1, 25 years plus an additional three years for the great bodily injury enhancement and one year for the weapon use enhancement. The remaining sentences were stayed pursuant to Penal Code section 654. Appellant was ordered to pay a restitution fine in the amount of $5,000 and a parole revocation fine in the same amount. Additionally, he was ordered to pay a $20 court security fee pursuant to Penal Code section 1465.8, subdivision (a)(1). Appellant now appeals from the judgment entered following resentencing and contends the restitution and parole revocation fines and the court security fee should be stricken. For reasons stated in the opinion, we affirm the judgment.
DISCUSSION
I
Appellant initially contended the $5,000 restitution and parole revocation fines and the $20 court security fee should be stricken as they were not imposed at appellant’s original sentencing hearing. Respondent asserted that while the clerk’s transcript reflects restitution and parole revocation fines of $200 and no security fee, the reporter’s transcript of the proceedings reflects the court imposed restitution and parole revocation fines of $5,000 each and a $20 security fee.
Appellant concedes the oral pronouncement of judgment by the sentencing judge is the judicial act which constitutes the rendition of judgment and controls over any conflicting written court documents. (See People v. Mesa (1975) 14 Cal.3d 466, 471) Appellant concedes that no error occurred.
II
Appellant contends the $20 security fee imposed pursuant to Penal Code section 1465.8 violates ex post facto principles and must be stricken. Appellant observes Penal Code section 1465.8 became operative after the date appellant committed the offenses for which he was convicted.
Penal Code section 1465.8, subdivision (a)(1) provides in pertinent part, “To ensure and maintain adequate funding for court security, a fee of twenty dollars ($20) shall be imposed on every conviction for a criminal offense . . . .”
Appellant committed the subject crimes in July 2003 and Penal Code section 1465.8 became effective on August 17, 2003. (Stats. 2003, ch. 159, § 25.)
On December 3, 2007, our Supreme Court in People v. Alford (2007) 42 Cal.4th 749 held that imposition of the security fee served a nonpunitive purpose and accordingly did not violate either federal or state prohibitions against ex post facto statutes. (Id. at p. 759.)
Appellant recognizes this court is bound to follow the decisions of the California Supreme Court (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455) but makes the argument to preserve it for federal court review.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: EPSTEIN, P. J., WILLHITE, J.