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People v. Castillo

California Court of Appeals, Third District, Sacramento
Jun 25, 2024
No. C098718 (Cal. Ct. App. Jun. 25, 2024)

Opinion

C098718

06-25-2024

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. LUIS ALFONSO CASTILLO, JR., Defendant and Appellant.


NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

(Super. Ct. No. 17FE001870)

Duarte, J.

This case returns to us after we previously remanded for resentencing. On remand, defendant asked the trial court to strike or dismiss a firearm enhancement found true by the jury, which required the court to impose a consecutive sentence of 25 years to life in prison. Alternatively, defendant asked the court to strike the enhancement and impose a lesser enhancement in its stead. The court declined to strike the enhancement.

Defendant appeals again, arguing the trial court abused its discretion in declining to strike the firearm enhancement. Seeing no prejudicial abuse of discretion, we affirm.

One of the headings in defendant's opening brief suggests the trial court also violated defendant's right to due process of law. The phrase "due process" does not otherwise appear in defendant's briefing. Because defendant has not supported this point with argument or authority, we disregard it. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.360(a), 8.204(a)(1)(B); People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793.)

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

We restate only the facts necessary to address defendant's claim of sentencing error.

Defendant started a shootout outside a casino and killed a bystander. (People v. Castillo (Feb. 2, 2022, C091329) [nonpub. opn.].) A jury found him guilty of second degree murder and possession of a firearm having been convicted of a felony and found defendant had personally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury or death. The trial court sentenced defendant to 15 years to life in prison for murder, plus 25 years to life in prison for the firearm enhancement, plus the upper term sentence of three years in prison for firearm possession. Defendant appealed, and this court affirmed his convictions but vacated his sentence and remanded for resentencing under new laws enacted while his appeal was pending. (People v. Castillo, supra, C091329.)

At the resentencing hearing, the trial court indicated it had reviewed the parties' sentencing briefs, our prior opinion, and a psychological report prepared prior to defendant's first sentencing hearing. In his brief, defendant argued the court should strike the firearm enhancement because it could result in a sentence of over 20 years in prison. Defendant also argued that dismissing the enhancement would not endanger public safety because he showed progress towards rehabilitation in prison, he had a supportive family, and he was remorseful. At the hearing, defendant testified about his remorse for the murder and explained that, at the time, he thought he needed to carry a gun for protection because his father had been shot in front of him when he was five years old. Defendant then argued that his childhood trauma also justified striking or dismissing the enhancement.

The People responded that defendant already had received an indeterminate sentence for murder, so the firearm enhancement would not necessarily result in a sentence longer than 20 years. The People also argued that defendant's childhood experiences did not fit the statutory definition of "childhood trauma," and, in any event, no evidence showed that the murder was connected to defendant's childhood trauma. More broadly, the People argued that, even if mitigating circumstances applied, defendant "remains a danger to the community" and "it would not be in the interest of justice to strike or reduce [the firearm] enhancement in any way."

After recounting the factual summary from our prior opinion and detailing defendant's criminal record, the trial court agreed with each of the People's arguments. Specifically, the court opined Penal Code section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(C) did not apply to defendant because his base term of 15 years to life for murder could result in a sentence of over 20 years by itself, so adding the firearm enhancement would not necessarily "result in a sentence" of over 20 years. The court then considered whether defendant's childhood experiences qualified as mitigation under section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(E). Though the evidence showed defendant's father had been shot, his family's home had been shot into, his brother had been shot, and he had received a posttraumatic stress disorder diagnosis, the court found that no evidence showed the murder had been connected to this prior victimization and childhood trauma.

Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

Next, the trial court explained that even assuming the facts supported the two mitigating circumstances and giving great weight to those mitigators as required by the statute, dismissing the firearm enhancement would likely result in physical injury or other serious danger to others. Specifically, the court considered that defendant had been 30 years old and already banned from possessing firearms for life at the time of the murder, had already served time in prison before being released and committing the murder, had failed to express remorse or show concern for the victim at the time of the murder, and had a significant criminal record. These circumstances showed that, despite defendant showing improved behavior in prison, he had proven his "inability to function peacefully in society when left to his own schemes, notwithstanding the strong intervention of the criminal justice system." Accordingly, the court found "substantial evidence of countervailing consideration" had "sufficient weight [to] overcome any potential mitigating factors under Section 1385." Finally, the court also found that, under the circumstances, striking or dismissing the enhancement would "not serve the interest of justice. "

Accordingly, the trial court denied defendant's request to strike or dismiss the firearm enhancement and imposed the same indeterminate sentence of 40 years to life in prison. The court imposed only the middle term sentence of two years in prison for firearm possession and stayed execution of that sentence.

Defendant timely appealed. After we granted additional time to prepare the record and multiple requests by the parties to continue the briefing schedule, the case was fully briefed on March 29, 2024, and assigned to this panel shortly thereafter.

DISCUSSION

Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in declining his request to either dismiss the firearm enhancement outright or dismiss the enhancement and impose a lesser enhancement in its stead. Specifically, defendant argues the court erred by: (1) finding that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety; (2) finding defendant's childhood trauma did not meet the requirements of section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(E); and (3) misinterpreting section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(C), which should have applied to defendant's sentence. We see no prejudicial abuse of discretion.

I

Dismissal Would Endanger Public Safety

Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion because its determination that dismissing the firearm enhancement would endanger public safety "was speculative, unreasonable, and unsupported by evidence." We disagree.

Section 1385, subdivision (c) provides: "Notwithstanding any other law, the court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so ...." (§ 1385, subd. (c)(1).) Subdivision (c)(2) of section 1385 guides courts in exercising their discretion under subdivision (c) by, among other things, instructing courts that the presence of certain enumerated mitigating circumstances "weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety." (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2).) The statute further specifies:" 'Endanger public safety' means there is a likelihood that the dismissal of the enhancement would result in physical injury or other serious danger to others." (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2).)

We review the trial court's determination for abuse of discretion. (People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 298.) On appeal, we will affirm as long as the court exercised that discretion "in a manner that is not arbitrary and capricious, that is consistent with the letter and spirit of the law, and that is based upon an 'individualized consideration of the offense, the offender, and the public interest.'" (People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 847.)"' "[T]he burden is on the party attacking the sentence to clearly show that the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary. [Citation.] In the absence of such a showing, the trial court is presumed to have acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, and its discretionary determination to impose a particular sentence will not be set aside on review." '" (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 376-377.) The court's"' "decision will not be reversed merely because reasonable people might disagree. 'An appellate tribunal is neither authorized nor warranted in substituting its judgment for the judgment of the trial judge.'" '" (Id. at p. 377.) In other words, "a trial court does not abuse its discretion unless its decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it." (Ibid.)

Here, the trial court based its finding on the following facts: defendant was 30 years old and already banned for life from possessing firearms at the time of the murder, had already served time in prison before being released and committing the murder, failed to express remorse or show concern for the victim at the time of the murder, and had a significant criminal record. This is not an irrational or arbitrary basis for finding that dismissing the enhancement and allowing defendant to be released from prison sooner by striking or reducing the enhancement would likely "result in physical injury or other serious danger to others."

Defendant's contentions that his "criminal history was not so egregious to support the court's findings," and his "prison record is substantial evidence contrary to the sentencing court's speculative finding of future dangerousness" both fail under the appropriate standard of review. Reasonable people might disagree about the egregiousness of defendant's criminal history or the predictive value of defendant's behavior during his current prison sentence, but that does not make the trial court's determination an abuse of discretion. It is not irrational or arbitrary to determine someone with a history of criminal violence, including murder, would likely continue to cause physical injury or serious danger to others. Further, defendant knew he was prohibited from carrying a firearm, but he nonetheless armed himself and used the weapon without hesitation. Likewise, it is not irrational or arbitrary to determine good behavior in prison will not eliminate the threat of physical injury or serious danger upon release, especially when defendant committed murder after being released from an earlier prison sentence.

Defendant also faults the trial court for suggesting he intended to kill the innocent bystander, rather than mistakenly killing an unintended victim. Defendant misreads the court's statement. The court echoed the first sentencing judge, who had also presided over the trial, explaining that the victim was shot twice, and another bullet ended up behind the victim, which suggests defendant was aiming at the victim, even if he had mistaken the victim for someone else. The evidence supports this inference, and the court was not irrational or arbitrary in determining the fact that defendant intentionally aimed at an innocent bystander supported a likelihood that he would cause physical injury or serious danger to others. Rather, as the court explained, even assuming defendant had mistaken the victim for one of his intended targets, his rash and indiscriminate use of violence increases the likelihood that he will pose a danger to the public.

In short, defendant has failed to demonstrate that the trial court's "decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it." Accordingly, we conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in finding that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety.

II

Current Offense Connected to Childhood Trauma

Defendant also contends the trial court abused its discretion by not affording great weight to evidence of his childhood trauma. Specifically, he contends the evidence of traumatic events from his childhood, documented in a psychologist's report, combined with his own assertion in a letter to the court that the murder was "Due To The Psycological [sic] Trauma That I've Incurred Throughout My Life," must be given great weight under section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(E). We disagree.

As noted, section 1385, subdivision (c)(2) requires a court considering dismissing an enhancement to "consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove" certain mitigating circumstances, including if "[t]he current offense is connected to prior victimization or childhood trauma." (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(E).) The statute further defines these terms." 'Childhood trauma' means that as a minor the person experienced physical, emotional, or sexual abuse, physical or emotional neglect." (§ 1385, subd. (c)(6)(A).) "A court may conclude that a defendant's childhood trauma was connected to the offense if, after reviewing any relevant and credible evidence, including, but not limited to, police reports, preliminary hearing transcripts, witness statements, medical records, or records or reports by qualified medical experts, the court concludes that the defendant's childhood trauma substantially contributed to the defendant's involvement in the commission of the offense." (Ibid.)

We assume, like the parties, that the violence defendant witnessed is properly categorized as childhood trauma under the statute. But that did not necessarily mean the trauma was connected to the offense. The trial court explained that the psychologist's report said nothing about such a connection, and defendant does not identify any such evidence in the report. The court also rejected defendant's testimony about a connection between his lifetime psychological trauma and the murder, finding it not credible, selfserving, and inconsistent with his prior testimony. Section 1385, subdivision (c)(6)(A) explicitly permits trial courts to determine whether evidence about the connection between childhood trauma and an offense is "relevant and credible." The court's reasons for finding defendant's statement not credible were not irrational or arbitrary, so the court did not abuse its discretion.

III

Enhancement Could Result in a Sentence Over 20 Years

Finally, defendant argues that applying the firearm enhancement could result in a sentence of over 20 years in prison, which counted as a mitigating circumstance under section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(C). The People contend defendant's indeterminate sentence of 15 years to life in prison is already over 20 years, so the enhancement does not "result" in a sentence of over 20 years. Even assuming defendant's interpretation of the statute is correct, we see no prejudice.

Section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(C) establishes a mitigating circumstance when "[t]he application of an enhancement could result in a sentence of over 20 years." (Italics added.) A person sentenced to 15 years to life in prison for second degree murder is eligible for parole after 15 years. (§§ 3046, subd. (a)(2), 190, subd. (a).) "[T]he day of release on parole marks the end of the prison term," which means defendant's base term could end in 15 years. (People v. Jefferson (1999) 21 Cal.4th 86, 95.) This in turn means the imposition of the firearm enhancement could result in a sentence of over 20 years.

We are not persuaded by the People's argument that defendant's sentence "already exceeded [20 years] as it is an indeterminate life sentence." They offer no authority to support the position that a sentence of 15 years to life in prison should be classified as longer than 20 years, rather than counting the actual length of the sentence served. Instead, the People claim that applying section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(C) when a court has imposed an indeterminate sentence "would essentially preclude imposition of all enhancements to any indeterminate life term." But section 1385, subdivision (c) does not require dismissal of enhancements when a mitigating circumstance applies. Courts maintain discretion to decline to dismiss enhancements when doing so is not in the furtherance of justice. (§ 1385, subd. (c)(1).) Courts also need not give great weight to a mitigating circumstance if dismissing the enhancement would endanger public safety. (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2).) Requiring these findings does not equate to "essentially preclud[ing] imposition" of enhancements. Accordingly, the trial court misinterpreted section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(C) when it concluded that section did not apply in this case.

We next must determine, "after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence," whether the error has resulted in a miscarriage of justice. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.) It is unclear whether we should apply the standard Watson harmless error test (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836) or the test elucidated most recently in People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, which applies when the "sentencing court was not fully aware of the scope of its discretionary powers." (Salazar, at p. 425.) The trial court here misinterpreted a statute during a sentencing proceeding, but "has revealed which sentencing choice it prefers." This means our review requires less speculation than when "a trial court has made no discretionary choice because it was unaware it had authority to make one." (People v. McDaniels (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 420, 426.) Nevertheless, we will assume without deciding that the more stringent Salazar standard applies. (See People v. Woodruff (2018) 5 Cal.5th 697, 759 [assuming, without deciding, that more stringent prejudice standard applies].) Under this standard, we" 'remand for resentencing unless the record "clearly indicate[s]" that the trial court would have reached the same conclusion "even if it had been aware that it had such discretion." '" (Salazar, at p. 425.)

Here, the trial court explained that, even applying and giving great weight to the mitigating factors in section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(C) and (E), it would still decline to exercise its discretion to dismiss the enhancement, finding that "dismissal of the Section 12022.53 subdivision (d) enhancement would endanger public safety because there is a likelihood that in doing so it would result in physical injury or other serious danger to others." As noted above, the court did not err in making this finding. The court then explained its reasoning at length, concluding: "It is clear that nothing short of incarceration for the life term contemplated by the Legislature for committing murder in violation of Penal Code Section 187 and the conduct described in the enhancement [that the jury] found true under Penal Code Section 12022.53[,] subdivision (d) will protect society from continuous and serious danger that is guaranteed if this enhancement is dismissed and defendant finds himself out on parole 15 or more years after serving his sentence in prison." Given the extensive evidence of how the court would exercise its discretion were it to give great weight to the mitigating factors, we conclude "[t]he record in this case demonstrates with unusual clarity that remand would be an idle act." (People v. Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th 371, 432.)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

We concur: Earl, P.J., Krause, J.


Summaries of

People v. Castillo

California Court of Appeals, Third District, Sacramento
Jun 25, 2024
No. C098718 (Cal. Ct. App. Jun. 25, 2024)
Case details for

People v. Castillo

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. LUIS ALFONSO CASTILLO, JR.…

Court:California Court of Appeals, Third District, Sacramento

Date published: Jun 25, 2024

Citations

No. C098718 (Cal. Ct. App. Jun. 25, 2024)