Opinion
Submitted September 28, 1999
November 8, 1999
Miguel A. Irizarry, New York, N.Y., for appellant.
Charles J. Hynes, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Roseann B. MacKechnie and Diane R. Eisner of counsel), for respondent.
SONDRA MILLER, J.P., THOMAS R. SULLIVAN, GABRIEL M. KRAUSMAN, HOWARD MILLER, JJ.
DECISION ORDER
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Marrero, J.), rendered April 11, 1997, convicting him of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree, criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree, and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant's contention that he was penalized for going to trial rather than accepting a plea agreement, is unpreserved for appellate review, having never been raised before the sentencing court (see, People v. Giordano, 87 N.Y.2d 441 ; People v. Hurley, 75 N.Y.2d 887 ). In any event, it is firmly established that a sentence imposed after trial may be more severe than that proposed in connection with a plea (see, People v. Clarke, 195 A.D.2d 569, 570-571; People v. Nelson, 179 A.D.2d 784, 786 ). Here, the sentencing minutes indicate that the court relied upon the appropriate factors in sentencing the defendant to a higher sentence than that which was offered during plea negotiations (see, People v. Diaz, 190 A.D.2d 685, 687 ).
The sentence imposed was not excessive (see, People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80 ).
S. MILLER, J.P., SULLIVAN, KRAUSMAN, and H. MILLER, JJ., concur.