Opinion
July 19, 1993
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Queens County (Colia, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant's conviction arose out of a series of observations by an undercover officer who sat at an observation post with binoculars, watched a series of transactions at a targeted location, and radioed his findings to a field team. Within the time span of 20 minutes the officer observed the defendant receive currency from about four or five passersby and hand this currency to the codefendant Louie Ranking. On the last sale, with which the defendant was charged, the officer observed Ranking enter a nearby bodega, retrieve several vials from a bag located on the store's shelf, and hand those vials to the codefendant Gregory Moore who in turn handed them to a customer. This last customer was pursued and apprehended, and three vials of crack cocaine were recovered.
The defendant has failed to preserve for appellate review his contention that the evidence adduced at the trial was legally insufficient to establish that he possessed the mental culpability necessary to commit the crime charged, and that, in furtherance thereof, he solicited, requested, commanded, importuned or intentionally aided the principal (see, People v Logan, 74 N.Y.2d 859; People v. Bynum, 70 N.Y.2d 858). In any event, the evidence adduced at trial, when viewed in the light most favorable to the People (see, People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620), was legally sufficient to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant's actions in receiving money from the customers and passing it to a codefendant established the defendant's intent to aid the principal in the commission of the drug sale (see, Penal Law § 20.00; People v. Kaplan, 76 N.Y.2d 140, 146-147; People v. Ward, 191 A.D.2d 661; People v. Wylie, 180 A.D.2d 774; People v. Baker, 176 A.D.2d 153). Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence (see, CPL 470.15).
The defendant's contention that the sentence imposed by the court impermissibly penalized him for exercising his right to go to trial is unsupported by the record (see, People v. Pena, 50 N.Y.2d 400, cert denied 449 U.S. 1087; People v. Nelson, 179 A.D.2d 784). While the challenged sentence is greater than that offered to the defendant in return for a plea of guilty to a lesser offense, it is firmly established that sentences imposed after trial may be more severe than those proposed in connection with a plea bargain (see, People v. Nelson, supra; People v Norfleet, 146 A.D.2d 812, 813). Moreover, we conclude that the sentence imposed upon the defendant was not excessive (see, People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80).
The defendant's remaining contentions are either unpreserved for appellate review or without merit. Sullivan, J.P., Eiber, Pizzuto and Joy, JJ., concur.