Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
Superior Court County of Los Angeles John David Lord, Judge.
J. Courtney Sevelson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Stephanie C. Brenan, William H . Shin, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
YEGAN, J.
David Chavez appeals from the judgment entered after conviction by a jury of evading a peace officer while driving recklessly (Veh. Code, § 2800.2) and driving while under the influence of drugs. (§ 23152, subd. (a).) He was sentenced to prison for two years.
Unless otherwise stated, all statutory references are to the Vehicle Code.
Appellant challenges only the conviction for violating section 2800.2. He contends (1) the evidence is insufficient to support a finding that, with the specific intent to evade pursuing deputies, he willfully fled from or attempted to elude them; and (2) the trial court erroneously denied his motion for a judgment of acquittal. (Pen. Code, § 1118.1.) We affirm.
Facts
People's Case-in-Chief
On October 18, 2005, Deputy Robert Jackson was driving a marked patrol vehicle in San Pedro. At approximately 10:20 p.m., Jackson saw a Mercedes driving on the wrong side of the road "coming head on at [him]." The Mercedes stopped, backed up, and drove into the correct lane. As the Mercedes passed by Jackson's patrol vehicle, he noticed that it was missing a front license plate and that appellant, the driver, was not wearing a seatbelt.
Jackson turned his vehicle around and followed behind the Mercedes. Appellant went through two stop signs and again drove on the wrong side of the road. Jackson turned on his vehicle's red light, but appellant did not stop. Jackson turned on his vehicle's "full light bar with the rotating lights," and he "chirped" the siren. Appellant looked back in Jackson's direction and continued driving. Jackson activated the siren so that it stayed on, but appellant still did not stop.
Appellant drove over a curb onto a grass area by a hospital where people were standing. The people "scattered out of the way." He then continued to drive on the road. By this time, two additional patrol vehicles had joined the pursuit and a helicopter was flying overhead. All of the pursuing patrol vehicles had their sirens on. The helicopter illuminated the pursuit with a spotlight.
The pursuit ended when appellant stopped his vehicle "on his own accord." He exited the vehicle and was "belligerently compliant." The deputies took him into custody without using any force. A number of bystanders were present when appellant was finally apprehended.
The pursuit lasted 80 minutes. During the entire pursuit, appellant drove between 5 and 15 miles per hour.
After he was arrested, appellant told Deputy Jackson that "he believed [the deputies] were chasing him because he was driving around the hospital." He said that he did not stop because he was "love struck" for his girlfriend, who had "messed up" his mind.
Deputy Christian Meadows administered a field sobriety test to appellant. Meadows formed the opinion that appellant "was under the influence of a CNS [central nervous system] stimulant, most likely methamphetamine." An analysis of appellant's blood showed that it contained amphetamine and methamphetamine.
The prosecution introduced evidence of two prior pursuits of appellant by law enforcement. The first pursuit occurred in June 1994. It lasted approximately 140 minutes and covered a distance of about 45 miles. The second pursuit occurred in January 1995.
Defense
Appellant was the only defense witness. He testified as follows:
During the prior pursuits in 1994 and 1995, he tried to "evade" the police. In 1995 he drove at a high rate of speed "[t]o escape. To get away from them." The police officers who apprehended him after the 1995 pursuit had beaten him "almost . . . to death."
On October 18, 2005, appellant was under the influence of methamphetamine. When he saw Deputy Jackson turn on the patrol vehicle's red light, he was "scared" because he "knew that [he] was under the influence." Appellant feared that the deputies would beat him just as the police had beaten him after the 1995 pursuit. He decided to continue driving until witnesses were present to observe the deputies' conduct. He was not trying to evade the deputies. He knew that he would eventually stop and be arrested. He was trying "just to gather witnesses and the media, which ended up happening," so that the beating he had sustained in January 1995 would not recur. He deliberately drove at a slow rate of speed "to let the cops know that [he] wasn't trying to evade, or get away, or escape from them."
Substantial Evidence Supports the Judgment
Section 2800.2, subdivision (a), makes it a crime "[i]f a person flees or attempts to elude a pursuing peace officer in violation of Section 2800.1 and the pursued vehicle is driven in a willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property . . . ." A violation of section 2800.1 occurs only if the person being pursued, "with the intent to evade, willfully flees or otherwise attempts to elude" a pursuing peace officer. (§ 2800.1, subd. (a).)
The jury instructions in this case defined "intent to evade" as meaning "an intent to escape arrest or capture." The instructions stated: "If [appellant's] sole intent was to wait for witnesses because of a perceived threat to his safety then he would not have the specific intent necessary for an intent to evade."
Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support a finding that he willfully fled from or attempted to elude the pursuing deputies with the specific intent to evade them. He does not contest the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding that he drove "in a willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property." (§ 2800.2, subd. (a).)
"In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we do not determine the facts ourselves. Rather, we 'examine the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence - evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value - such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.] We presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence. [Citation.] [¶] The same standard of review applies to cases in which the prosecution relies primarily on circumstantial evidence . . . . [Citation.] '[I]f the circumstances reasonably justify the jury's findings, the judgment may not be reversed simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.' [Citation.] We do not reweigh evidence or reevaluate a witness's credibility. [Citation.]" (People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1129.)
Substantial evidence supports the jury's finding that appellant willfully fled from or attempted to elude the deputies with the specific intent to evade them. Appellant was pursued by patrol vehicles as well as a helicopter. The pursuit lasted 80 minutes. He testified that, during the pursuit, he knew he was under the influence of methamphetamine. The jury could have reasonably concluded that appellant had intended to evade the deputies to avoid being arrested for driving while under the influence of methamphetamine. After he was apprehended, appellant did not say that he was merely trying to delay his arrest until sufficient witnesses had gathered to assure that he would not be beaten. He told Deputy Jackson that he had not stopped because he was "love struck" for his girlfriend, who had "messed up" his mind. Moreover, the prior pursuits in 1994 and 1995 manifested an intent, common scheme, and plan to escape from law enforcement officials rather than submit to their authority. Appellant admitted that, during the prior pursuits, he had intended to evade the police.
The prosecutor so argued to the jury during closing argument: "[W]hat [appellant] was doing was escaping the fact that he was under the influence, what he was doing was escaping the fact that he didn't want to get in trouble for driving under the influence . . . . So what he did is he just kept on driving for 80 minutes." "You can glean his intent to evade and to avoid capture and punishment because he was under the influence."
The Trial Court Did Not Err In Denying
Appellant's Motion for a Judgment of Acquittal
At the close of the People's case-in-chief, appellant moved for a judgment of acquittal as to the alleged violation of section 2800.2. (Pen. Code, § 1118.1.) The motion was based on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that he had willfully fled from or attempted to elude the pursuing deputies with the specific intent to evade them. Appellant contends that the trial court erroneously denied the motion.
" 'The standard applied by a trial court in ruling upon a motion for judgment of acquittal pursuant to [Penal Code] section 1118.1 is the same as the standard applied by an appellate court in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, that is, "whether from the evidence, including all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, there is any substantial evidence of the existence of each element of the offense charged." ' [Citation.] 'The purpose of a motion under section 1118.1 is to weed out as soon as possible those few instances in which the prosecution fails to make even a prima facie case.' [Citations.] The question 'is simply whether the prosecution has presented sufficient evidence to present the matter to the jury for its determination.' [Citation.] The sufficiency of the evidence is tested at the point the motion is made. [Citations.] The question is one of law, subject to independent review. [Citation.]" (People v. Stevens (2007) 41 Cal.4th 182, 200.)
The trial court did not err in denying the motion for a judgment of acquittal. Viewing the evidence as it existed at the time the motion was made (without considering appellant's later testimony in his defense), a reasonable trier of fact could have concluded that appellant had intended to evade the pursuing deputies to avoid being arrested for driving while under the influence of methamphetamine. Based on a field sobriety test as well as other factors, Deputy Meadows opined that appellant "was under the influence of a CNS [central nervous system] stimulant, most likely methamphetamine." Appellant's blood contained both amphetamine and methamphetamine. Thus, without appellant's later testimony that he knew he was under the influence of methamphetamine, a reasonable trier of fact could have inferred that appellant actually had such knowledge during the pursuit.
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: GILBERT, P.J., PERREN, J.