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People v. Caoyonan

California Court of Appeals, First District, Fifth Division
Sep 30, 2008
No. A116892 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 30, 2008)

Opinion


THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. LYNDON CAOYONAN, Defendant and Appellant. A116892 California Court of Appeal, First District, Fifth Division September 30, 2008

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

City & County of San Francisco, No. 192442

Jones, P.J.

Lyndon Caoyonan appeals from a judgment entered after a jury convicted him of second degree murder. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 189.) He contends his conviction must be reversed because (1) the trial court erred when it refused to suppress his confession, (2) the court abused its discretion when it admitted pictures and a videotape that depicted aspects of the crime, and (3) he received ineffective assistance of counsel. We conclude the court did not commit any prejudicial errors and affirm.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Appellant was convicted of murdering his wife Nicole.

On November 4, 2003, near 11:00 p.m., San Francisco police officers were dispatched to a wooded area near Laguna Honda Hospital to investigate a report that someone was screaming for help. When the officers arrived, they found a woman’s body resting against a tree at the bottom of a gully. She was dressed in pajamas and had an electrical cord knotted around her neck. Based on the body’s discoloration, it appeared it had been there for a couple of days. The body was identified as being appellant’s wife Nicole.

San Francisco Police Inspectors Joseph Toomey and Holly Pera went to appellant and Nicole’s apartment in San Francisco the next day. Appellant answered the door. He said Nicole was not home. The inspectors spoke briefly with appellant and then asked him to accompany them to the police station for an interview. Appellant agreed.

Appellant’s statement to the police on November 5, 2003, was recorded on a videotape. He told the police the following:

Appellant picked up Nicole from work around 5:00 p.m. on Halloween night. They argued when appellant told Nicole that he had lost his job. Appellant and Nicole took their young son trick or treating and then went to a friend’s house. After returning home around 1:00 a.m., they quarrelled again, Nicole tearfully. Nicole went to bed and appellant left the bedroom to sleep on the couch. A friend named Iain Nisperos came over a couple of hours later. When everyone awoke the next morning, appellant, his young son, and Nisperos decided to go shopping. Appellant told Nicole where they were going. When they returned, Nicole was not there. However, her cell phone and an overnight bag were missing. Nicole called later that evening to say she was okay. She planned to be home the next day, Sunday, for the football game. Nicole did not return home for the football game on Sunday. That evening, appellant went to a “couple of bars” to look for her. On Monday, Nicole was not there when appellant went to pick her up after work. On Tuesday, one of Nicole’s friends called the apartment and asked for her. Appellant was surprised she was still not at work. Appellant told the police he was “not too sure” where Nicole was. He said he believed she just needed some time to think.

At that point in the conversation, the police told appellant that Nicole’s body had been found and that she was dead. Appellant denied responsibility stating, “I didn’t do anything.” He asked the police whether he was free to leave. The police assured appellant that was correct. They stopped the interview and drove appellant home.

Appellant spoke with his friend Iain Nisperos that evening. He told Nisperos that Nicole was dead and that the police thought he did it.

The next day November 6, 2003, appellant called Nisperos and said he wanted to meet. Nisperos asked appellant whether he “had . . . done what they were saying he did.” After replying “[d]o you really want to know?” appellant told Nisperos that he killed Nicole and that he had no remorse. Nisperos told appellant he should “do the right thing” and turn himself in. Appellant said he was not going to do that.

Nisperos called Inspector Toomey and reported appellant’s confession. Toomey picked up Nisperos and brought him to the police station. Appellant called Nisperos on his cell phone while he was at the police station. Nisperos arranged to meet him at the Glen Park BART station.

Two plainclothes police officers went to the BART station instead. They saw appellant sitting on a bench. When the officers contacted appellant and identified themselves, appellant immediately tried to grab a knife he was carrying. The officers wrestled with appellant and subdued him. Appellant screamed telling the officers that he wanted to die.

Later that day, on November 6, 2003, appellant gave another interview to the police. Again, the interview was recorded on a videotape. Appellant told the police the following:

When appellant got home on Halloween night, he told Nicole he had lost his job. Nicole accused appellant of being “out of control” and told him to “[g]et out.” At that point, a voice in appellant’s head said “Choke her.” “And she’ll stop.” Appellant retrieved a scarf from the living room, brought it into the bedroom, and wrapped it around Nichole’s neck. Nicole fell onto the bed and struggled. Eventually, appellant released the scarf when he thought she was dead. Nicole made a noise a few moments later that “creeped [appellant] out.” He found a cell phone cord and pulled it tight around Nicole’s neck. After killing Nicole, appellant got a blanket from the living room and wrapped her body in it. He thought for “a while” about what he was going to do to cover up the killing. The problem was made more difficult because his friend Nisperos came over to visit. Appellant waited until Saturday night. He found a big garbage can in the neighborhood and put Nicole’s body in it. Then on Sunday morning, appellant took the garbage can out of the apartment and put it in a van that he borrowed. That evening, appellant drove the van around San Francisco looking for a place to dump Nicole’s body. Eventually he found an area of thick brush. Appellant opened the garbage can and Nicole’s body fell out. He pushed the body into the bushes and down a slope. Appellant then put the garbage can back in the van and drove away.

Appellant said he told his parents that he had killed Nicole. He also said he had gone to a priest. When asked what the priest told him to do, appellant said the priest told him that God loved him and that he should pray.

Based on these facts, an information was filed charging appellant with murder. The case proceeded to trial where the prosecution presented the evidence we have set forth above. The prosecutor also presented, as part of his case, the recordings of appellant’s interviews with the police on November 5 and 6, 2003. Appellant testified on his own behalf. He again admitted that he killed Nicole and that he tried to cover up the crime by dumping her body in the bushes. His counsel’s primary focus at trial was to urge that appellant was guilty of manslaughter, not murder.

The jurors considering this evidence, found appellant guilty of second degree murder. Subsequently, the court sentenced appellant to 15 years to life in prison.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Suppress

Appellant contends the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress his videotaped post-arrest confession to the police. To understand this argument, further background is necessary.

As is relevant here, appellant was interrogated by the police on three different occasions. All were recorded on videotape. The first occurred on November 5, 2003, before appellant was arrested. As we have stated, appellant denied any knowledge of, or responsibility for, Nicole’s death.

The second interrogation took place on November 6, 2003, shortly after appellant was arrested. The interrogation took place at the police station and was conducted by San Francisco Police Inspectors Holly Pera and Joseph Toomey. Appellant was in handcuffs at the time. At the beginning of the interrogation, Inspector Toomey began providing appellant his Miranda rights, going over each right individually and trying to ascertain whether appellant understood it. After obtaining several waivers, Toomey told appellant that if he could not afford an attorney, one would be provided for him free of charge. At that point, appellant replied, “I like the free of charge. I like that one. I take that one.” Inspector Toomey did not understand appellant’s statement to mean that appellant was invoking his Miranda rights. Immediately thereafter, he reiterated that if appellant could not afford an attorney, one would be appointed for him free of charge. Appellant said “okay” and the interrogation continued. In the course of the interrogation, appellant admitted that he had “killed Nicole.” About 20 minutes into the interrogation, appellant stated clearly that he wanted an attorney. At that point, Toomey and Pera stopped the interrogation and turned off the recording equipment.

Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.

Both inspectors left the room. Pera asked another inspector who was not involved in the investigation to go into the room and watch appellant.

About 10 minutes later, appellant motioned to Pera as she walked by the interrogation room. She entered and asked if appellant wanted to speak with her. He said “yes” and stated he thought about calling her the night before. Appellant said that “even though he stated that he wanted to get hold of an attorney that he didn’t want to. What he really wanted to do was talk to us right then.” Pera told appellant she would get Inspector Toomey and they could reinitiate the interrogation.

Pera and Toomey turned the recording equipment back on. Before commencing the interrogation, Pera stated for the record, “Okay. Inspector Toomey, while you were—while we were out, I was sitting and talking to Lyndon a little bit. Lyndon mentioned that he had thought about calling me last night.” Appellant interrupted and said “Today.” Pera continued, “ . . . today, okay, but he changed his mind for, you know, whatever reason. He also mentioned that while the police were chasing him last night, he was really deep down hoping that they would catch him and um, kind of put an end to all this for him. And then Lyndon said that he would like to talk to us about what happened. He knows he asked for an attorney before but he doesn’t really want to call one right now. He just wants to talk about what happened. Is that right? Am I saying it right? You’re nodding your head yes. Okay.” Appellant responded, “Yeah.” Inspector Pera repeated the Miranda warnings and appellant specifically said he understood each right, and that he wanted to talk. Appellant then provided the detailed confession that we have described above.

Prior to trial, appellant filed a motion to suppress. He sought to exclude both statements he made to the police on November 6, 2006. The trial court conducted a hearing on appellant’s motion and granted it in part. The court ruled appellant’s first statement on November 6, 2003 must be suppressed because appellant had invoked his Miranda rights when in response to Inspector Toomey’s statement about providing a free attorney, appellant said, “I like the free of charge. I like that one . . . . I take that one.” However, the court ruled appellant’s second statement to the police on November 6, 2003 could be admitted because appellant had initiated that interrogation and it was voluntary.

Appellant now challenges that ruling arguing the trial court erred when it declined to suppress the second statement he made to the police on November 6, 2003.

The standard of review we must apply is well established. “‘We must accept the trial court’s resolution of disputed facts and inferences, and its evaluations of credibility, if they are substantially supported. [Citations.] However, we must independently determine from the undisputed facts, and those properly found by the trial court, whether the challenged statement was illegally obtained.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Johnson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 25, overruled on other grounds in People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 879, quoting People v. Boyer (1989) 48 Cal.3d 247, 263.)

Here, appellant raises two arguments. First, he contends the trial court erred when it ruled he initiated the second interrogation on November 6, 2003.

In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court ruled that prior to any questioning a suspect in custody “must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.” (Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 444.)

In Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477, the court articulated a rule that was designed to implement Miranda: an accused having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel is not subject to further interrogation until counsel has been made available to him. (Id. at pp. 484-485.) However, the Edwards court was careful to carve out an exception to its general rule. The police may speak with a defendant who has invoked his Miranda rights if “the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations . . . .” (Id. at p. 485.) An accused “initiates” further communication, exchanges, or conversations when he speaks words or engages in conduct that can be fairly said to represent a desire on his part to open up a more generalized discussion relating directly or indirectly to the investigation. (People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 648.) If a defendant does “initiate” further communication, exchanges, or conversations, the police may commence interrogation if the defendant validly waives his Miranda rights. (Id. at p. 649.) A trial court’s finding that a defendant “initiated” further communication, exchanges or conversations, must be upheld on appeal if it is supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 731.)

Here, the trial court’s ruling that appellant initiated the second interrogation on November 6, 2003 is amply supported. Inspector Pera testified that when she walked by the interrogation room, appellant “motioned” to her. As Pera described it: “I was outside of the interview room when he waived me into the interview room . . . .” Pera entered the room and asked if appellant wanted to see her. He said “yes.” Appellant then told Pera that “even though he stated that he wanted to get hold of an attorney that he didn’t want to. What he really wanted to do was talk to us right then.” We conclude there is substantial evidence that appellant “initiated” a further exchange.

Appellant argues that Pera was not credible. He points out that no other person saw the exchange that she described, and argues that it is “far from convincing” that he understood what Pera was saying when she turned on the recording device and recounted what had occurred. However, credibility determinations are for the trial court. (People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1092-1093, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Rundle (2008) 43 Cal.4th 76, 151.) We must affirm the court’s decision where, as here, it is supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 731.)

Next, appellant argues that even if he nodded his head and motioned Pera into the room, this was not an initiation of contact because it was Pera who commenced the dialogue. The issue is whether appellant’s conduct or speech can be fairly said to represent a desire on his part to open up a more generalized discussion relating directly or indirectly to the investigation. (People v. Mickey, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 648.) Here, appellant’s conduct in motioning for Pera to enter the room and his statements clearly reflected a desire on his part to reinitiate the discussion.

Appellant argues that his “offhand comment” that he thought about calling Pera the night before did not open the door to general questioning. But appellant did not stop with that comment. He also told Pera that he no longer wanted to see a lawyer and that he wanted to speak with her.

We conclude the trial court did not err when it ruled appellant “initiated” the second interrogation on November 6, 2003.

Appellant’s alternate argument is that the trial court should have suppressed his second November 6, 2003 statement because it was the tainted by and was the product of the illegal first interview.

For purposes of analyzing this argument, we will assume the trial court’s ruling that appellant’s first statement to the police on November 6, 2003 had to be suppressed because the police continued to question appellant after he invoked his Miranda rights and thus committed an Edwards violation. Nevertheless, an Edwards violation does not so taint the investigatory process that all subsequent statements must necessarily be suppressed. Rather, the admissibility of any subsequent statement turns on whether it is knowingly and voluntarily made. (Oregon v. Elstad (1985) 470 U.S. 298, 309, see also People v. Storm (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1007, 1033.)

We turn first to the issue of whether appellant’s second statement was voluntary. On appeal, we independently determine whether a statement was voluntary by examining the totality of the circumstances. (People v. Neal (2003) 31 Cal.4th 63, 80.)

Here, several factors support the conclusion that appellant’s second statement was voluntary. First, appellant had been in custody for only a brief period of time. The trial court estimated it to be less than an hour. A brief period of confinement supports a finding of voluntariness. (Cf. People v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1041, holding that a defendant who was in custody for between six and eleven hours made statements that were voluntary].)

Second, while police may have violated Edwards when they continued to question appellant after he invoked his Miranda rights during the first interview, this was in no way a clear or obvious violation. Appellant’s statement, “I like the free of charge. I like that one . . . . I take that one” was ambiguous at best. It is not surprising that Inspector Toomey did not immediately recognize it as a request for counsel. Indeed, when appellant clearly asked for counsel later in the interrogation, the questioning ceased immediately.

Third, appellant himself reinitiated the exchange with Inspector Pera. He motioned for her to come into the interview room and told her that he didn’t really want an attorney and that he wanted to talk. The fact that appellant voluntarily chose to speak with Inspector Pera strongly supports the conclusion that his second statement was voluntary. (Cf. People v. Bradford, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 1043 [holding that a statement was voluntary because the defendant initiated the interrogation].)

Fourth, before appellant provided his second statement to the police, he again was informed of, and he waived his Miranda rights. As the trial court noted, appellant was a full grown man and he appeared to be of at least average intelligence. While appellant did not have any prior experience with the law, it is reasonable to conclude he understood the rights he was waiving.

Fifth, the recordings of appellant’s statements support the conclusion that his second statement was voluntary. Appellant obviously is in distress during both interviews. He states repeatedly that he is “bad,” and says that he wants to hurt himself. But it appears that the primary reason for appellant’s distress is his realization that he has committed a terrible act. Fairly viewed, appellants second statement appears to be motivated by a desire to unburden himself, and was not the product of official coercion. As our Supreme Court has stated repeatedly, “[t]he Fifth Amendment is not ‘concerned with moral and psychological pressures to confess emanating from sources other than official coercion.’” (People v. Bradford, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 1041, quoting Oregon v. Elstad, supra, 470 U.S. at pp. 304-305.) We conclude appellant’s second statement was voluntary.

After independent review, we also conclude appellant’s second statement was knowingly made. Appellant initiated the second interview which itself is a factor that tends to support a knowing waiver of rights. (People v. Bradford, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 1045.) In addition, appellant was informed of and he expressly waived his Miranda rights. We conclude appellant’s waiver was made with a full awareness of the rights he was abandoning and the consequences of his decision. (Ibid.)

None of the arguments appellant makes convinces us the trial court erred. First, appellant argues the second interrogation should have been suppressed because it was in effect a continuation of the illegal first interrogation. Appellant notes that both interrogations occurred in the same place and under the same general circumstance. While appellant is correct, he fails to recognize a critical fact. The first interview stopped when appellant clearly asserted his right to counsel. At that point Inspectors Toomey and Pera ceased all questioning and turned off the recording equipment. The only reason a second interrogation commenced was because appellant himself initiated it by contacting Pera and indicating a desire to talk. We conclude the interviews were sufficiently distinct.

Next, appellant suggests we are applying an incorrect standard when determining whether his second statement must be suppressed. According to appellant the correct standard is “whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which the instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.” However, the standard appellant articulates is from a dissenting opinion authored by Justice Chin in People v. Storm, supra, 28 Cal.4th at page 1043. With respect to Justice Chin, we are obligated to follow the reasoning of the majority. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.)

It is not clear whether appellant’s second statement would have to be suppressed even under Justice Chin’s reasoning. Justice Chin describes several factors that would dissipate the taint of an illegally obtained first confession including “the fact that the suspect initiated the interview, or that the officers gave fresh Miranda warnings, including the right to counsel’s presence before the interview commenced.” (People v. Storm, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 1047.) Both those circumstances are present here.

Appellant argues his second statement was not voluntary because it was the product of an intentional violation of his Miranda rights. He relies on People v. Neal, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pages 81-82, where our Supreme Court ruled that one factor that weighed in favor of a finding that a statement was not voluntary was the fact that the detective who conducted the interrogation intentionally violated Miranda by continuing to question the defendant even though he had invoked his right to remain silent and his right to counsel. Neal is distinguishable because there, the defendant clearly invoked his right to remain silent and his right to counsel and the detective intentionally violated that request by continuing to question the defendant. Here by contrast, appellant ambiguously asserted his right to counsel and there is no indication that Pera and Toomey intentionally violated appellant’s Miranda rights. Indeed, when appellant clearly asked for counsel, the questioning ceased. Neal is not controlling under these very different facts.

Next, appellant argues his second statement was not voluntary because it was the product of the type of “softening technique” that was decried in People v. Honeycutt (1977) 20 Cal.3d 150. This is clearly incorrect. In Honeycutt, our Supreme Court held that when a waiver “results from a clever softening-up of a defendant through disparagement of the victim and ingratiating conversation, the subsequent decision to waive without a Miranda warning must be deemed to be involuntary . . . .” (Id. at p.160.) Here, the police did not disparage Nicole nor did they engage in ingratiating conversation. Honeycutt is not controlling.

We conclude the trial court correctly ruled appellant’s second statement to the police was admissible.

Having reached this conclusion, we need not decide whether any error was prejudicial.

B. Admission of Crime Scene Recording and Photographs

Prior to trial, defense counsel filed a motion to exclude as irrelevant and unduly inflammatory photographs of Nicole’s autopsy and of the crime scene. The motion stated that if the court should find the photographs to be relevant, “[i]t is respectfully requested that a proper procedure . . . would be a cropping of the photographs to exclude extraneous and irrelevant non-testimonial evidence contained in any such photographs.”

The trial judge addressed appellant’s motion near the beginning of trial. She stated on the record: “We looked at the photographs this morning and I think we’re going on the right track with those. We’ll see them again and revisit the issue again when they’re blown up but before they’re shown.” Defense counsel commented, “In terms of the photographs, what we’re going to use, Judge, I ask . . . to add another point to the photographs situation once they’re blown up and in the courtroom[.] I ask they be used while the witnesses are testifying, removed down after the witnesses regarding their, whatever, whoever is testifying to their relevance, and after that they be removed and not just hanging here in front of the jury throughout the rest of the case.” The trial court agreed, “Yes. But we can get, and you remind us but don’t do it in open court. Walk up and say, ‘Can we take that one down.’” Defense counsel replied, “Okay. Thank you.”

Subsequently at trial, Dr. Azar, who performed the autopsy on Nicole’s body, identified three photographs that were taken during the autopsy. Exhibit 26 showed Nicole’s head and neck. Exhibit 27 was a close-up of the phone cord that was wrapped around Nicole’s neck. Exhibit 28 was a photograph of the “ligature furrow” in Nicole’s neck. When presenting the photographs, the prosecutor commented, “May the record reflect they have previously been shown to [defense counsel].” Defense counsel said, “[t]hat’s true” and made no objection. Dr. Azar used the photographs to help illuminate his testimony about the state of Nicole’s body when it was found. The court later admitted the photographs into evidence without objection.

The prosecution also played for the jurors a DVD that depicted the crime scene. The court asked defense counsel whether he had any objection to playing the DVD. Counsel replied, “No. We talked about this.”

Appellant now contends the trial court erred when it admitted and allowed the jurors to see the photographs of Nicole’s autopsy, and the DVD recording of the crime scene.

Defense counsel never objected to the DVD and he specifically declined to object when the court played it for the jurors. That claim is waived. (Evid. Code, § 353, People v. Kipp (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1100, 1124.)

The claim regarding the autopsy photographs is also waived. While defense counsel filed a written motion to exclude the photographs, the colloquy between the court and counsel that we have quoted makes clear that the parties discussed the issue and that they reached some sort of agreement about how the photographs should be treated. Then at trial, the court admitted the photographs without any objection from defense counsel. We conclude the issue is waived. (Evid. Code, § 353.)

The issue is also waived because defense counsel failed to obtain a ruling from the court on his motion to exclude. (People v. Hayes (1990) 52 Cal.3d 577, 619, see also Simons, Cal. Evidence Manual (2008) Relevant Evidence, § 1:20, p. 23.)

Furthermore, even if we were to assume, arguendo, that the issue was not waived, and that the court should have excluded the photographs and DVD in question, we would not reverse. Appellant’s argument is premised on the assumption that the photographs and DVD were so horrific that they must have prejudiced the jurors against him. We have viewed the evidence in question and simply disagree. The photos and DVD are not pleasant to look at, but they are not gruesome and are not the type of evidence that would prejudice the jurors against appellant. We conclude it is not reasonably probable appellant would have achieved a more favorable result absent the error alleged. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) Any possible error was harmless.

C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Appellant argues that if trial counsel’s failure to object resulted in a waiver of his right to challenge the admissibility of the photographs and DVD on appeal, then trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel.

A defendant who contends he received ineffective assistance has the burden of proving that (1) trial counsel’s performance was deficient in that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness when measured by prevailing professional norms, and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. (People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 215-218.) An appellant who alleges ineffective assistance on direct appeal bears an especially heavy burden of proof: “‘[I]f the record on appeal sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged[,] . . . unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or unless there simply could be no satisfactory explanation,’ the claim on appeal must be rejected. [Citations.]” (People v. Wilson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 926, 936, quoting People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412, 426; see also People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 267.)

Furthermore, “If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice . . . that course should be followed.” (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 697.)

Here, as we have stated, the photographs and DVD were not so disturbing that they would have caused the jurors to be prejudiced against appellant. We conclude it is not reasonably probable appellant would have achieved a more favorable result absent the error alleged. (People v. Wilson, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 936.)

III. DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

We concur: Simons, J., Needham, J.


Summaries of

People v. Caoyonan

California Court of Appeals, First District, Fifth Division
Sep 30, 2008
No. A116892 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 30, 2008)
Case details for

People v. Caoyonan

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. LYNDON CAOYONAN, Defendant and…

Court:California Court of Appeals, First District, Fifth Division

Date published: Sep 30, 2008

Citations

No. A116892 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 30, 2008)