Opinion
3-24-0295
08-12-2024
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. VICTOR R. CASTILLO, JR. Defendant-Appellant.
This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of the 12th Judicial Circuit, Will County, Illinois, Appeal No. 3-24-0295 Circuit No. 20-CF-1231 Honorable Carmen Goodman, Judge, Presiding.
JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice McDade and Justice Hettel concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
BRENNAN, JUSTICE
¶ 1 Held: The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in granting the State's verified petition to deny pretrial release.
¶ 2 Defendant, Victor R. Castillo, Jr., appeals from the circuit court's granting of the State's verified petition to deny pretrial release. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 4 Defendant was indicted in August 2020, with two counts of delivery of a controlled substance, being 15 to 200 pills of MDMA (Class X) (720 ILCS 570/401(a)(7.5)(A)(ii) (West 2020)), possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver (Class X) (id.), and unlawful possession of a controlled substance (Class 4) (id. § 402(c)). Defendant's bond was set at $500,000, but was later reduced to $150,000. Defendant posted bond in July 2021. While on bond, defendant committed another offense and was detained. In April 2024, defendant filed a motion seeking pretrial release. In response, the State filed a verified petition to deny pretrial release, alleging defendant was charged with a detainable offense, and his release posed a real and present threat to the safety of any person, persons, or the community under section 110-6.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1 (West 2022)). The State also alleged that defendant had a high likelihood of willful flight to avoid prosecution.
¶ 5 The factual basis provided that on two occasions defendant arranged to sell MDMA to an undercover officer and sold the officer 20 pills the first time and 50 pills the second time. On August 5, 2020, officers assisted with a parole check on defendant's residence and vehicle. They found an "empty [b]lack Glock case with an empty magazine," "numerous small bags of cannabis," 103 orange pills containing 33.32 grams of MDMA, 5 grams of cocaine, and a scale with white powder on it. Defendant told the officers that he planned to sell the drugs. Defendant was "a documented and self-admitted Latin King." The petition further alleged that defendant had been on parole for two separate cases of manufacturing and delivering a controlled substance when he was charged in this case. In 2021 he posted bond and was released. While on bond, he committed two additional offenses. While on bond, defendant also failed to appear in court twice. A pretrial risk assessment indicated that defendant was a moderate high risk and had five previous convictions for drug offenses.
¶ 6 A hearing was held on April 18, 2024, in this case and another of defendant's pending cases (case No. 23-CF-1462). The State presented the factual basis as set forth in both petitions, stressing that defendant was on parole and bond for drug offenses when he committed two similar drug offenses and failed to appear twice. The State also reiterated that an empty Glock case with an empty magazine was found in defendant's residence during the August 5, 2020, parole check.
¶ 7 Defense counsel responded at the hearing that one of the failures to appear was a misunderstanding, explaining that "the last failure to appear was because he had picked up the 23-CF case and we weren't ready to surrender." Counsel also indicated that defendant did not commit any violence and could not operate his legs from the waist down, which mitigated his risk of flight. The court asked counsel what conditions he was thinking of. Counsel stated electronic monitoring or home confinement. The court granted the State's petition, finding that it met its burden by clear and convincing evidence. In so ordering, the court noted defendant's failures to appear, the history of the case, and defendant's other pending cases. The court detained defendant under both the dangerousness and willful flight standards. Defendant filed a motion for relief, which the court denied on April 26, 2024.
¶ 8 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 9 The only argument defendant raises on appeal is that the State failed to prove that no conditions of release existed to mitigate defendant's dangerousness or risk of flight. We consider factual findings for the manifest weight of the evidence, but the ultimate decision to grant or deny the State's petition to detain is considered for an abuse of discretion. People v. Mikolaitis, 2024 IL App (3d) 230791, ¶ 8. Under either standard, we consider whether the court's determination is arbitrary or unreasonable. Id.
¶ 10 Everyone charged with an offense is eligible for pretrial release, which may only be denied in certain situations. 725 ILCS 5/110-2(a), 110-6.1 (West 2022). The State must file a verified petition requesting the denial of pretrial release. Id. § 110-6.1. The State then has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence (1) the proof is evident or presumption great that defendant committed a detainable offense, (2) defendant poses a real and present threat to any person, persons, or the community or is a flight risk, and (3) no conditions could mitigate this threat or risk of flight. Id. § 110-6.1(a), (e). When determining a defendant's dangerousness and the conditions of release, the statute includes a nonexhaustive list of factors the court can consider. Id. §§ 110-6.1(g), 110-5.
¶ 11 Here, the State presented evidence that there were no conditions available to mitigate the threat defendant posed. The statute provides factors the court can consider when determining the conditions of release, and the State presented evidence of such factors, including the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of defendant. Id. § 110-5. As was observed in People v. Bueno, 2024 IL App (2d) 240053, ¶ 13 (quoting 725 ILCS 5/110-2(a) (West 2022)), "Section 110-5(a) refers to a defendant's history and whether he or she was on parole, probation, or other release at the time of the current offense, and section 110-2(a) notes that pretrial release is generally presumed, but only on certain conditions, including that 'the defendant *** complies with all terms of pretrial release.'" (Emphasis in original.) Thus, the trial court is tasked with considering not just whether conditions short of detention exist, but also whether a defendant is likely to comply with them.
¶ 12 Here, the record shows that defendant continued to commit new drug offenses while on parole and bond. Thus, conditions like home confinement or GPS monitoring would not prevent defendant from continuing to commit such offenses. Indeed, home confinement would be particularly ineffective given the factual record here, where defendant would be confined to the very property where an empty Glock case with an empty magazine, numerous bags of cannabis, MDMA, cocaine, and a scale containing white power were found. In other words, defendant would be confined to the very place where the drugs were located. Moreover, defendant failed to appear in court on two occasions. There is no reasoned basis in the record from which to conclude that defendant would comply with electronic home monitoring on pretrial release. Simply put, the evidence supporting the State's petition satisfied its burden. See People v. Lee, 2024 IL App (1st) 232137, ¶ 33 (where the defendant was on parole from a gun case and failed to comply with the conditions placed upon him, this "demonstrated history of refusing to abide by conditions of release" satisfied the State's burden of showing no less restrictive conditions were appropriate, and the trial court did not err in so finding); People v. Davis, 2023 IL App (1st) 231856, ¶¶ 31-32 (State satisfied burden of showing that no less restrictive conditions were appropriate where the defendant's history, including a prior conviction of escape from law enforcement, demonstrated an unwillingness to follow rules and the unlikelihood that he would follow the court's order, rendering futile a release with conditions).
¶ 13 Accordingly, we conclude that it was not against the manifest weight of the evidence for the court to find that there were no conditions to mitigate the threat defendant posed. Therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion in granting the State's petition.
¶ 14 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 15 The judgment of the circuit court of Will County is affirmed.
¶ 16 Affirmed.
¶ 17 PRESIDING JUSTICE McDADE, dissenting:
¶ 18 I dissent from the majority's decision to affirm the circuit court's order granting the State's verified petition to deny pretrial release.
¶ 19 As the majority recites, section 110-6.1(e) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 states that "[a]ll defendants shall be presumed eligible for pretrial release. . . ." 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e) (West 2022). To rebut this presumption, the State must prove the following three elements, by clear and convincing evidence: (1) that the proof is evident or the presumption great that the defendant has committed a detainable offense; (2) that the defendant poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person, persons, or the community, or a risk of flight; and (3) that no conditions can mitigate this threat. Id.
¶ 20 The majority finds that the State met its burden of proof with respect to the third element by presenting evidence of the fact that there were no available conditions to mitigate the risks that defendant posed. However, the burden of proof is comprised of two concepts: (1) a burden of production, and (2) a burden of persuasion. Black's Law Dictionary 196 (6th ed. 1990). The burden of production is "[t]he obligation of a party to introduce evidence sufficient to avoid a ruling against him on the issue," whereas the burden of persuasion is "[t]he onus on the party with the burden of proof to convince the trier of fact of all elements of his case." Id. Together, these two concepts require the State to produce both evidence and argument to satisfy its burden of proof in pretrial release cases.
¶ 21 Even if, as the majority seems to find, the State's evidentiary showing satisfied its burden of production, the State's petition to deny pretrial release is devoid of any mention of mitigating conditions, or of the argument that no mitigating conditions exist. It does not even acknowledge that conditions form an element when setting out its burden of proof. Nor did the State mention or argue the same during the detention hearing. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the State met its burden of persuasion as to the element regarding conditions. Consequently, I would reverse the circuit court's judgment as an abuse of discretion.