Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kings County No. 07CM0934. Lynn C. Atkinson, Judge.
Catherine White, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
Before Vartabedian, Acting P.J., Gomes, J., and Dawson, J.
INTRODUCTION
Appellant, Michael Patrick Clark, was charged in an information filed April 13, 2007, with assault with a deadly weapon on a peace officer in the performance of his/her duties (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (c), count one), possession of cocaine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351.5, count two), possession of a controlled substance for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352, subd. (a), count three), evasion of a police officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a), count four), false representation of one’s identity (§ 148.9, subd. (a), count five), and resisting arrest (§ 148, subd. (a)(1), count six). It was further alleged that appellant had a prior serious felony conviction within the meaning of the three strikes law and a prior qualifying prison term pursuant to section 667.5, subdivision (b).
Unless otherwise specified, all further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
On May 15, 2007, appellant entered into a plea agreement whereby he would admit counts two, four, and six, as well as the prior serious felony conviction allegation. The remaining counts would be dismissed and appellant’s sentence would be no greater than nine years four months.
The court advised appellant of the consequences of his plea as well as of his constitutional rights pursuant to Boykin/Tahl. Appellant expressly waived his rights. The court established a factual basis for the plea based on the stipulations of counsel and the preliminary hearing transcript. Appellant pled guilty to counts two, four, and six. Appellant admitted a prior serious felony conviction within the meaning of the three strikes law. The remaining allegations were dismissed.
Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238; In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122.
On June 19, 2007, the court sentenced appellant to the midterm of four years on count two, which it doubled pursuant to the three strikes law, plus a consecutive term of eight months on count four, which it doubled to one year four months pursuant to the three strikes law. Appellant was given a concurrent sentence for the misdemeanor allegation alleged in count six. Appellant’s total prison term is nine years four months. The court imposed a restitution fine and granted applicable custody credits. The trial court denied appellant’s request for a certificate of probable cause.
The court denied appellant’s request that it strike the prior serious felony allegations in the interests of justice pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497.
Clark’s appointed appellate counsel has filed an opening brief which summarizes the pertinent facts, raises no issues, and requests this court to independently review the record. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) The opening brief also includes the declaration of appellate counsel indicating that Clark was advised he could file his own brief with this court. By letter on September 20, 2007, we invited Clark to submit additional briefing. To date he has not done so.
FACTS
At 1:55 a.m. on March 17, 2007, Officer Jeffrey Davis of the Hanford Police Department was on duty in a marked police vehicle in a parking lot on Eighth Street in Hanford. Davis saw an older model Oldsmobile, light blue in color with license number 2CDK810, on which he had performed a traffic stop the previous night. Davis recognized appellant as the driver of the Oldsmobile. Appellant did not receive a traffic citation the prior evening.
During a department briefing at 7:00 p.m. on March 17th, Davis received a flier from the state parole department with a picture of a male adult with a shaved head who could possibly be driving a light blue Oldsmobile. Davis recognized the picture as being appellant, the driver in the traffic stop the night before.
Appellant was pulling out of a parking stall and drove away from the parking lot. As soon as Davis saw the Oldsmobile, appellant looked directly at Davis. When Davis pulled into the parking lot, appellant began driving recklessly through the parking lot and exited the lot onto Douty Street. The tires to appellant’s car were screeching. Appellant showed complete disregard for pedestrians walking through the parking lot. Davis followed appellant southbound on Douty. Before Davis could activate his lights and siren, appellant had accelerated through a red light on Seventh Street. Appellant continued to accelerate.
Davis activated his overhead lights and siren. There were several hundred pedestrians walking through downtown Hanford because the bars there were closing. At Third Street, appellant came to a three-way stop sign. He was now traveling at approximately 70 miles per hour. The speed limit in this part of town is 35 miles per hour. Appellant made no attempt to stop at the stop sign.
Appellant made a right turn onto Irwin Street, almost losing control of the car as he did so. Appellant turned onto Scott Street. Other officers were pursuing appellant. Appellant turned onto Phillips Street, Reddington Street, Davis Street, and back onto Irwin. Appellant made a sharp turn onto Lane Street and another sharp turn onto Harris Street. During this phase of the chase, appellant was driving down the middle of the street most of the time. Appellant ran another stop sign, though he did slow down.
Appellant traveled down Douty Street and Fourth Street. At Sixth Street and Douty Street, Davis stopped his pursuit due to the risk posed to pedestrians. Davis began working to get pedestrians off the street in downtown Hanford. Davis could see appellant’s car being chased by several Kings County Sheriff’s deputies and California Highway Patrol officers. Appellant headed down onto Eighth Street headed directly toward Davis. Davis was parked with his engine running and his siren and overhead lights off.
Before appellant could get close enough to collide with Davis, Davis accelerated and made a sharp right turn to avoid being hit. Davis ended up with the front end of his car on the sidewalk. Davis thought appellant was coming directly at him with the Oldsmobile. After appellant’s car was stopped, Davis searched appellant and found a small plastic baggy with several small white rocks. Total package weight was 2.5 grams. After advising appellant of his Miranda rights, appellant told Davis the rocks were “crack.” A technician weighed one of the small white rocks at .28 grams. It tested positive for cocaine base.
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436
DISCUSSION
We initially note that there are no obvious or prejudicial errors in appellant’s change of plea hearing. Appellant was fully advised of the consequences of his plea and his constitutional rights. He was further advised of and waived his constitutional rights in open court. The parties stipulated to a factual basis for the plea based on the preliminary hearing transcript. Appellant bargained for, and received, dismissal of three allegations. Appellant was promised, and received, a lid of nine years four months on his sentence.
A guilty plea is, for most purposes, the legal equivalent of a jury’s guilty verdict. (People v. Valladoli (1996) 13 Cal.4th 590, 601.) A guilty plea serves as a stipulation that the People need not introduce proof to support the accusation. The plea ipso facto supplies both evidence and verdict and is deemed to constitute an admission of every element of the charged offense. (People v. Alfaro (1986) 42 Cal.3d 627, 636 [overruled on another ground in People v. Guerrero (1988) 44 Cal.3d 343]; People v. Chadd (1981) 28 Cal.3d 739, 748.)
After independent review of the record, we have concluded no reasonably arguable legal or factual argument exists.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.