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People v. Castellon

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION SIX
Jan 31, 2012
2d Crim. No. B229302 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2012)

Opinion

2d Crim. No. B229302

01-31-2012

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JUAN A. CASTELLON, Defendant and Appellant.

Landra E. Rosenthal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris. Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Jaime L. Fuster, Dana M. Ali, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff And Respondent.


NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

(Super. Ct. No. TA108856) (Los Angeles County)

Juan A. Castellon appeals from the judgment following his conviction by jury of one count of first degree murder and two counts of using false documents. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a)/189 & 114.) The jury also found allegations of firearm use (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)); personally and intentionally discharging a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)); and causing great bodily injury or death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)) to be true. The trial court sentenced appellant to 50 years to life in state prison (25 years to life for murder, plus 25 years to life pursuant to section 12022.53, subdivision (d); and a concurrent term of 5 years for false document use count). Appellant's sole contention on appeal is that the trial court erred and violated his constitutional rights by failing to instruct the jury sua sponte with CALCRIM No. 570, the sudden quarrel and heat of passion voluntary manslaughter instruction. We affirm the judgment.

All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.

BACKGROUND


Prosecution Evidence

In 2009, appellant rented and lived in a converted garage apartment at 2700 West Cypress Street in Compton. His landlord, Gabriello Barrios, lived in the house at that address.

On Friday, August 21, 2009, appellant was working at Ramona's Deli in Gardena, with Jeffrey Santos, Amilcar Saso, Jose Madrid, Tomas Guerrero (the victim), and Guerrero's roommate, Maiko Diaz. Saso left work with Guerrero, Madrid, and appellant, who was driving. After making several stops and dropping the other men off, appellant drove away with Guerrero in his car. Saso never saw Guerrero alive again.

The next day, August 22, 2009, Los Angeles Sheriff Department detectives investigated a body that was found in an alley behind 750 East 135th Street in Los Angeles. They found a Ramona's Deli receipt in the victim's pocket and later identified him as Guerrero. There were no defensive wounds on his hands or forearms.

On the evening of August 23, around 9:25 p.m., Los Angeles Sheriff Department Deputy Jay London, and his partner, Deputy Telly Johnson, were on patrol near Clymar Avenue and Cypress Street. They saw appellant and four other men standing near a red Honda Accord, in an alley. (The other men were Santos, Adan Hernandez, and the Honda's owner, Byron Talone.) One of the men dropped a black bag on the ground; it contained eight live rounds of .222 Remington ammunition. The Honda's trunk was open; it contained a bloodstained Remington .222 rifle, wrapped in a towel.

Detectives searched appellant's apartment and Barrios's backyard. They found bloodstains on appellant's mattress, box spring, and the underlying wood frame. The apartment walls also had bloodstains and "possible bullet entrances." A bloodstained carpet and a bloodstained mop were in the adjacent alley. The DNA samples from bloodstains in appellant's apartment, the discarded carpet, and the Remington .222 rifle matched Guerrero's DNA.

On October 7, 2009, Detective Q. Rodriguez interviewed appellant. At first, he denied that he killed Guerrero. After Rodriguez described the evidence that authorities had retrieved from his apartment, he admitted that he killed Guerrero.

Appellant said that a few days before he shot Guerrero, he saw text messages on Guerrero's phone that said he would kill him. When they were at his apartment on August 21, appellant saw Guerrero with a .22-caliber revolver and asked him what the gun was for. Guerrero responded, "it's to kill someone." A struggle ensued, and one round was fired. Then, while Guerrero was on the bed, appellant shot him in the head. He said that he wrapped Guerrero's body in a sheet, put a plastic bag over his head, and placed it in his Camaro. He then drove to 135th Street and Wilmington Avenue, and discarded Guerrero's body in a nearby alley. He also said that he threw a revolver from his car window in Downey, near Imperial Highway. Appellant admitted that he owned a .222 Remington rifle, but denied that he used it to kill Guerrero; he said that he shot him with a "pistola," or revolver.

Los Angeles County Deputy Medical Examiner, Dr. Jeffrey Gutstadt, determined that Guerrero's death was caused by multiple gunshot wounds that were inflicted by a "high-velocity weapon, high-powered weapon." Dr. Gutstadt opined that if two men were struggling over a .22-caliber revolver, which had discharged during the struggle, the injuries would be far less extensive than Guerrero's injuries. Such a struggle would also have left signs of stippling associated with close-range firing. There were no signs of stippling on Guerrero.

Tracy Peck, a senior criminalist for the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, testified that the rifle found in the trunk of Talone's Red Honda is a Remington .222-caliber bolt action rifle. This model is fired from the shoulder, and its operator must manually move a bolt to fire each successive round.

Defense Evidence

Appellant testified in his own defense. He had worked at Ramona's Deli for about a year, where he became friendly with Guerrero and his roommate, Diaz. Appellant had never argued with Guerrero. Diaz and Guerrero had each been to appellant's apartment. Another coworker, Santos, was appellant's best friend.

Sometime between June and August of 2009, appellant loaned his Nissan Maxima to Diaz. The Maxima was impounded before Diaz returned it and appellant did not have enough money to get it back. He had to take the bus until he bought his white Camaro from Guerrero. He and Guerrero did not have any written agreement for the Camaro sale. Appellant made a partial payment to Guerrero but delayed paying the balance because Guerrero did not provide the documents necessary to transfer title of the Camaro to appellant.

In August, appellant and Diaz were looking for additional work. Diaz parked his truck in an alley and accompanied appellant in the Camaro. When they returned several hours later, Diaz's truck was gone. Some time later, appellant started receiving calls from someone who said that if appellant did not return Diaz's truck, he would be harmed or killed. Appellant did not recognize the caller's voice, but believed that Diaz was behind the threats. He did not confront Diaz about the phone threats, or notify the police. He said that based on his experience in El Salvador, the police could not be trusted. Because of his immigration status, he feared he would be deported if he notified the police.

Appellant further testified that on Friday, August 21, 2009, after work, he drove Santos's car to take Madrid, Saso, and Guerrero to Stu's Liquors, where some of them cashed their paychecks. After the other men got out of the car, Guerrero agreed to stop at appellant's apartment to look at some speakers that he wanted to buy. They went to get appellant's car from Santos's house, then went to Auto Zone, at about 3:30 p.m.

After leaving Auto Zone, Guerrero and appellant went to his apartment. Guerrero brought his backpack inside, and sat on the bed. For a few minutes, they spoke about the money that appellant owed Guerrero for the Camaro, and the price that Guerrero would pay for the speakers. As appellant went to the closet to get the speakers, Guerrero pulled a revolver from his backpack. He asked why Guerrero had a gun. Guerrero said it was "to kill someone."

Appellant believed that Guerrero meant to kill him, and he grabbed his rifle from the closet. Appellant thought that Guerrero's actions were related to the threats he had received on his phone. Guerrero had been holding the revolver in his right hand. Appellant's first shot hit Guerrero in the right shoulder. Guerrero remained on the bed, seated, after appellant fired that shot. He fired a second shot that hit Guerrero in the head. Appellant said it took just seconds to fire the two shots, and that "[e]verything happened quickly." He shot Guerrero because he was pointing a gun at him, and he feared that Guerrero would kill him.

After shooting Guerrero, appellant put the gun on the floor, went into the bathroom and vomited. He did not check to see if Guerrero was alive before he left the apartment, and he was afraid to call the police.

At trial, appellant admitted that he knowingly used false documents to get a job at Ramona's Deli. He acknowledged that when he spoke to the police on October 6, 2009, he lied about killing Guerrero. He also lied when he said there was a struggle over the revolver, when he said he did not have a rifle, and when he described how he disposed of the revolver. When asked if he would lie whenever it would benefit him, appellant replied, "Maybe."

DISCUSSION

Appellant argues that the trial court erred and violated his constitutional rights by failing to instruct the jury sua sponte with CALCRIM No. 570, the sudden quarrel and heat of passion voluntary manslaughter instruction. We disagree.

CALCRIM No. 570 provides that "a killing that would otherwise be murder is reduced to voluntary manslaughter if the defendant killed someone because of a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion. . . . The defendant killed someone because of a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion if: . . . [t]he defendant was provoked; . . . [a]s a result of the provocation, the defendant acted rashly and under the influence of intense emotion that obscured his reasoning or judgment; . . . and . . . [t]he provocation would have caused a person of average disposition to act rashly and without due deliberation, that is, from passion rather than from judgment. . . . Heat of passion . . . can be any violent or intense emotion that causes a person to act without due deliberation and reflection. . . . In order for heat of passion to reduce a murder to voluntary manslaughter, the defendant must have acted under the direct and immediate influence of provocation as I have defined it. While no specific type of provocation is required, slight or remote provocation is not sufficient. Sufficient provocation may occur over a short or long period of time. . . . It is not enough that the defendant simply was provoked. The defendant is not allowed to set up his own standard of conduct. You must decide whether the defendant was [sufficiently] provoked [based on sudden quarrel or heat of passion - as a lesser included offense of murder]."
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A trial court must instruct on a necessarily included offense where there is substantial evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the defendant committed the lesser offense and not the offense charged. (People v. DePriest (2007) 42 Cal.4th 1, 50; People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 162.) Voluntary manslaughter is the intentional killing of a human being without malice, and is a lesser included offense of murder when the requisite mental element of malice is negated by a sudden quarrel or heat of passion or an unreasonable but good faith belief in the need for self-defense. (People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 583; People v. Gutierrez (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 704, 708.) An appellate court independently reviews the question of whether the trial court erred by failing to instruct on a lesser included offense. (People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1215.)

Here, at appellant's request, the trial court instructed the jury on justifiable homicide through self-defense (CALCRIM No. 505) and voluntary manslaughter based on imperfect self-defense (CALCRIM No. 571). It also gave them instructions on the difference between murder and manslaughter (CALCRIM No. 500); on murder with malice aforethought (CALCRIM No. 520); and on the difference between first and second degree murder (CALCRIM No. 521). At trial, appellant testified that he killed Guerrero in self-defense and his trial counsel argued that he was either not guilty of murder based on self-defense, or was guilty of voluntary manslaughter based on imperfect self-defense.

The existence of provocation distinguishes the heat of passion form of voluntary manslaughter from murder. (See People v. Lee (1999) 20 Cal.4th 47, 59.) The provocation must be caused by the victim, must be viewed from an objective standpoint and not the defendant's subjective perspective, and must be "sufficiently provocative" (ibid.) "such that an average, sober person would be so inflamed that he or she would lose reason and judgment" ( id . at p. 60). (See also People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 201.) The heat of passion requirement for manslaughter has both a subjective and an objective component. (People v. Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1215; People v. Steele (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1230, 1252.) The defendant must actually and subjectively attempt to kill under a heat of passion, and the circumstances must be such as to arouse an ordinarily reasonable person to a heat of passion. (Ibid.)

Here, there is no substantial evidence of provocation to support instructing the jury on heat of passion voluntary manslaughter. There was no evidence that appellant and Guerrero fought, argued, or exchanged heated words prior to the shooting. To the contrary, appellant said that he had never had a problem with Guerrero before. Further, appellant invited Guerrero into his apartment although he claimed to have seen texts on Guerrero's phone that said he would kill appellant. In addition, in order to fire the second shot at Guerrero's head, appellant had to manually move the rifle's bolt, which required some deliberation. Further, appellant repeatedly stated that he shot Guerrero in self-defense, because he was afraid.

We reject appellant's related claim that the trial court violated his due process right to a fair trial by not instructing on heat of passion voluntary manslaughter. "But due process requires that a lesser included offense instruction be given only when the evidence warrants such an instruction." (Hopper v. Evans (1982) 456 U.S. 605, 611; People v. Holloway (2004) 33 Cal.4th 96, 141 [federal and state Constitutions not infringed where voluntary manslaughter theory not supported by substantial evidence].) Further, the instructional error, if any, was harmless. In convicting appellant of first degree murder, the jury necessarily found he acted willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation. That state of mind is inconsistent with having acted under the heat of passion. (See People v. Carasi (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1263, 1306.)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

COFFEE, J. We concur:

YEGAN, Acting P.J.

PERREN, J.

Arthur M. Lew, Judge


Superior Court County of Los Angeles

Landra E. Rosenthal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris. Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Jaime L. Fuster, Dana M. Ali, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff And Respondent.


Summaries of

People v. Castellon

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION SIX
Jan 31, 2012
2d Crim. No. B229302 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2012)
Case details for

People v. Castellon

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JUAN A. CASTELLON, Defendant and…

Court:COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION SIX

Date published: Jan 31, 2012

Citations

2d Crim. No. B229302 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2012)