Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Nos. INF062652, INF062734, Jeffrey L. Gunther, Judge. (Retired judge of the Sacramento Super. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.)
Michael Satris, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Michael Murphy and Emily R. Hanks, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
RICHLI J.
Defendant and appellant Anthony John Bujan pled guilty to two counts of burglary (Pen. Code, § 459; counts 1 & 5); seven counts of receiving stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a); counts 2-4, 6-9); one count of transporting methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a); count 10); and one count of possessing methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a); count 11). Defendant was sentenced to a total term of six years four months in state prison. Defendant’s sole contention on appeal is that the trial court erred in denying his suppression motion (Pen. Code, § 1538.5). We reject this contention and affirm the judgment.
I
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Because the sole issue on appeal pertains to the denial of the suppression motion, the factual background is taken from the suppression hearing.
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Deputy Adonis Glasper of the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department special enforcement team specializing in burglary and robbery apprehension testified that he was on duty on July 15, 2008, when, about 8:15 p.m., he heard a call in reference to a suspicious vehicle that was parked inside a PGA West gated community in La Quinta. Deputy Glasper heard the description of the vehicle (a green Lexus sedan) and immediately recognized it as a vehicle from an ongoing investigation he had been conducting. Approximately one month before, on June 7, 2008, Deputy Glasper had received a suspicious-vehicle call in the same gated community. Upon his arrival, he had noticed an unauthorized green Lexus parked in the gated community and wrote down the vehicle’s license plate number. Subsequently, there was a residential burglary report where the green Lexus had been parked. Deputy Glasper determined the registered owner of the vehicle was defendant, and he had a driver’s license picture of defendant. There had been reports of about 24 burglaries committed in the PGA West community.
Upon his arrival on July 15, 2008, Deputy Glasper was informed that a green Lexus had entered the gated community without permission again. Deputy Glasper was accompanied by Deputy Jason Chancellor. When the deputies arrived at the location where the vehicle was parked, Deputy Glasper approached the vehicle and discovered that it was unoccupied. He then proceeded to the residence in front of which the vehicle was parked and knocked on the front door. Meanwhile, Deputy Chancellor searched the immediate area and found defendant near a public pool area. When Deputy Chancellor first saw defendant, he had shined a light on defendant and asked if he could speak with him. Defendant replied, “About what[?]” as he continued to walk away from the deputy. Defendant then took off running. Deputy Chancellor had reasonable suspicion that defendant had committed criminal activity, based on the police having received “10 to 12 residential burglaries within that area, with the previous vehicle, based on Deputy Glasper telling [him] that that vehicle was seen in another residential burglary....”
As Deputy Glasper was leaving the residence after receiving no response to his knock, he heard Deputy Chancellor yelling from the rear of the property. Deputy Glasper saw defendant running toward him and immediately recognized defendant from his driver’s license picture. Deputy Glasper ordered defendant to stop; however, defendant changed direction and continued to run. Deputy Glasper pursued defendant and found him hiding behind some bushes, wearing gloves. Based on his training and experience, Deputy Glasper noted that burglars used gloves to hide fingerprints. Glove imprints were discovered on a glass sliding door of the residence burglarized on June 7. Based on the burglary reports in the PGA West community, glove prints located in the burglaries, and the fact defendant was wearing gloves, Deputy Glasper suspected that defendant was committing the burglaries.
Deputy Glasper detained defendant and then arrested him on two active outstanding warrants and for trespassing. Deputy Glasper then searched defendant’s person to make sure he did not have any drugs and/or weapons in his possession. In defendant’s pockets, Deputy Glasper located a glass pipe, BMW keys, and a pair of pliers that are commonly used as burglary tools.
After confirming the green Lexus belonged to defendant, Deputy Glasper had the vehicle towed incident to an arrest and because the vehicle was not supposed to be in the gated community. It was standard procedure to tow an unauthorized vehicle found on private property. During an inventory search of the vehicle pursuant to standard procedure, Deputy Glasper found stolen items, access key cards to the community, methamphetamine, and a stolen cellular telephone. The cellular telephone was found underneath the center console, referred to as a “false compartment” by Deputy Glasper. Deputy Glasper noted that it is police department policy to also search these areas during an inventory search. He further explained that he knew before looking in this compartment that something was stored inside it, because an object was protruding from the compartment. He did not have to manipulate the area to get it open.
Subsequently, Deputy Glasper executed search warrants on three residences linked to defendant. Stolen items belonging to PGA West residents were seized from these locations. Defendant testified that many of the items seized during the searches of his car and residences belonged to him and that none of those items were returned to him.
Following argument from the parties, the trial court denied defendant’s suppression motion. The court found that defendant’s detention and arrest were lawful. The court further found that the searches of defendant’s person and car were lawful.
II
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his suppression motion because the deputies did not have reasonable suspicion to detain him and the search of the vehicle was unlawful. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
The standard an appellate court employs in its review of a denial of a motion to suppress evidence is well settled. In evaluating a challenge to the trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we defer to its factual findings, whether express or implied, if they are supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Sardinas (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 488, 493.) We then exercise our independent judgment to decide what legal principles are relevant, independently apply them to the facts, and determine as a matter of law whether there has been an unreasonable search and/or seizure. (People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 362.)
B. Reasonable Suspicion to Detain
Not every encounter between the police and a citizen is protected by the Fourth Amendment. (In re Christopher B. (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 455, 460.) Police contacts with individuals fall into three broad categories: (1) consensual encounters; (2) detentions; and (3) formal arrests. (In re Manuel G. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 805, 821.) A consensual encounter does not trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny, but a detention requires an “articulable suspicion that the person has committed or is about to commit a crime.” (Ibid.)
A consensual encounter “may properly be initiated by police officers even if they lack any ‘objective justification.’” (People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 327.) Hence, a detention does not occur when a police officer merely approaches a person on the street, or here, in a public area of a residential community, and to ask a few questions. (In re Manuel G., supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 821.) In determining whether an encounter is consensual, a court considers all the circumstances to determine whether a reasonable person would have felt free to decline the police officer’s request to talk or to otherwise terminate the encounter. (Ibid.) We must make a realistic assessment of defendant’s encounter with the police based upon the totality of the specific facts presented to us. (People v. Bouser (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1280, 1287.) “What constitutes a restraint on liberty such that a person would conclude that he is not free to leave varies with the particular police conduct at issue and the setting in which the conduct occurs.” (People v. Ross (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 879, 884.)
Circumstances that might indicate a detention are “the presence of several officers, an officer’s display of a weapon, some physical touching of the person, or the use of language or of a tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer’s request might be compelled.” (In re Manuel G., supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 821.) However, neither the officer’s uncommunicated state of mind nor the individual’s subjective belief are relevant in determining whether a detention has occurred. (Ibid.)
Initially, here, we find Deputy Chancellor’s attempt to speak with defendant upon discovering him in a public pool area was a consensual encounter. Defendant at that point in time was never physically impeded in his movement. In fact, he continued to walk away from the deputy. The encounter, however, became a detention once Deputy Glasper ordered defendant out from behind the bushes. The deputies nonetheless had reasonable suspicion to detain defendant under the totality of circumstances. A police officer may temporarily detain a suspect “based only on a ‘reasonable suspicion’ that the suspect has committed or is about to commit a crime.” (People v. Bennett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 373, 387.) “A detention is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when the detaining officer can point to specific articulable facts that, considered in light of the totality of the circumstances, provide some objective manifestation that the person detained may be involved in criminal activity.” (People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 231.) An officer may use certain commonsense conclusions about human behavior to establish a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. (U.S. v. Cortez (1981) 449 U.S. 411, 417 [101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d ].) “[F]light from police is a proper consideration and indeed can be a key factor in determining whether in a particular case the police have sufficient cause to detain.” (Souza, at p. 235, italics added.)
The detention here was more than reasonable. The deputies responded to a call in reference to a suspicious green Lexus that was parked inside a gated community. Deputy Glasper immediately recognized the vehicle from an ongoing burglary investigation he had been conducting in that same gated community. The deputies were aware that defendant was the registered owner of the vehicle. They were also cognizant of defendant’s description based on his driver’s license picture. Additionally, Deputy Glasper was aware that there had been reports of about 24 burglaries committed in the community. Upon their arrival in the community, the deputies were informed by security at the PGA West community that a green Lexus had entered the gated community without permission again. Defendant was found near the immediate area where the green Lexus was parked. Hence, the deputies had reason to believe defendant was trespassing.
In addition, when Deputy Chancellor attempted to speak with defendant, defendant took off running. Defendant also fled when Deputy Glasper ordered him to stop. As noted above, unprovoked flight upon noticing a police officer may support a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. (Illinois v. Wardlaw (2000) 528 U.S. 119, 124 [120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570].) Deputy Glasper pursued defendant and found him hiding behind bushes, wearing gloves, which are often utilized to commit burglaries to hide fingerprints. Deputy Glasper was also aware that glove imprints were discovered on a glass sliding door of a prior residential burglary in the community. Furthermore, Deputy Glasper was aware that defendant had two outstanding active warrants for his arrest. Based on the foregoing, the deputies reasonably believed defendant was committing the burglaries in the PGA West community or that criminal activity was afoot. The deputies here had more than a hunch to detain defendant.
C. Inventory Search of Vehicle
Defendant argues that the trial court erroneously found the search of the vehicle was proper pursuant to an inventory search, because the People failed to prove Deputy Glasper was following “a standardized criteria or an established routine in searching the false compartment below the center console of [defendant]’s car.” Defendant makes much ado about nothing in regard to this area.
As the court in People v. Needham (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 260 observed, “[i]nventory searches must be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. [Citation.] The police may exercise discretion in opening containers during inventory searches provided that discretion is exercised according to ‘standardized criteria’ [citation] or ‘established routine’ [citation] based on some standard other than suspected criminal activity. [Citation.] ‘A police officer may be allowed sufficient latitude to determine whether a particular container should or should not be opened in light of the nature of the search and characteristics of the container itself.’ [ Citation.] For instance, an inventory policy permitting police officers to open closed containers when unable to ascertain the contents from examining the container’s exterior would not violate the Fourth Amendment. [Citation.] [¶] “The standardized procedure or established routine authorizing the inventory search need not be written. [Citation.] However, ‘an inventory search must not be a ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 266.)
In the present matter, Deputy Glasper testified that it was Riverside County Sheriff’s Department’s standard procedure to tow a vehicle found on private property without permission when the driver is arrested and that the inventory search was conducted in accordance with standard procedures. The deputy’s testimony alone is ample evidence of the existence of a standardized policy, and that the policy was followed in this case. (See, e.g., People v. Green (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 367, 375 [even though officer did not use “the magic words ‘standard procedure, ’ her matter-of-fact response” indicated postimpound inventory searches were standard department procedure]; People v. Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, 127 [if search procedure is routine or standardized, policy need not be written]; People v. Needham, supra, 79 Cal.App.4th 260, 266-267 [no written police required].) The inventory search of the car and its contents was properly governed by standardized criteria or established routine.
“The policies behind the warrant requirement are not implicated in an inventory search, [citation] nor is the related concept of probable cause[.]” (Colorado v. Bertine (1987) 479 U.S. 367, 371 [107 S.Ct. 738, 93 L.Ed.2d 739].) The impoundment of a vehicle and subsequent inventory search are part of the caretaking procedures of the police. (Id. at p. 372.) “[P]olice have a legitimate interest in taking an inventory of the contents of a vehicle... before towing it. This inventory serves ‘to protect an owner’s property while it is in the custody of the police, to insure against claims of lost, stolen, or vandalized property, and to guard the police from danger.’ [Citation.]... ‘[I]nventory searches are now a well-defined exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.’ [Citation.]... [P]olice must ‘follow[] standardized procedures.’ [Citations.] ‘[R]easonable police regulations relating to inventory procedures administered in good faith satisfy the Fourth Amendment.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Williams, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 126.) We therefore agree with the trial court; the deputy had the legal authority to conduct an inventory search.
In sum, the trial court properly denied defendant’s suppression motion.
III
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: McKINSTER Acting P.J., MILLER J.