Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
Sonoma County Super. Ct. No. SCR486912
Jenkins, J.
Defendant Samuel Christopher Carsner appeals the sentence imposed following his conviction on the grounds that the trial court erred by denying his Romero motion. We affirm.
People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497.)
Background
In the early hours of May 2, 2006, a Sonoma County Sheriff’s Deputy spotted defendant driving a vehicle reported as stolen. The officer pulled behind defendant, activated his overhead lights, and attempted to effect a traffic stop. Defendant initially slowed down, but did not yield. A high speed chase ensued for over four miles, during which defendant reached a speed of 90 miles per hour, in a 45 miles per hour zone while crossing over both westbound and eastbound lanes of traffic. Ultimately, defendant failed to negotiate a bend at high speed and collided head-on with a power pole. The collision caused power lines to fall onto the roadway and under a police patrol vehicle. Defendant exited the stolen vehicle unhurt and fled on foot. A deputy gave chase, caught defendant, and a violent struggle ensued before defendant was subdued and placed in handcuffs.
Based on these events, the district attorney for the County of Sonoma filed an information in four counts on June 28,2006, charging defendant as follows: count I — felony vehicle theft, in violation of Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a); count II — felony receipt of stolen property, in violation of Penal Code section 496d, subdivision (a); count III — felony fleeing from a pursuing police officer’s vehicle, in violation of Vehicle Code section 2800.2, subdivision (a); count IV — misdemeanor resisting an officer, in violation of Penal Code section 148, subdivision (a)(1). Counts I and II also carried the allegation that defendant had a previous conviction for felony theft of a vehicle. The information further alleged defendant had suffered a prior strike conviction under Penal Code section 1170.12 — assault with a deadly weapon with a gang enhancement—in March 1995. Additionally, the information alleged defendant had two prior prison convictions within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b).
At a change of plea hearing on January 24, 2007, defendant pleaded no contest to count I (vehicle theft) and count III (evading an officer) of the information. Defendant also admitted to a prior conviction for vehicle theft, to a prior strike conviction for assault with a deadly weapon with a gang enhancement, and to a prior prison conviction. The court accepted the People’s motion to dismiss all other counts at the time of sentence. In return for his plea, defendant was promised he would serve no more that seven years and six months.
On June 8, 2007, defendant filed a Romero motion asking the court to strike his prior strike conviction because his present conviction was “the result of an unfocused individual not wanting to return to prison who was using drugs”; drug use was a contributing factor in defendant’s five prior felony convictions; defendant had never been in a drug treatment program; defendant had been screened and approved for a residential drug treatment program; and, defendant had committed no new offenses in the meantime. On June 25, 2007, the People filed its opposition to defendant’s Romero motion. The People contended that it would not be in the interests of justice to vacate defendant’s prior strike conviction because of his “lengthy and continuous criminal history.” Also, the People noted defendant had been granted probation in previous convictions yet had gone on to commit additional criminal offenses.
At the sentencing hearing on June 26, 2007, the trial court denied defendant’s Romero motion. The court stated: “I’m unable to grant the Romero motion in this case. The prior violent felony was gang related, and this is another violent act, fleeing from the officers in a stolen car at a high rate of speed. It just doesn’t fit the basis on which a Romero motion can be granted.” The court imposed a midterm sentence of six years on count I, a concurrent midterm sentence of four years on count III, and a consecutive one year sentence on defendant’s prior prison conviction for an aggregate term of seven years. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal on July 25, 2007.
Discussion
Defendant contends the trial court erred by denying his Romero motion. We review the denial of a Romero motion for abuse of discretion. (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 158.) In ruling on a Romero motion, the trial court “must consider whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of his present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the [spirit of the three strikes law] scheme[] . . . in whole or in part, and hence should be treated as though he had not previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or violent felonies.” (Id. at p. 161.) The three strikes law “establishes a sentencing requirement to be applied in every case where the defendant has at least one qualifying strike” unless the sentencing court concludes defendant warrants exception to the three-strikes scheme. (People v. Strong (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 328, 337-338.) However, only under “extraordinary . . . circumstance[s]” can a defendant be “deemed to fall outside the spirit of the very scheme within which he squarely falls once he commits a strike as part of a long and continuous criminal record, the continuation of which the law was meant to attack.” (Id. at p. 338.)
On appeal, “ ‘[t]he burden is on the party attacking the sentence to clearly show that the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary. [Citation.] In the absence of such a showing, the trial court is presumed to have acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, and its discretionary determination to impose a particular sentence will not be set aside on review.’ ” (People v. Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 977-978.) “Concomitantly, ‘[a] decision will not be reversed merely because reasonable people might disagree. “An appellate tribunal is neither authorized nor warranted in substituting its judgment for the judgment of the trial judge.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 978.)
Here, defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by denying his Romero motion because the trial court failed to give sufficient consideration to the following factors: defendant’s prior convictions were in some way connected to his drug addiction; he was under the influence at the time he committed the current offenses; and he admitted his history of drug and alcohol abuse and has taken necessary steps to obtain treatment, including being accepted onto the waiting list for long-term residential treatment. We disagree.
The trial court is presumed to have considered all of the relevant factors in the absence of an affirmative record to the contrary. (People v. Kelley (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 568, 582.) Thus, the fact that the court focused its explanatory comments on the violent and dangerous nature of defendant’s past and present crimes does not mean that it considered only that factor. Indeed, by way of the pre-trial briefing on the Romero motion and the presentence report the court received a range of relevant information concerning defendant’s background, character, and prospects. This included not only his lengthy criminal history, but also his history of drug and substance abuse, his failure to address his drug problem in the past, his poor prior performance on probation, and his recent successful screening and acceptance by TASC as a candidate for long-term residential drug treatment. Nevertheless, after hearing argument of counsel on the matter at the time of sentencing, the trial court declared defendant’s background and character “doesn’t fit the basis on which a Romero motion can be granted.” Thus, we cannot say the trial court failed to consider or balance the factors deemed important by defendant. Essentially, defendant asks us to reweigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the trial court, and we decline to do so. (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 378 [noting “[i]t is not enough to show that reasonable people might disagree about whether to strike one or more prior conviction allegations” and stating that a trial court’s denial of a Romero motion should be affirmed where the trial court “reached an impartial decision in conformity with the spirit of the law”].) Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s denial of defendant’s Romero motion.
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: McGuiness, P. J. Pollak, J.