Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. BA325997, Frederick N. Wapner, Judge.
Marylou Hillberg, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Paul M. Roadarmel, Jr., and Viet H. Nguyen, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
KRIEGLER, J.
The jury convicted defendant Alejandro Garcia Castaneda of possessing a counterfeit public seal in violation of Penal Code section 472, and he received a two-year prison sentence. In his timely appeal, defendant contends there was constitutionally insufficient evidence as to one of the elements of the offense, that he possessed a counterfeit driver’s license with intent to defraud someone. We reject defendant’s claim and affirm.
This statute states, in pertinent part, that “[e]very person who, with intent to defraud another . . . has in his possession any such counterfeited seal or impression thereof, knowing it to be counterfeited, and willfully conceals the same, is guilty of forgery [of this state].” (Pen. Code, § 472.)
Defendant was also charged with offenses related to possession of a handgun; however, because defendant was acquitted on these counts, we limit our factual discussion to the circumstances concerning the counterfeiting offense.
On July 19, 2007, at approximately 11:00 p.m., Los Angeles Police Officer Irene Kohler and her partner, Officer Andreas, stopped defendant while he was driving his girlfriend’s car. The officers stopped the car because defendant was speeding, and the description of the car and its license plate number matched those of a vehicle that had been involved in a criminal incident earlier that evening. The officers ordered defendant and his passenger out of the car, and asked defendant for his identification. Defendant replied that he had none. While searching the vehicle, Officer Kohler found a document that appeared to be defendant’s driver’s license in the center console. The document was of poor quality—it contained a badly forged state seal, lacked hidden security features that are usually on an official driver’s license, lamination was poor, the print was in an incorrect font and size and suffered from water damage, its barcode was smudged, and the license number itself was missing a digit. Based on her training and expertise, Officer Kohler opined that it was counterfeit.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction because the prosecution adduced no evidence that he possessed the counterfeited driver’s license with an intent to defraud. More specifically, he argues mere possession of a forged driver’s license is insufficient to prove he had the intent to defraud because the license could be used for legitimate, nonfraudulent purposes, such as buying liquor or entering into a courthouse, and there was no corroborative evidence of an intent to defraud. We disagree.
In reviewing an insufficiency of evidence claim, an appellate court must consider “‘the evidence in a light most favorable to the judgment and presume the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence in support of the judgment. The test is whether substantial evidence supports the decision, not whether the evidence proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citations.] [The court’s] sole function is to determine if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.] The standard of review is the same in cases where the prosecution relies primarily on circumstantial evidence. [Citations.] The California Supreme Court has held, ‘Reversal on this ground is unwarranted unless it appears “that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the conviction].”’ [Citations.]” (People v. Castellanos (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1489, 1492-1493 (Castellanos).)
In order for a person to be convicted of forgery under Penal Code section 472, each of the following elements must be proved: (1) defendant possessed a counterfeit seal or an impression of a counterfeit seal; (2) defendant knew that the seal or impression of the seal was counterfeit; (3) defendant willfully concealed the fact that the seal or impression of the seal was counterfeit; and (4) when defendant possessed the seal or impression of the seal, he intended to defraud. (Pen. Code, § 472; Judicial Council of Cal. Crim. Jury Instns. (2007-2008) CALCRIM No. 1926.) Defendant is only contesting sufficiency of evidence as to element four—the specific intent to defraud. As we explain, the nature of the forged instrument and the circumstances of defendant’s possession supported a reasonable inference of fraudulent intent.
As we have explained in analogous circumstances, “‘Specific intent as an element of a crime may be proved by circumstantial evidence.’ [Citations.]” (Castellanos, supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at p. 1493.) Under a variety of circumstances, possession of forged documents will support an inference fraudulent intent. (Id. at pp. 1493-1494 [“defendant’s possession of blank sheets of Selective Service cards and instructions on making California driver’s licenses could lead a reasonable trier of fact to infer that he possessed the requisite intent to defraud”]; People v. Norwood (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 148, 159 (Norwood) [“The necessary fraudulent intent may be inferred from defendant’s unauthorized possession of these various exhibits”].) This is especially true where, as here, the forged document has “‘apparent legal efficacy.’” (Castellanos, supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at p. 1494, quoting Lewis v. Superior Court (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 379, 388.)
In Castellanos, the defendant had in his possession a forged resident alien card bearing his photograph, and we held that the instrument “would create a legal right or obligation to someone such as a prospective employer.” (Castellanos, supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at p. 1494.) Similarly, defendant’s forged driver’s license bearing his photograph and driver’s license number would have created important legal rights. “[Vehicle Code] [s]ection 14607.4 states that ‘[d]riving a motor vehicle on the public streets and highways is a privilege, not a right,’ and the state ‘has a critical interest in enforcing its traffic laws and in keeping unlicensed drivers from illegally driving.’” (Valov v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1127 (Valov); see also Veh. Code, § 12500 [“A person may not drive a motor vehicle upon a highway, unless the person then holds a valid driver’s license issued under this code”].) Nor are the legal rights and obligations emanating from a driver’s license limited to driving privileges. “[S]tate and local law enforcement agencies, along with California businesses, rely heavily on the photographs in state driver’s licenses and identity cards to prevent fraud.” (Valov, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 1128.) Indeed, “‘driver’s licenses are used to establish identity for a host of commercial transactions . . . .’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
Defendant offers no authority for the highly dubious assertion that the mere possession of the fake driver’s license is insufficient to prove he had the specific intent to defraud because the fake license could be used for “legitimate” nonfraudulent purposes such as buying liquor, flying on an airplane, or entering a courthouse. First, under Penal Code section 470a, it is a crime to counterfeit “any driver’s license . . . with the intent that such driver’s license . . . be used to facilitate the commission of any forgery.” Intent to defraud in this state is broadly defined as “an intent to deceive another person for the purpose of gaining a material advantage over that person or to induce that person to part with property or alter that person’s position by some false statement or false representation of fact, wrongful concealment or suppression of the truth or by any artifice or act designed to deceive.” (People v. Pugh (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 66, 72.) Use of a counterfeit license to trick a merchant into selling liquor or to deceive airport or courthouse security cannot be viewed as legitimate.
In addition to the nature of the forged document, corroborative evidence supports the jury’s finding of the specific intent. Defendant concedes that possession of a forged driver’s license plus slight corroborative evidence of inculpatory circumstances would be sufficient to prove specific intent to defraud. Here, defendant made a false statement to Officer Kohler, which amounted to corroborative evidence. (See People v. Rosborough (1960) 178 Cal.App.2d 156, 159.) “Way back in People v. Cole (1903) 141 Cal. 88, 90, our [S]upreme [C]ourt explained the rule this way: ‘Deception, falsehood, and fabrication as to the facts of the case are treated as tending to show consciousness of guilt, and are admissible on the same theory as flight and concealment of the person when charged with crime.’ (Italics added.) In People v. Wayne (1953) 41 Cal.2d 814, 823, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Snyder (1958) 50 Cal.2d 190, the court reiterated that limited concept: ‘“Where a material fact is established by evidence and it is shown that a defendant’s testimony as to that fact was willfully untrue, this circumstance not only furnishes a ground for disbelieving other testimony of this defendant [citations], but also tends to show consciousness of guilt . . . .”’ (Quoting Zarrillo v. Stone (1945) 317 Mass. 510, 512 [58 N.E.2d 848] italics added.) Finally, in People v. Kimble (1988) 44 Cal.3d, 480, 496, the court characterized the rule as applying to ‘“[f]alse statements deliberately made by defendants to arresting officers concerning matters within [defendants’] own knowledge, and relating to the issue of guilt or innocence . . . .” (Quoting Witkin, Cal. Evidence (2d ed. 1966) § 512, at p. 482, and cases cited.)’” (People v. Fritz (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 949, 957-958.)
Our decision in Norwood is highly instructive. There, we found corroborative evidence of an intent to defraud based on the defendant’s false statement to the arresting officer concerning fraudulent possession of traveler’s checks. (Norwood, supra, 26 Cal.App.3d at p. 159.) “The trial court could have found that defendant’s denial to [the arresting officer] that he had never seen or touched the warrants or traveler’s checks was a lie betraying a consciousness of guilt. [Citations.] This denial also strongly supports the inference that in placing the items beneath the armrest defendant was attempting either to hide them from the arresting officer or to disassociate himself from them because of the officer’s presence, again suggesting that he was motivated by a consciousness of guilt.” (Norwood, supra, 26 Cal.App.3d at pp. 159-160.) From defendant’s false statement to Officer Kohler that he did not have identification, the jury could reasonably infer defendant’s attempt to conceal the counterfeit instrument and, hence, a consciousness of guilt. (See ibid.)
To support his argument, defendant relies primarily on People v. Swope (1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 140, 144 (Swope), which found insufficient evidence of forgery based on possession of a forged check without any corroborative evidence of other inculpatory circumstances. Swope, however, is easily distinguished. In Swope, the defendant was charged with forging a check (Pen. Code, § 470), not a possessory offense. The prosecution’s case involved the cashing of a single check, which was payable to another individual, not Swope—and there was no evidence that Swope endorsed the name of the payee. (Swope, supra, 269 Cal.App.2d at p. 144.) Moreover, the Swope court relied on the absence of the kind of evidence presented in the instant case, a material false statement by Swope, evidencing consciousness of guilt. (Id. at pp. 144-145.)
Finally, defendant argues that his false statement to the police showed that he did not intend to use the forged license to defraud. It is well established, however, that the question of whether to draw an inference consistent with innocence or guilt “is one of fact for the jury or other trier of fact. [Citation.]” (People v. Rosborough, supra, 178 Cal.App.2d at p 165.) As there was substantial evidence from which the jury could infer defendant’s intent to defraud, we must defer to the jury’s finding. (Ibid.; see also, e.g., People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: TURNER, P. J., ARMSTRONG, J.