Opinion
F084719
08-02-2023
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CHARLES DAVID COKER, Defendant and Appellant.
Lynette Gladd Moore an Allan E. Junker, under appointments by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Kimberley A. Donohue and Rachelle A. Newcomb, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. No. F21908723 James A. Kelley, Judge.
Lynette Gladd Moore an Allan E. Junker, under appointments by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Kimberley A. Donohue and Rachelle A. Newcomb, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
HILL, P. J.
INTRODUCTION
Appellant Charles David Coker pleaded no contest to driving under the influence causing injury and leaving the scene of an accident. Additionally, appellant admitted he had previously been convicted of two serious felonies and that he had suffered five prior felony convictions. Finally, appellant admitted a number of aggravating factors. After having one of his serious felonies stricken, appellant was sentenced to 18 years and four months in prison.
On appeal, appellant argues Penal Code section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(B)requires the sentencing court dismiss all but one of his enhancements. We affirm.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In a first amended felony complaint filed May 16, 2022, the District Attorney of Fresno County charged appellant with driving under the influence causing injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (f); count 1). It was further alleged appellant caused great bodily injury to more than one person (Veh. Code, § 23558) and individually caused great bodily to two people (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). Appellant was also charged with felony leaving the scene of an accident (Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (a); count 2).
As to both counts, it was alleged that appellant had previously been convicted of two serious felonies (§ 667, subds. (a)(1), (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)) and had suffered five prior felony convictions between 1992 and 2019. Finally, six aggravating factors were alleged to apply to appellant, including that appellant engaged in violent conduct that posed a serious danger to society (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(1)), which resulted in great bodily harm to a particularly vulnerable victim (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1), (a)(3)).
On May 16, 2022, appellant pleaded no contest to all charges and admitted all enhancements and aggravating factors.
On the day of his sentencing hearing, July 25, 2022, appellant filed a combined sentencing memorandum and Romero motion, inviting the trial court to strike his 1992 serious felony conviction and to strike all but one of his enhancements pursuant to section 1385, subdivision (c)(2). The trial court granted the Romero motion and struck appellant's 1992 serious felony conviction but declined to dismiss any other enhancements. Appellant was sentenced to 18 years and four months in prison-six years for count 1 (the upper term, doubled pursuant to § 667, subd. (e)(1)), one year and four months for count 2, three years for each of the two great bodily injury enhancements, and five years for his prior prison terms (§ 667, subd. (a)).
People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497.
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.
The Attorney General does not dispute the appealability of appellant's claim on appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Underlying Offense
We summarize the facts underlying appellant's conviction as they are not directly relevant to the issue on appeal. The facts are taken from the probation officer's report in this case.
On November 7, 2021, officers responded to a vehicle collision in Fresno County. Officers observed a white vehicle crashed into a fence with three occupants-the driver and her two minor children. All three suffered extensive injuries and were transported to a nearby hospital for treatment.
Officers located appellant's vehicle nearby, with an injured passenger inside. Appellant had fled on foot. Officers determined that appellant had been driving southbound, and the driver of the white vehicle was driving northbound, when appellant swerved and collided with the white vehicle. Officers located appellant in a nearby apartment complex, where he was arrested and taken to a nearby hospital for treatment of his injuries.
Officers spoke with appellant at the hospital. Appellant admitted he was driving his vehicle when the collision occurred. Officers conducted a blood draw and determined appellant was under the influence of methamphetamine.
The Sentencing Hearing
On May 16, 2022, appellant pleaded no contest to all charges in the first amended felony complaint, based on the court's indicated 18-year and four-month sentencing lid.
Appellant argued in his July 25, 2022 sentencing memorandum and Romero motion that section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(B)-(C) required the dismissal of all but one of his enhancements. The court found:
"Given the current state of the law and the legislative preference for the Court to review strikes that are more than five years old, I think the [L]egislature would certainly want the Court to review a 30-year-old strike.
"I would note that the strikes that the defendant picked up were not for similar offenses. I also believe that nobody drives impaired intending to go out and kill someone or hurt somebody, but it's a likely or possible occurrence when somebody gets behind the wheel of a vehicle and they're impaired that somebody could be injured as a result, including-[appellant] was injured himself, but he severely injured some innocent people who were just out driving a car or riding in a car in the case of the minors and it's a hell of a thing to put two little kids through ... having to go through surgeries and hospitalization and the frightening factor of the collision itself. All of it could have been avoided.
"Based on the arguments set forth in the submission by the defendant, the Court will strike the 1992 strike, given the facts that are set forth for the record."
The court and counsel did not discuss the dismissal of appellant's enhancements pursuant to section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)B). Having stricken one of appellant's prior felony strike convictions, the court imposed a sentence of 18 years and four months.
DISCUSSION
Appellant argues section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(B), as amended by Senate Bill No. 81 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 81), requires all but one of his enhancements be dismissed. He asserts that dismissal of the enhancements is mandatory, as the sentencing court lacks the discretion to impose multiple enhancements in a single case.
Joining the unanimous opinion of other California appellate courts, we reject the argument that the "shall be dismissed" language in section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(B) strips the sentencing court of its discretion to impose multiple enhancements.
A. Section 1385 as Amended by Senate Bill 81
Senate Bill 81 went into effect on January 1, 2022, amending section 1385 by adding subdivision (c). (Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1.) Section 1385, subdivision (c) provides the following, in relevant part:
"(1) Notwithstanding any other law, the court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so, except if dismissal of that enhancement is prohibited by any initiative statute.
"(2) In exercising its discretion under this subdivision, the court shall consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove that any of the mitigating circumstances in subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present. Proof of the presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety. 'Endanger public safety' means there is a likelihood that the dismissal of the enhancement would result in physical injury or other serious danger to others. [¶] ... [¶]
"(B) Multiple enhancements are alleged in a single case. In this instance, all enhancements beyond a single enhancement shall be dismissed.
"(C) The application of an enhancement could result in a sentence of over 20 years. In this instance, the enhancement shall be dismissed." [¶] ... [¶]
"(4) The circumstances listed in paragraph (2) are not exclusive and the court maintains authority to dismiss or strike an enhancement in accordance with subdivision (a)."
B. Analysis
"Our task in interpreting section 1385 is to 'ascertain' and 'give effect to the intended purpose' of our Legislature in enacting the statute. [Citation.] '[T]he text of a statute is often the best indicator of its meaning.' [Citation.] If the text is 'unambiguous,' our task 'begins and ends with th[e] text' [citation]; but if the text is ambiguous because it 'permits more than one interpretation,' then we' "may consider other aids, such as the statute's purpose, legislative history, and public policy"' as well as the general canons of statutory construction." (People v. Walker (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 386, 396, second and fourth bracketed insertions in original, review granted Mar. 22, 2023, S278309.)
Appellant argues the plain language is unambiguous and urges this court to interpret the phrase "shall be dismissed" in section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(B) as mandatory. However, we are not permitted to "pluck this phrase out of its placement in the statute and consider it in isolation; instead, we are required to consider where it fits into the '" 'context of the statute as a whole.'" '" (People v. Walker, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 396.) "Here, the statement that a court 'shall' dismiss certain enhancements appears as a subpart to the general provision that a 'court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so.'" (People v. Anderson (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 233, 239 (Anderson).)
Therefore, dismissal is necessarily conditioned on the court's finding that dismissal is in the interest of justice. Likewise, the court engages in this analysis while "exercising its discretion under this subdivision." (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2).) "This language, taken together, explicitly and unambiguously establishes: the trial court has discretion to dismiss sentencing enhancements; certain circumstances weigh greatly in favor of dismissal; and a finding of danger to public safety can overcome the circumstances in favor of dismissal." (Anderson, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 239.)
Appellant then argues that recent legislative efforts demonstrate the Legislature interpreted the "shall be dismissed" language as mandatory. He points to proposed Assembly Bill No. 931 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), which sought to interpret the "shall be dismissed" language in section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(B) as follows:
"As currently drafted in Penal Code Section 1385 (c) (2), [Senate Bill] 81 allows the court discretion to impose enhancements when the dismissal would endanger public safety. However, in sub-sections (c) (2) (B) and (C), the language prohibits the court from imposing multiple enhancements, as well as prohibiting the court from imposing enhancements if the enhancements will result in a sentence of more than 20 years." (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, com. on Assem. Bill No. 931 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) June 6, 2022, p. 4.)
However, Assembly Bill No. 931 failed to pass. The legislative history of Senate Bill 81 is clear that the court's discretion is preserved.
"By clarifying the parameters a judge must follow, [Senate Bill] 81 codifies a recommendation developed with the input of the judges who serve on the Committee on the Revision of the Penal Code for the purpose of improving fairness in sentencing while retaining a judge's authority to apply an enhancement to protect public safety." (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, Unfinished Business Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 81 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 30, 2021, p. 5, italics added.)
Further, in a letter to the Secretary of the Senate that was placed by unanimous consent in the Senate Journal, the author of Senate Bill 81 stated, "I respectfully request the following letter be printed in the Senate Daily Journal expressing our intent with respect to this measure: [¶] ... [¶] [A]mendments taken on August 30, 2021 remove the presumption that a judge must rule to dismiss a sentence enhancement if certain circumstances are present, and instead replace[ ] that presumption with a 'great weight' standard where these circumstances are present. The retention of the word 'shall' in Penal Code [section] 1385(c)(3)(B) and (C) should not be read as a retention of the previous presumption language-the judge's discretion is preserved in Penal Code [section ]1385[ subdivision ](c)(2)." (Sen. Skinner, author of Sen. Bill No. 81 (20212022 Reg. Sess.), letter to Sect. of the Sen., Sept. 10, 2021, 121 Sen. J. (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) p. 2638, italics added.)
We acknowledge that "the statements of an individual legislator, including the author of a bill, are generally not considered in construing a statute, as the court's task is to ascertain the intent of the Legislature as a whole in adopting a piece of legislation." (Quintano v. Mercury Casualty Co. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1049, 1062.) "A legislator's statement is entitled to consideration, however, when it is a reiteration of legislative discussion and events leading to adoption of proposed amendments rather than merely an expression of personal opinion. [Citations.] The statement of an individual legislator has also been accepted when it gave some indication of arguments made to the Legislature and was printed upon motion of the Legislature as a 'letter of legislative intent.'" (California Teachers Assn. v. San Diego Community College Dist. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 692, 700.)
"The author's unambiguous rejection of this interpretation, placed in the official record with the unanimous consent of her colleagues, supports our conclusion that a trial court is not required to dismiss all but one enhancement or an enhancement that could result in a sentence of more than 20 years, but rather that the trial court has discretion in deciding whether to do so." (Anderson, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 241.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: LEVY, J. MEEHAN, J.