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People v. Coderre

Court of Appeals of California, Third District, Butte.
Nov 7, 2003
No. C041857 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 7, 2003)

Opinion

C041857.

11-7-2003

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. AARON DEREK CODERRE, Defendant and Appellant.


Defendant Aaron Derek Coderre was convicted after a jury trial of attempted premeditated murder. (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 187, subd. (a).)[] The jury also found defendant had used a deadly weapon in the commission of the offense. (§ 12022, subd. (b).) Sentenced to life plus one year in state prison, defendant appeals. He contends there is insufficient evidence to support the finding that he acted with premeditation and deliberation and that the trial court committed reversible error when it denied his Marsden[] motion. We affirm.

All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.

People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden).

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Robert Campanale met defendant at the Paradise Library in February 2000. He talked to defendant about Scriptures and Bible study. After spending a couple of hours together, defendant followed Campanale home. At Campanales house, defendant talked about his "messianic call to liberate the red man and to redress the red man for the oppression of the white man." Campanale told defendant he had pronounced delusions of grandeur. However, Campanale allowed defendant to stay the night because it was late and because defendant seemed to be a troubled young man.

As defendant slept, Campanale heard defendant use foul language, saying "Murder that motherfucker." Campanale questioned defendant about that the next morning and defendant simply grinned. Defendant also explained that his parents had hurt him in childhood and spoke of harming them.

Defendant stayed with Campanale for three days. On the third day, he told Campanale that he had just had a fight with his sister and that he would kill her too. Campanale then asked defendant to leave because he was irritated and tired of hearing defendant talk about killing his parents. Campanale told defendant he was foolish. As defendant was leaving, he threw his knapsack over his shoulder, looked Campanale "dead in the eye," grinned, and said: "I was going to murder you too. But Im going to put it off a while."

On or about June 4, 2000, Debra Martinez spoke with defendant after a Paradise powwow event. She had previously worked with defendant on the Paradise Powwow Committee. Defendant was living in a park at the time and Martinez told him if he were ever hungry he could come to her house for food. Later than night, Martinez returned home to find defendant there. Defendant talked of violence against "government people" and fighting for people who are oppressed. He was very concerned about protecting a Canadian tribe from loggers and talked of going to Canada to fight for them using any means possible.

Defendant also spoke to Martinez about his parents, particularly his mother, and told Martinez his parents had abused him. He said things like "Well, Im going to take care of it" and told her he had obtained a gun from a friend. Defendant also told Martinez that he did not want anyone to talk him out of what he had on his mind and that he had to be careful what he told her so as not to put her in a position where she would have to call the police. He also spoke of a friend with whom he was having a disagreement.

At the end of July 2000, Martinez spoke with defendant again. Defendant appeared troubled and was holding on to something in his pocket. She asked him to sit on the porch and talk.

At first, defendant was silent. Then he said he was a violent person and anyone who did not accept him was his enemy. By the end of the conversation, he was screaming obscenities at Martinez and she became concerned for her safety. She tried to reassure him that she understood what he had come to say and that it was okay for him to leave. After he left, she called the police because she was afraid he might hurt himself or someone else.

On July 31, 2000, a Paradise peace officer transported defendant to a Butte County mental health facility for treatment and evaluation pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 5150. Defendant escaped within 24 hours, before the evaluation was complete.

On August 15, 2000, at approximately 6:00 p.m., Nancy Howe noticed defendant standing in the road in front of her house in Paradise. He was very thin, was shuffling back and forth, and did not appear to have good balance. He was smiling and seemed confused. The police had come to speak with defendant and had left him there.

Howe then took defendant some food and talked to him for three hours. Defendant told Howe that some people had placed a curse on him and he had to take vengeance to be strong again. The conversation was disjointed, and defendant had "dark moments" when he appeared dangerous and got angry. At one point, defendant said "fuck you" to Howe in a "very pronounced" manner. Howe believed defendant was very angry, but not at her. Howe made sure to stay three to five feet away from defendant because she felt he might be dangerous.

Defendant told her he wanted to stay with an older man he knew on Scottwood but that the man made him angry because of past conversations. Howe and her husband then drove defendant to the corner of Scottwood and Damrow Lane.

On August 17, 2000, at approximately 1:00 a.m., Campanale was reading on his front porch on Damrow Lane. He went inside for a drink, and defendant pushed open his front door and came into the house. Campanale and defendant talked for two hours out on the porch and then went to sleep. The next morning, Campanale woke up at 6:00 a.m. and went to his garden. Defendant woke up around 6:30 a.m. and left.

Defendant returned to Campanales house at approximately 12:30 p.m. Defendant asked Campanale to give him reasons to not kill his parents. Campanale gave him some reasons and defendant fell silent. Campanale continued to talk about miscellaneous matters in an attempt to soothe defendant, but defendant remained silent. At about 2:00 p.m., defendant took out a penknife, opened it, and began playing with it. After about 30 minutes of this, Campanale tired of "talking to the wind" and went out to the garden.

Defendant came out to the garden while Campanale worked. Sometime around 3:30 p.m., Campanale was bent over a flower box, talking about his tomatoes. When he stood up, defendant lunged at him from about five or six feet away and cut Campanales throat with the penknife. When Campanale saw the blood, he looked at defendant and defendant lunged at him again. Campanale told defendant he was crazy and picked up a two-by-two. Defendant ran and Campanale chased him. After about 100 feet, Campanale stopped running to check the severity of his wound. He wrapped a shirt around his throat and a neighbor called the police. Campanales vocal cords were cut and he received nine stitches in his throat.

Later that day, Nancy Howe heard that the police were looking for defendant. Howe called the police to inform them about her experience with him. The following day, Howe and her sister saw defendant at a park in Chico. Defendant was clean and looked to be in very good shape. He was walking upright and swiftly. Howe and her sister quietly followed defendant to see where he was going and until they were able to locate a police officer. When Howe saw an officer on a bicycle, she told him defendant was wanted for questioning by the Paradise police. Defendant subsequently was arrested. Before he was handcuffed, defendant slipped a folding knife out of his pocket and attempted to conceal it under his foot.

Defendant admitted having been with Campanale on August 17, 2000, but denied assaulting him. Defendant was subdued, unemotional, very articulate, and did not express any hostility.

Forensic psychologist Kent Caruso examined defendant and opined that he is a "fairly remarkably disturbed individual" with average to high average intelligence. Defendant is suspicious, inclined to become paranoid, and can become floridly psychotic. While he can be delusional at times, he is capable of behaving aggressively even when not delusional. He feels comfortable behaving in an intimidating and aggressive fashion, becomes easily agitated, and does not like it when he does not get his own way. Defendant has the potential to deteriorate much more rapidly than most people and even more rapidly than some emotionally disturbed individuals. If he is placed in an uncomfortable situation for a long enough period of time, he may become angry, frustrated, and agitated, and may have a physical or verbal response. Caruso could not conclude, however, that defendant was legally insane at the time of the attack.

Psychologist Paul Wuehler also examined defendant. Defendant confessed to Wuehler that he had thought about attacking Campanale on three occasions and had acted on the third. Wuehler concluded that defendant was able to understand right from wrong and was able to appreciate what he was doing. He further concluded that defendant was able to conform his behavior to the requirements of the law and that he was not legally insane at the time of the attack. Wuehler believed there was evidence that defendant was malingering and there was no evidence of psychosis and no evidence that he lost control of his cognitive processing during the incident.

Clinical psychologist Michael Hitchko also examined defendant. Defendant was unreliable in providing background information and refused to talk about certain things. Defendant told Hitchko that he went to Campanales house because he was unable to get to his parents or pastors houses and he felt threatened, confused, and in need of solace. Defendant believed Campanale had previously made fun of him and had questioned defendants masculinity. While speaking with Campanale, defendant became argumentative, frustrated, and angry. Defendant said he then felt like he had been hit by a big board and it seemed as if he was watching himself attack Campanale. Hitchko diagnosed defendant as schizophrenic and concluded he was legally insane when he attacked Campanale.

On January 31, 2002, the jury found defendant guilty of attempted murder. The jury further found that defendant was sane when he committed the offense, had used a deadly weapon, and had acted with premeditation and deliberation.

DISCUSSION

I. Premeditation and Deliberation

Defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to support the jurys special finding that he acted with premeditation and deliberation. We disagree.

First degree murder is defined by section 189, which provides in pertinent part: "All murder which is perpetrated by means of a destructive device or explosive, knowing use of ammunition designed primarily to penetrate metal or armor, poison, lying in wait, torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing . . . is murder of the first degree. All other kinds of murders are of the second degree. [¶] . . . [¶] To prove the killing was `deliberate and premeditated, it shall not be necessary to prove the defendant maturely and meaningfully reflected upon the gravity of his or her act." "`[P]remeditated means `considered beforehand, and `deliberate means `formed or arrived at or determined upon as a result of careful thought and weighing of considerations for and against the proposed course of action." (People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 767.) "`"`Thoughts may follow each other with great rapidity and cold, calculated judgment may be arrived at quickly . . . ." [Citation.] The law does not require that an action be planned for any great period of time in advance." (People v. Rand (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 999, 1001.)

For purposes of determining whether there is sufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation, we do not distinguish between attempted murder and completed first degree murder. (People v. Herrera (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1456, 1462-1463, fn. 8 (Herrera).) Moreover, "[s]ettled principles of appellate review require us to review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence . . . from which a reasonable trier of fact could find that the defendant premeditated and deliberated beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.]" (People v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1124; see alsoHerrera, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 1463.) "`In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must draw all inferences in support of the verdict that can reasonably be deduced and must uphold the judgment if, after viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.]" (People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 813.) We "may not redetermine the credibility of witnesses, nor reweigh any of the evidence," but "must . . . resolve all conflicts, in favor of the judgment." (People v. Poe (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 826, 830.) "Before the judgment of the trial court can be set aside for the insufficiency of the evidence, it must clearly appear that on no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support the verdict of the jury." (People v. Hicks (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 423, 429.)

In arguing that the evidence was insufficient, defendant relies upon the oft-cited test found in People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 26-27 (Anderson), which sets forth three categories of evidence for a reviewing court to consider in evaluating proof of premeditation and deliberation: facts related to (1) defendants behavior before the incident that shows planning, (2) any prior relationship or conduct with the victim from which the jury could infer a motive, and (3) the manner of the killing from which the jury could infer defendant intended to kill the victim according to a preconceived plan. "These categories are `"intended to guide an appellate courts assessment whether the evidence supports an inference that the killing occurred as the result of preexisting reflection rather than unconsidered or rash impulse." [Citation.] They represent a `synthesis of prior case law, but `are not a definitive statement of the prerequisites for proving premeditation and deliberation in every case. [Citation.] `[I]t is not necessary that [these] "factors be present in some special combination or that they be accorded a particular weight." [Citations.]" (People v. Vorise (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 312, 318.)

In this case, defendant argues that "the only fair and reasoned analysis of the instant case" is that, "due to [his] disturbed mental condition, he acted impulsively." That is certainly one interpretation of the evidence, but it is not the only one. To the contrary, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found that defendant attacked Campanale with premeditation and deliberation.

The evidence showed that, prior to the attack, defendant engaged in planning activity indicating both premeditation and deliberation. Defendant told Campanale in February 2000 that he was going to murder him but would put it off for awhile. Defendant admitted having thought about attacking Campanale on three occasions and acting on the third. Moreover, defendant specifically requested he be taken to Campanales house, and on the day of the attack, he spent well over an hour silently twirling his knife. A reasonable jury could infer that these planning activities demonstrated defendant had considered killing Campanale well before the attack. The fact that defendant had postponed his attempt to kill Campanale and chose this particular occasion to follow through with his attack also suggests his actions were a result of careful thought and weighing of considerations for and against the proposed course of action.

There was also evidence of defendants prior relationship with Campanale from which to infer a motive for the attack. Defendant admitted that Campanale made him angry, and he believed Campanale had made fun of him. He also told Martinez before the attack that he was a violent person and anyone who did not accept him was his enemy. From these facts, the jury could reasonably infer motive. Likewise, the nature of the attack supports an inference that defendant had planned it. The jury could infer from the evidence that defendant brought a knife to Campanales house, held it open in his hands for a long period of time, waited until Campanale was not paying attention, and then swiftly lunged at Campanales neck with the weapon.

Thus, there was sufficient evidence of the factors set forth in Anderson suggesting premeditation and deliberation. There was also additional evidence in this case from which deliberation might be inferred. Defendant had talked regularly of killing his parents and had specifically asked Campanale for reasons why he should not do so. This evidence suggests defendant was capable of deliberating, and did in fact deliberate, the killing of his parents. After Campanale provided defendant with reasons not to kill his parents, defendant fell silent and sat twirling his knife for well over an hour. It is reasonable to infer that during this time, defendant was not only weighing considerations for and against killing his parents, but thinking and weighing considerations for and against killing Campanale.

In sum, there is ample evidence in the record that defendant had considered the attack on Campanale beforehand and had determined to follow through with the attack after careful thought and weighing of considerations for and against the attack. While defendant emphasizes evidence that he was mentally disturbed and impulsive, issues of fact and credibility are questions for the trier of fact. We presume the jury considered this evidence and do not reweigh the evidence when assessing its sufficiency.

II. Marsden Hearing

Defendant also contends the trial court committed reversible error by denying his Marsden motion. He argues that the court failed to give him an opportunity to explain the reasons for his dissatisfaction with counsels performance at a time when he was mentally able to participate in the hearing.

The jury found defendant guilty on January 31, 2002. On March 4, 2002, the court received the following letter from defendant:

"2/28/2002

"Honorable Judge Howell:

"Sir, I need your help. Ever since Mr. Willis [defendants trial counsel] has been my public defender, it feels like all my clothes have been taken from me, I am naked, blind folded, gagged and chained, and thrown into a dark dungeon. It is very scary. I cannot understand him. He doesnt answer my questions and explains little or nothing. I do not know what to do and am afraid. I am alone with no representation in these proceedings. Is it possible to dismiss Mr. Willis for malpractice? I was not allowed on the witness stand to defend myself, and the victim was not being truthful! Would it be possible to have someone contact a Mr. Denny Forland (as I understand he oversees the public defenders office)? Perhaps he can help me — I am desperate. I feel a number of things in this matter do not add up. Time is precious, but truth is even more precious.

"Thank you for your kindness,

"Aaron Coderre."

At the April 8, 2002, sentencing hearing, the court indicated it had received and reviewed the letter, and set a Marsden hearing for April 10, 2002. The prosecutor was informed that he need not be present and would be notified of the courts ruling.

On April 10, 2002, the court convened with defendant and Mr. Willis for the Marsden hearing, where the following colloquy took place:

"[The Court:] Are you feeling okay today, Mr. Coderre?

"Defendant Aaron Derek Coderre: No.

"The Court: Can you hear me, Mr. Coderre?

"Defendant Aaron Derek Coderre: I dont really want to talk.

"The Court: You dont want to talk today? Im having this hearing because you wrote me a letter and said that you wanted a lawyer other than Mr. Willis to represent you. And I wanted to find out what the problem was. Do you want to tell me what the problem is?

"Defendant Aaron Derek Coderre: I want to say a lot of things, but I dont want to talk right now."

The court then addressed Mr. Willis regarding the allegation in the letter that defendant was not allowed on the witness stand to defend himself. Mr. Willis responded: "Well, Your Honor, to the extent we could, Mr. Coderre and I did discuss him testifying. [¶] The issue, really the only issue in this case other than the degree of the crime was his sanity at the time. I felt that, quite frankly, that he had presented everything regarding those issues that was relevant to the psychologists, and all that came in through the psychologists. [¶] The only advantage that I could have seen to him testifying, would be that he might come unglued on the witness stand. And quite frankly, Im not going to practice with the goal to those kind of theatrics."

Mr. Willis and the court then agreed that defendant might, once again, be incompetent to proceed.[] The proceeding was then suspended to allow Mr. Willis to notify the prosecutor (who was not present) to appear the following Monday to determine whether defendant should be sent back to Dr. Lancaster for re-evaluation of his current competence.

Defendant had been found incompetent to stand trial on May 14, 2001. Proceedings were suspended until December 3, 2001, following defendants commitment to Atascadero State Hospital.

On Monday, April 15, 2002, the prosecutor, defendant, and Mr. Willis were present. The court began by informing the prosecutor that they had conducted a Marsden hearing and the court had some doubt at the hearing about defendants competence. The court indicated it had been "under the mistaken belief that [it] could not conclude the Marsden hearing, having some question of doubt as to the competency of the defendant." Since that time, the court indicated it had done some research and concluded it was required to promptly consider a Marsden motion "even when the proceedings are suspended where defendants right to effective assistance would otherwise be substantially impaired." The court therefore found, "on the evidence presented to this on the Marsden hearing and its review of the file," that Mr. Willis should not be relieved. The court found defendant had received competent counsel and denied the Marsden motion.

The court then proceeded to address defendants competence, but Mr. Willis interrupted and indicated that defendant appeared "quite coherent" at the moment. Mr. Willis then stated he needed some time to prepare before sentencing, and the hearing was adjourned. Neither defendant nor Mr. Willis indicated that defendant had additional information with respect to his request for substitution of counsel, nor was there any request for a new Marsden hearing.

Defendant now insists that the court had a duty to allow him to further explain his complaints about Mr. Willis after learning that defendant was "quite coherent" at the April 15, 2002, hearing. We find no error.

First, the court had already ruled on the Marsden motion when Mr. Willis stated that defendant appeared "quite coherent." There was no request for reconsideration or a new hearing and no indication that additional facts were relevant and available regarding defendants request for substitution of counsel.

Second, the court sufficiently inquired into defendants Marsden motion. In Marsden, the Supreme Court held that "a judge who denies a motion for substitution of attorneys solely on the basis of his courtroom observations, despite a defendants offer to relate specific instances of misconduct, abuses the exercise of his discretion to determine the competency of the attorney." (Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 124.) Thus, "[w]hen a defendant moves for substitution of appointed counsel, the court must consider any specific examples of counsels inadequate representation that the defendant wishes to enumerate." (People v. Webster (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411, 435.)

Here, however, defendant did not orally request new counsel in court, but rather, chose to send a written letter to the court. The format he used to make his request permitted him to state all the reasons for the relief requested. (Cf. People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 481 (Freeman).) Defendant expressed in his letter the reasons for his dissatisfaction with counsel, including that he did not understand Mr. Willis, that Mr. Willis did not answer his questions or explain things, that he was not permitted to testify in his own defense, and that the victim had not been truthful. When a defendant has set forth in a self-contained document the basis for his dissatisfaction with appointed counsel in sufficient detail, a full hearing on the alleged inadequate representation is not required. (People v. Horton (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1068, 1103; Freeman, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 481; People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 580.) In this instance, the court was sufficiently apprised of the specific allegations leveled against Mr. Willis. At the hearing, defendant was unable or unwilling to add anything to his letter. Under the circumstances in this case, we conclude defendant was afforded an adequate opportunity to apprise the court of the reasons for his dissatisfaction with appointed counsel.

Third, it was appropriate for the court to consider and rule on defendants Marsden motion even though defendant might not have been competent at the time of the hearing. In this case, defendant had already provided the court with a letter setting forth the reasons for his dissatisfaction with Mr. Willis. Moreover, the issue is controlled by People v. Stankewitz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 72 (Stankewitz). There, the defendant sought substitution of counsel while criminal proceedings were suspended for a competency hearing. On appeal, the defendant contended the trial court improperly ruled on his motion for substitution of attorneys before resolving the competency issue. (Stankewitz, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 87.) The Supreme Court rejected the argument, stating: "While it is true that section 1368 mandates the suspension of `all proceedings in the criminal prosecution once the court has ordered a hearing into the mental competence of the defendant [citations], it is equally true that the Sixth Amendment right to effective representation virtually compels a hearing and an order granting a motion for substitution of counsel when `there is a sufficient showing that the defendants right to the assistance of counsel would be substantially impaired if [the defendants] request was denied. [Citations.]" (Stankewitz, supra, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 87-88.)

"[W]hile the trial court may not `proceed with the case against the defendant before it determines his competence in a section 1368 hearing [citation], it may and indeed must promptly consider a motion for substitution of counsel when the right to effective assistance `would be substantially impaired if his request were ignored. [Citation.]" (Stankewitz, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 88.) Under Stankewitz, the trial court clearly had jurisdiction to entertain defendants Marsden motion.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

We concur: MORRISON, J. and HULL, J.


Summaries of

People v. Coderre

Court of Appeals of California, Third District, Butte.
Nov 7, 2003
No. C041857 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 7, 2003)
Case details for

People v. Coderre

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. AARON DEREK CODERRE, Defendant…

Court:Court of Appeals of California, Third District, Butte.

Date published: Nov 7, 2003

Citations

No. C041857 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 7, 2003)