Opinion
E081067
01-03-2024
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. EDWARD CASARES, JR., Defendant and Appellant.
Steven A. Torres, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A. Swenson and Christopher P. Beesley, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County No. FVA018711. Katrina West, Judge. Affirmed.
Steven A. Torres, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A. Swenson and Christopher P. Beesley, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
McKINSTER J.
Defendant and appellant Edward Casares, Jr., is serving a sentence of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for his conviction of special circumstance first degree murder. (Pen. Code, § 187.) In January 2023, he filed a motion for an evidence preservation hearing pursuant to section 1203.01 and People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin). The superior court denied the motion. On appeal, defendant contends the denial of his request for a Franklin hearing violates equal protection. As we explain, we reject his contention and affirm.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
A Franklin hearing allows a convict to preserve evidence of youth-related mitigating factors for purposes of a future youthful offender parole hearing pursuant to section 3051. (See Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th 261; see also In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439, 448-459.) Juvenile offenders (i.e., those under 18 when they offended) who are sentenced to LWOP are eventually entitled to a section 3051 hearing; youthful offenders (i.e., those between 18 and 25 when they offended) who are sentenced to LWOP are not. (§ 3051, subds. (a)(1), (b), (h).)
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND AND FACTS
On June 14, 2023, we granted defendant's request to take judicial notice of the opinion of this court in People v. Casares, Jr. (May 4, 2007, E040820) [nonpub. opn.], defendant's appeal of his original judgment.
In October 2002, defendant, who was 22 years old at the time, killed Michael Christopher Sima. Subsequently, a jury convicted him of first degree murder with special circumstances, and the trial court sentenced him to LWOP. On January 26, 2023, defendant filed a motion for a Franklin hearing and for appointment of counsel to assist in the hearing. The superior court denied the motion after finding "defendant is not entitled to a Franklin Hearing in that he was 22 at the commission of the offense."
II. DISCUSSION
Defendant contends that providing Franklin hearings to youthful offenders with non-LWOP sentences and juvenile offenders with LWOP sentences, but not to youthful offenders with LWOP sentences (§ 3051, subd. (h)), violates equal protection.
Regarding the differential treatment of youthful offenders with non-LWOP sentences, this court is already on record as rejecting the identical contention. (People v. Ngo (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 116 (Ngo), review granted May 17, 2023, S279458.)
In Ngo, we found "several rational bases for the unequal treatment." (Ngo, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 123.) "For one thing, section 3051 was enacted in response to [People v.] Caballero [(2012) 55 Cal.4th 262 (Caballero)]. In Caballero, the Supreme Court called for 'legislation establishing a parole eligibility mechanism that provides a defendant serving a de facto life sentence without possibility of parole for nonhomicide crimes that he or she committed as a juvenile with the opportunity to obtain release on a showing of rehabilitation and maturity.' [Citation.] It did not call for such a mechanism for any defendants-whether juvenile, youthful, or otherwise-serving a de jure LWOP sentence. The Legislature could rationally limit its response accordingly.
"For another, section 3051 provides for a youthful offender parole hearing. A youthful offender sentenced to LWOP is not entitled to parole at all. Just like all other adult offenders convicted of murder with special circumstances, a youthful offender convicted of murder with special circumstances must actually spend the rest of his or her life in prison.
"If any further justification is needed, we find it in the difference in culpability. A person guilty of murder with special circumstances is the worst of the worst. This is the most heinous crime known to our Penal Code, and one of the few crimes subject to the death penalty in California. [Citations.]" (Ngo, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 123.)
We also noted that "a long line of cases have rejected the equal protection claim defendant makes here"; People v. Hardin (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 273, review granted January 11, 2023, S277487 (which defendant primarily relies upon and urges us to follow) was the sole outlier. (Ngo, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 124, and cases cited.) We found Hardin's reasoning flawed in that, (1) it incorrectly considered section 3051 not to be a sentencing statute; (2) it incorrectly limited the "'rational basis'" inquiry to the purposes of the challenged law; (3) it incorrectly required a perfect fit between means and ends; and (4) it incorrectly overlooked the existence of a rational basis for distinguishing between youthful offenders with de jure LWOP sentences and youthful offenders with de facto LWOP sentences (such as 50 years to life). (Ngo, at pp. 124-126.)
Regarding the differential treatment of juvenile offenders with LWOP sentences, the obvious rational basis is age. "[B]oth the United States Supreme Court and our high court have repeatedly found the bright line drawn between juveniles and nonjuveniles to be a rational one when it comes to criminal sentencing. [Citations.]" (People v. Jackson (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 189, 196-197.) Accordingly, the distinction that section 3051 draws between juvenile offenders with LWOP sentences and youthful offenders with LWOP sentences has repeatedly been upheld. (Id. at pp. 196-198; accord, People v. Bolanos (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1069, 1079, review granted Apr. 12, 2023, S278803; People v. Sands (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 193, 204-205; In re Murray (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 456, 463-465; People v. Acosta (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 769, 779-781.)
For the foregoing reasons, we find that section 3051, subdivision (h), does not violate equal protection and the superior court properly denied defendant's request for a Franklin hearing.
III. DISPOSITION
The order appealed from is affirmed.
We concur: RAMIREZ P. J., MENETREZ J.