Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. 07F00479
ROBIE, J.
Defendant Bruce Brown pled no contest to unlawful possession of a controlled substance. On appeal, he challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress, contending the trial court erred when it admitted evidence discovered by police officers after they seized him without a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. We disagree and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In January 2007, about 11:38 p.m. on a Saturday night in the City of Sacramento, Police Officer Raul Becerra and his partner initiated a traffic stop of a gray Toyota Camry. The officers -- in full uniform, driving a marked patrol car -- activated their overhead lights and siren as they passed through Franklin Boulevard following the Camry eastbound on 47th Street. The officers suspected false registration tags.
The Camry continued to drive at a normal speed down 47th Street, passing numerous well-lit areas suitable for pulling over. Officer Becerra noticed a person in the driver’s seat and a person in the front passenger’s seat of the four-door Camry. The persons in the Camry moved continuously. Officer Becerra thought “something was going on” in the car because he could see them turning to each other, talking, and gesturing with their hands. The Camry continued for a block and one-half before it turned southbound on Martin Luther King Jr. Boulevard and pulled into an open gas station on the corner. The area where the traffic stop occurred is known for gang activity, prostitution, and narcotics trafficking.
The driver and passenger opened their doors and started to get out as the Camry slowed to a stop. Officer Becerra pulled into the gas station, stopped his patrol car, stepped out, and ordered them to stay in the car. The driver stayed in the car. The passenger -- defendant -- swung his door open, looked back at the officers, and dashed behind the gas station. At about the same time, Officer John Pullen arrived at the scene alone in his patrol car. Initially, Officer Becerra and his partner stayed at the gas station while Pullen followed defendant in his patrol car.
Defendant ran around the south side of the gas station and turned north onto Martin Luther King Jr. Boulevard. Officer Becerra followed defendant on foot once defendant emerged on the other side of the gas station. Officer Becerra yelled “stop” several times during the chase. Defendant crossed 47th Street, continued up Martin Luther King Jr. Boulevard, and turned west on 46th Street. About 300 yards from the gas station, defendant dropped to the ground in the front yard of a 46th Street residence. Officer Pullen reached defendant first and Officer Becerra arrived a few seconds later. The officers handcuffed defendant, walked him back to the street, conducted a patdown search, and put him in the back of Officer Pullen’s patrol car. Officer Becerra arrested defendant upon discovering he was a parolee at large.
The officers drove Pullen’s patrol car back to the gas station and noticed defendant “laying down and shuffling, [and] kicking his feet” in the backseat. The officers transferred defendant into Officer Becerra’s patrol car. Where defendant had been sitting in the back of Officer Pullen’s patrol car, Officer Pullen found “two wrapped up pieces of paper” containing cocaine and a large glass pipe.
The People charged defendant with possession of cocaine and possession of drug smoking paraphernalia. Defendant moved to suppress all evidence resulting from his detention. The parties stipulated that defendant was not seized at the time of the traffic stop. The trial court reasoned that the location (“in an area that does have significant crime activity,”) the time of day (“at midnight,”) the delay in the Camry’s stopping, the movement inside the Camry, and the flight at full speed from the traffic stop supported a reasonable suspicion defendant was involved in criminal activity. The trial court consequently denied defendant’s motion to suppress. Defendant pled no contest to possession of cocaine and was sentenced to two years in state prison.
DISCUSSION
I
Standard Of Review
“In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we view the record in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling and defer to its findings of historical fact, whether express or implied, if they are supported by substantial evidence. We then decide for ourselves what legal principles are relevant, independently apply them to the historical facts, and determine as a matter of law whether there has been an unreasonable search and/or seizure.” (People v. Miranda (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 917, 922.)
II
Officers Becerra And Pullen Lawfully Seized Defendant After He Ran Away Based On A Reasonable Suspicion Defendant Was Involved In Criminal Activity
Defendant contends he was unlawfully seized because Officers Becerra and Pullen lacked a reasonable suspicion he was involved in criminal activity. The People disagree and also raise two other arguments related to the traffic stop. First, the People contend Officer Becerra was entitled to order defendant back into the Camry without “articulable justification” because an officer may order a passenger to stay in a car as a matter of course during a traffic stop. Second, the People contend that when defendant was detained at the time of the traffic stop, his subsequent flight was a crime that justified the seizure when he was caught.
We agree with defendant that both of the People’s additional arguments depend on the validity of the initial traffic stop. To consider these arguments at this time would run counter to the parties’ stipulation that defendant was not detained at the time of the initial traffic stop, because the trial court noted that the stipulation had the effect of rendering the validity of the traffic stop irrelevant. The People cannot now make arguments that depend on the validity of the traffic stop because the parties agreed not to litigate the issue.
Accordingly, we turn to the question of whether the officers had a reasonable suspicion that defendant was engaged in criminal activity when he was seized. Defendant argues that “this is a ‘flight only’ case” because “no objective inference of criminal activity may reasonably be inferred” from the facts available to Officer Becerra other than defendant’s flight. We disagree.
“A detention is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when the detaining officer can point to specific articulable facts that, considered in light of the totality of the circumstances, provide some objective manifestation that the person detained may be involved in criminal activity.” (People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 231.) “[C]ourts . . . consider ‘the totality of the circumstances--the whole picture’ to determine whether a particular intrusion by police was justified. Any temporary detention includes factors that, considered together, may suggest either criminal or innocent behavior to trained police officers. No single fact--for instance, flight from approaching police--can be indicative in all detention cases of involvement in criminal conduct. Time, locality, lighting conditions, and an area’s reputation for criminal activity all give meaning to a particular act of flight, and may or may not suggest to a trained officer that the fleeing person is involved in criminal activity.” (Id. at p. 239.)
“[F]light from police is a proper consideration--and indeed can be a key factor--in determining whether in a particular case the police have sufficient cause to detain.” (People v. Souza, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 235, italics added.) Even if we were to agree with defendant that “no objective inference of criminal activity may reasonably be inferred” from the facts other than defendant’s flight from the traffic stop, our conclusion that defendant’s flight was the key factor in a determination of reasonable suspicion of criminal activity is still based on the totality of the circumstances -- “the whole picture.” (Souza, at pp. 231, 239.)
Defendant argues there are myriad potential innocent explanations for the delay in the traffic stop, the “continuous movement” Officer Becerra saw inside the Camry as it drove down 47th Street, and defendant’s presence in a high-crime area. However, “‘[t]he possibility of an innocent explanation does not deprive the officer of the capacity to entertain a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct.’” (People v. Foranyic (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 186, 189; Illinois v. Wardlow (2000) 528 U.S. 119, 125 [145 L.Ed.2d 570, 577] [reasoning that conduct “ambiguous and susceptible to innocent explanation” could nevertheless support a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity justifying detention by officers “to resolve the ambiguity”].)
While we may agree with defendant that the time of the traffic stop between 11:30 p.m. and midnight on a Saturday night adds little, if anything, to the reasonable suspicion calculus, we nevertheless conclude the officers still had ample basis for detaining defendant. Failing to follow a police order may be a factor in the calculus of reasonable suspicion. (See In re Frank V. (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1232, 1241.) Here, defendant ran away from the traffic stop at full speed after Officer Becerra ordered him to stay in the Camry. Officer Becerra knew the area where the traffic stop occurred was a high-crime area. It was reasonable for Officer Becerra to think “something [suspicious] was going on” when the Camry passed multiple safe places to pull over while the driver and passenger gestured and interacted with each other. The manner of defendant’s flight -- during a traffic stop, while the car was still slowing down -- was “so unusual, so far removed from everyday experience that it crie[d] out for investigation.” (People v. Foranyic, supra, 64 Cal.App.4th at p. 190.) The totality of the circumstances supported a reasonable suspicion defendant was engaged in criminal activity and the trial court therefore correctly denied defendant’s motion to suppress.
Defendant appears to assert that presence in a high-crime area is only relevant to a determination of reasonable suspicion when the person detained is engaged in activity suggestive of the type of crime for which the high-crime area is known. We see no reason for officers or courts to so confine this factor when considering the totality of the circumstances. (People v. Souza, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 231.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: MORRISON, Acting P.J. BUTZ, J.