Opinion
05-17-2017
The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Victoria CALDWELL, appellant.
Laurette D. Mulry, Riverhead, NY (Felice B. Milani of counsel), for appellant. Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, New York, NY (Nikki Kowalski and Matthew B. Keller of counsel), for respondent.
Laurette D. Mulry, Riverhead, NY (Felice B. Milani of counsel), for appellant.
Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, New York, NY (Nikki Kowalski and Matthew B. Keller of counsel), for respondent.
RUTH C. BALKIN, J.P., JEFFREY A. COHEN, ROBERT J. MILLER, and VALERIE BRATHWAITE NELSON, JJ.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Collins, J.), rendered October 28, 2015, convicting her of falsifying business records in the first degree
(four counts) and wilful violation of the Public Health Law, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 621, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932 ), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt of falsifying business records in the first degree (four counts) and wilful violation of the Public Health Law beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15[5] ; People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 ), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v. Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d 383, 779 N.Y.S.2d 399, 811 N.E.2d 1053 ; People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 ). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902 ).
The defendant's contention that a severance of the trial from all of the codefendants was warranted on her behalf is without merit. Severance motions are addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court (see People v. Mahboubian, 74 N.Y.2d 174, 183, 544 N.Y.S.2d 769, 543 N.E.2d 34 ). "Severance is compelled only where the core of each defense is in irreconcilable conflict with the other and where there is a significant danger that the conflict alone would lead the jury to infer a defendant's guilt" (People v. Martins, 306 A.D.2d 423, 423, 760 N.Y.S.2d 874 ). Here, initially, the Supreme Court granted the defendant's motion for a severance with respect to several of the codefendants. As to the remaining codefendants, the core of each their defenses was not in irreconcilable conflict with that of the defendant (see People v. Turnbull, 52 A.D.3d 747, 860 N.Y.S.2d 189 ; cf. People v. Mahboubian, 74 N.Y.2d at 184, 544 N.Y.S.2d 769, 543 N.E.2d 34 ). As the proof against the defendant was supplied by the same evidence, only the most cogent reasons would warrant a severance (see People v. Bornholdt, 33 N.Y.2d 75, 87, 350 N.Y.S.2d 369, 305 N.E.2d 461 ). The defendant failed to provide any such cogent reason to warrant full severance.
The defendant's contention that her Sixth Amendment right to confrontation under Bruton v. United States , 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 was violated by the admission into evidence of statements made by a nontestifying codefendant to a prosecution witness is partially unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05[2] ; People v. Jenkins, 93 A.D.3d 861, 940 N.Y.S.2d 874 ; People v. Rodriguez, 210 A.D.2d 266, 620 N.Y.S.2d 68 ; People v. Halstead, 180 A.D.2d 818, 580 N.Y.S.2d 413 ). In any event, the contention is without merit. Bruton does not apply, and no violation of the Confrontation Clause exists, when the challenged statements are not incriminating on their face, but only become so when linked with other evidence introduced at trial (see People v. Johnson, 27 N.Y.3d 60, 29 N.Y.S.3d 851, 49 N.E.3d 1143 ). Here, the challenged statements did not directly implicate the defendant (see People v. Gilocompo, 125 A.D.3d 1000, 4 N.Y.S.3d 288 ), and, hence, were not "facially incriminating" statements (Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 207, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 ).
The sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80, 455 N.Y.S.2d 675 ).