Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, No. 06NF3430, David A. Hoffer, Judge.
Valerie G. Wass, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Melissa Mandel and James D. Dutton, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
ARONSON, J.
A jury convicted Lenin Jimenez Campos of second degree vehicle burglary (Pen. Code, §§ 459; 460, subd. (b); all statutory references are to this code, unless otherwise noted), receiving stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a)), and misdemeanor driving without a license (Veh. Code, § 12500.) Defendant contends the trial court erred in admitting statements in violation of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda) and abused its discretion by denying his mistrial motion after a prosecution witness disclosed defendant had been fired from his job for drug use. He also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the vehicle burglary conviction. We affirm.
I
Facts And Procedural Background
On September 29, 2006, around 2:40 a.m., Jose Miranda, a dishwasher at an Anaheim catering company, saw defendant and an accomplice in the company’s parking lot removing tires and stereo equipment from Rosario Santacruz’s Honda Civic. They placed the items in another Honda parked nearby. Miranda recognized defendant, a former employee of the catering company, and had seen him working on defendant’s uncle’s car in the parking lot earlier in the day. When police officers stopped defendant about six hours later, the Honda Accord he drove bore Santacruz’s license plates. Officers found Santacruz’s stereo equipment and some tools on the back seat and four tires in the trunk. Defendant told an officer he was a mechanic working on the Accord, and the items came from that car. He claimed his passenger, Delgado, owned the car, although officers observed a punched ignition in the car and Delgado was not the registered owner. Defendant had not been issued a driver’s license.
The jury convicted defendant as charged and the trial court found he had violated probation in three prior cases. The court imposed a two-year midterm sentence for vehicle burglary and stayed (§ 654) or suspended sentence on the other current counts.
II
Discussion
A. Investigating Officers Did Not Violate Defendant’s Miranda Rights
Defendant contends the trial court should have suppressed his statements to Officer Erin Moore pursuant to Miranda. The court correctly denied defendant’s motion because defendant was not in custody at the time Moore questioned him.
Officer Moore stopped defendant’s car because of the stolen license plates and asked defendant for his driver’s license, registration and insurance, which defendant could not produce. She also asked where he was going, who owned the vehicle, what he was doing in the area, and whether he had anything illegal in his possession. A second officer arrived a few minutes after the stop and two more showed up a short time later. Officer Moore asked defendant if she could search him, and defendant consented. She asked him to step out of his car, directed him to the rear of his vehicle, and conducted a pat search. She noticed the stereo, amplifier, and speakers on the backseat and asked about the items. Defendant said he was working on the car and the items came from the vehicle. The officers learned from a dispatcher defendant was on probation and a warrant had issued for his arrest. The entire detention lasted about 20-30 minutes and the officers learned about the arrest warrant about 15 minutes into the stop. After Moore handcuffed and placed defendant in the back of her car, defendant spontaneously stated his passenger was the owner of the vehicle. Moore told him to wait and they would discuss it when they arrived at the police station.
Defendant argues Miranda warnings were required after he exited his vehicle at Moore’s request because a reasonable person in his position would not have believed he was free to terminate the investigation and leave, and because “he was actually not free to leave the scene.” He misapprehends the nature of the inquiry.
As we explained in People v. Pilster (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1395, 1403, footnote 1, original italics, the issue “‘is not whether a reasonable person would believe he was not free to leave, but rather whether such a person would believe he was in police custody of the degree associated with formal arrest.’” Miranda warnings are required “‘as soon as a suspect’s freedom of action is curtailed to a “degree associated with a formal arrest.”’ [Citation.] This determination presents a mixed question of law and fact. [Citation.] We apply a deferential substantial evidence standard to the trial court’s factual findings, but independently determine whether the interrogation was custodial. [Citation.]” (Pilster, at p. 1403.)
“Custody determinations are resolved by an objective standard: Would a reasonable person interpret the restraints used by the police as tantamount to a formal arrest? [Citations.] [Fn. omitted.] The totality of the circumstances surrounding an incident must be considered as a whole. [Citation.] Although no one factor is controlling, the following circumstances should be considered: ‘(1) [W]hether the suspect has been formally arrested; (2) absent formal arrest, the length of the detention; (3) the location; (4) the ratio of officers to suspects; and (5) the demeanor of the officer, including the nature of questioning.’ [Citation.] Additional factors are whether the suspect agreed to the interview and was informed he or she could terminate the questioning, whether police informed the person he or she was considered a witness or suspect, whether there were restrictions on the suspect’s freedom of movement during the interview, and whether police officers dominated and controlled the interrogation or were ‘aggressive, confrontational, and/or accusatory,’ whether they pressured the suspect, and whether the suspect was arrested at the conclusion of the interview. [Citation.]” (Pilster, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1403-1404.)
Here, defendant had not been formally arrested at the time of the questions. Moore spoke to defendant in and near his car during a traffic stop. This is a significant difference from interrogation at the police station, “which frequently is prolonged, and in which the detainee often is aware that questioning will continue until he provides his interrogators the answers they seek.” (Berkemer v. McCarty (1984) 468 U.S. 420, 438.) Moore was apparently the only officer interviewing defendant. Significantly, she did not handcuff defendant, which is “a distinguishing feature of a formal arrest.” (Pilster, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 1405.) As for the length of the detention, “Miranda warnings are not required during the course of a brief detention unless the suspect is placed under restraints normally associated with a formal arrest. When this occurs, Miranda warnings are required because the suspect understands the detention is not likely to be ‘temporary and brief’ and therefore is ‘completely at the mercy of the police.’” (Id. at p. 1404.) The detention here lasted a total of 20-30 minutes. Although defendant’s detention was not brief, his admissions were obtained at the outset of the investigation, and there is no evidence the investigating officer told defendant about the arrest warrant before she asked him about the property in the car. Under all the circumstances, we find a reasonable person in defendant’s position would not have believed he was in police custody of the degree associated with formal arrest at the time Moore posed her questions.
Defendant’s volunteered statement the car belonged to Delgado was not the product of custodial interrogation.
B. The Trial Court Did not Abuse Its Discretion by Denying Defendant’s Mistrial Motion
The prosecutor on direct examination asked Miranda how he knew defendant. Miranda replied “from [the catering company], but [defendant] was fired for using drugs.” The court sustained defense counsel’s objection and struck the reference to defendant’s drug use. The court advised the jury to “disregard any speculation by th[e] witness as to why the defendant was fired.” Outside the presence of the jury, defendant’s lawyer moved for a mistrial. The prosecutor, noting the reference to drug use had not appeared in the police report, argued the witness’s comment did not warrant a mistrial because the court cured any potential prejudice with its admonishment to the jury to disregard the comment. The court denied the motion.
The court also excluded (Evid. Code, § 352) evidence of a methamphetamine pipe found in defendant’s car.
Defendant contends the trial court erred when it denied defendant’s mistrial motion, arguing the jury used the information as evidence of defendant’s bad character and that he committed the charged crimes to support his drug habit. We do not find the contention persuasive.
The court should grant a mistrial motion only when the moving party’s chances of receiving a fair trial have been irreparably damaged. (People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 283-284.) Determining whether a particular incident is incurably prejudicial is by its nature a speculative endeavor, and the trial court is vested with considerable discretion in deciding this issue. (People v. Cox (2003) 30 Cal.4th 916, 953.) We review a trial court’s ruling on whether to grant a mistrial under the differential abuse of discretion standard. (Ibid.)
Absent evidence to the contrary, we presume jurors follow the trial court’s admonitions and instructions. (People v. Houston (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 279, 312). As one court observed: “Juries often hear unsolicited and inadmissible comments and in order for trials to proceed without constant mistrial, it is axiomatic the prejudicial effect of these comments may be corrected by judicial admonishment; absent evidence to the contrary the error is deemed cured.” (People v. Martin (1983) 150 Cal.App.3d 148, 163.)
The court’s admonition characterized Miranda’s testimony as speculation, and directed the jurors to disregard it. Defendant cites nothing in the record indicating the jurors did not follow the court’s curative instructions, and we do not see any reason why the jurors would fail to heed the court’s admonition. Indeed, no evidence suggested Miranda, employed as a dishwasher at the catering firm, would have been privy to the reasons why defendant no longer worked there. Thus, there is no basis to conclude the trial court acted arbitrarily or capriciously when it concluded the witness’s brief reference did not prevent defendant from receiving a fair trial. We therefore conclude the court did not abuse its discretion when it denied defendant’s mistrial motion.
C. Sufficient Evidence Supports the Vehicle Burglary Conviction
Defendant argues his conviction for vehicle burglary must be reversed because there was insufficient evidence he entered a locked vehicle. We disagree.
Substantial evidence is evidence of legal significance, reasonable in nature, credible and of solid value. (People v. Samuel (1981) 29 Cal.3d 489, 505.) The court reviews the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment below and presumes in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence. If the evidence permits a reasonable trier of fact to conclude the charged crime was committed, the opinion of a reviewing court that the circumstances may also be reconciled with a contrary finding will not warrant reversal. (See Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 318-319.)
Section 459 provides that “[a]ny person who enters any . . . vehicle . . . when the doors are locked . . . with intent to commit . . . larceny” is guilty of second degree burglary. Defendant concedes Santacruz testified she had locked the doors to her car, but he complains she was not asked whether she recalled locking them, and the fact she failed to close one of the windows suggests she may have forgotten to lock one or more of the doors. He also notes she left her car keys with her nephew, but the prosecution’s failure to call the nephew as a witness meant there was no evidence whether he entered or moved the vehicle or closed the window between the time she left the car and the time Miranda spotted defendant removing the tires from the car. Defendant also notes Miranda did not testify whether he saw an open window, and there was no evidence of a forced entry.
Defendant’s attack on the evidence is based on speculation and fails to undermine the substantial evidence presented at trial. Santacruz testified the doors were locked when she left her car. Santacruz believed she may have left a window slightly open based on her son’s recollection. But photographs of the car taken by the police after the theft showed the windows were rolled up. The evidence establishes no one other than defendant and his companion were in or around the car after Santacruz left it.
Defendant’s reliance on People v. Woods (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 226 is misplaced. In Woods, the defendant stole a coin purse and camera from the passenger seat of a police decoy vehicle by reaching through a window the officer had left open about five inches. The court held that under section 459 “the entire vehicle [must] be secured insofar as possible” and that where “the entry occurs through a window deliberately left open” there must be “some evidence of forced entry before the prosecution’s burden of proof is satisfied.” (Id. at p. 230.) Unlike Woods, there is no evidence defendant or his accomplice’s entry into Santacruz’s car occurred through an open window.
Defendant also argues the evidence did not establish defendant entered or aided and abetted entry of Santacruz’s car. Miranda testified the driver side door of Santacruz’s Civic was open and defendant’s companion closed the door. He also observed defendant remove property from Santacruz’s car and place it into defendant’s car, including the stereo equipment. Since the stereo equipment was inside Santacruz’s car when she left it, and in defendant’s car when he was stopped by the police, the jury could reasonably infer defendant or his companion entered Santacruz’s car and stole the equipment. Sufficient evidence supports the conviction for vehicle burglary.
II
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: RYLAARSDAM, ACTING P. J., FYBEL, J.